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This dissertation deals with the evolution of manpower management in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918: recruiting, entry-level training and the 
provision of reinforcements from Canada to England and England to France. The central 
theme is the increasing professionalism in the Canadian Forces with the development of 
an efficient and comprehensive system of recruiting, training and reinforcing units at the 
'front.-
This work argues that from first to last, the government did not appreciate the 
need to husband manpower although the Canadian Forces made continual efforts to 
manage the pool by altering recruiting criteria and seeking alternative sources for 
recruits.
Training was based on British army programs that were well-suited to conditions 
on the Western Front. However, training in Canada was largely a waste of time because 
of obsolete equipment and by the end of the war, depot units were responsible only for 
recruiting and forwarding men to the reserve units. Initially the reinforcement structure 
was based on British army policies but these did not accommodate the structure of the 
Canadian Forces. However, with the creation of the Ministry of the Overseas Military 
Forces of Canada, was rationalized and modified to suit Canada’s needs.
This dissertation relies on extensive primary sources in both Canada and Great 
Britain to conclude that by 1918, Canada had developed an efficient and comprehensive 
system for managing the national manpower pool. The dissertation also notes profound 
changes in both the state and society.
Key words: Canadian Expeditionary Force, manpower, training, reinforcements
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Manpower is the lifeblood of armies regardless of time or place. The importance 
of this resource has been emphasized by Charles Messenger, a British historian, who has 
concluded that “irrespective of what happened on the battlefield, the [British] army’s 
greatest struggle during 1914-1918 was obtaining and maintaining the necessary strength 
to meet increasing commitments.”1 As with the British army, much of Canada’s military 
effort in the First World War was engaged in the struggle to provide the trained soldiers 
necessary to sustain the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium - not just 
the Canadian Corps, but the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the legions of administrative 
units in the rear areas as well. However, the struggle to do this has been largely 
overlooked by Canadian historians, a surprising omission considering that, all things 
being equal, success on the battlefield ultimately depended on the supply of manpower.
This is an organizational study and is therefore impersonal..This is not to say that 
the experiences of individual soldiers are not important; clearly they were, and Canadian 
historians have devoted considerable effort to examining their hopes, fears and
\
experiences. But, military life as experienced by these soldiers was shaped not only by 
organizations created by the Canadian Forces throughout the war but also by personnel 
policies that dictated their terms of service. Understanding the experiences of the private 
soldier, therefore, demands some knowledge of the administrative and bureaucratic 
environment in which the soldier lived, worked and fought.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a wartime creation, but had its roots in the 
peacetime army, both the Permanent Force and the Active Militia. While the influence of 
peacetime army diminished as the war ground on, the attitudes, beliefs and outlooks at all
levels from Militia HQ to individual units were shaped in varying degrees by prewar 
customs and policies. Chapter 1 is therefore devoted to a discussion of the prewar 
Canadian military, the organization, recruiting and training. War is very much a ‘come as 
you are’ affair, and for that reason Chapter 1 also discusses not only the training state of 
the militia, but also the weapons and equipment on which the training was based.
! A recent study of Germany’s Panzer arm by Dennis Showalter discusses 
philosophical approaches to war and notes that military planners who view war as an 
exercise in management believe that “Military effectiveness depends on the rational 
mobilization and application of human and material resources.”2 God may be on the side 
of the big battalions, as Napoleon is said to have remarked, but the men for these 
battalions were drawn from the manpower pool of the nation and the extent to which they 
were available depended very much on the nation’s manpower policies. Chapter 2 is 
therefore devoted to a discussion of how Canada and the Canadian military managed 
manpower. The failure of the Borden Government to balance the competing interests of 
industry, agriculture and the military is considered as well as the inability of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force to husband its most important asset -  manpower.
Recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public 
demonstrations and recruiting sergeants equipped with white feathers on every street. 
comer, was a highly visible process that has been studied by a wide variety of historians. 
Their conclusions have varied, but in general, they have regarded recruiting, at least in 
1915-1916, as patriotic chaos with Militia and District HQ assigning quotas, but 
otherwise providing little in the way of direction or assistance.3 But, this overlooks the 
role of the military hierarchy in formulating and disseminating policy as well as
c
2
monitoring and coordinating recruiting efforts at all levels in the chain of command. 
District commanders, for example, enjoyed substantial powers and could be ruthless with 
unit commanders and others who did not toe the line. The obituary for,Major-General 
Logie o f Military District 2 in Toronto, an outstanding district commander, said in part: 
“Although stem with his officers and frowning upon battalion commanders who 
considered their appointments as social adornments, General Logie was ever considerate 
of the shortcomings of raw recruits.”4 In short, Logie must have been a holy terror to 
commanding officers who had difficulties meeting his expectations. Brigadier-General 
Cruikshank of Military District 13 in Alberta was equally impatient with commanding 
officers who crossed him. In July 1915, for example, he discovered that the 63rd Battalion 
was not recruiting in Calgary as directed. His letter to the offending commanding officer 
was couched in no uncertain terms: “This to say the least is very extraordinary and would 
indicate a desire to evade my instructions.”5Brigadier-General Hemming of Military 
District 3 in Eastern Ontario was even more direct and in January 1917 sent a blood­
curdling letter to the commanding officer of the 252nd Battalion and other units that had 
failed to meet their recruiting quotas. “It is pointed out,” Hemming wrote, “that the 
present progress of recruiting will take some four years to recruit to the required strength, 
and it is regretted that this length of time cannot be allowed. I wish to inform you 
personally that unless immediate improvement is made I shall recommend the removal of 
the majority of the Officers of the 252nd and replace them with others who will show 
some initiative and action.”6. With district commanders such as these, it is clear, 
notwithstanding the public manifestations of the recruiting effort, that the military, not
3
4
the community, controlled recruiting. Chapter 3 discusses the extent to which this control 
was exercised as well as the growth of the various recruiting organizations in Canada.
Chapter 4 examines recruiting criteria: the standards that had to be met by those 
who joined. Not surprisingly, these standards changed continually as the war went on. 
Height, age, vision and citizenship requirements were all revised while groups 
marginalized by society, including natives, Asians, Orientals and blacks, became 
increasingly welcome. Militia Headquarters was not a passive participant in this process 
of change but actively sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. Chapter 4 
concludes that recruiting criteria were dynamic, evolving to meet perceived needs, and 
were, by and large, firmly controlled by the military,
Chapter 5 discusses the application of recruiting criteria and its impact on the 
number of potential recruits in the national manpower pool. The need of key industries 
for manpower is reviewed and an estimate is made of the number of men that could 
reasonably be expected to be available for military service. Efforts to augment the 
manpower pool by enlisting criminals and recruiting outside of Canada are also v
discussed. Of particular interest is the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, an agency 
that established recruiting offices across the United States and enlisted more than 33,000 
men for the Canadian Expeditionary Force -  about 6% of all enlistments. Also considered 
is the use of women to replace able-bodied men for service at the front and the half­
hearted attempt in 1918 to create the Canadian Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps.
Chapter 6 concerns entry-level training. Critical issues dealt with include control 
-  directing the training,: setting the standards, and implementing administrative: 
procedures. Little is known of the subjects taught to the new recruits and for that reason
the chapter contains a detailed discussion of training programs and their evolution. The 
difficulties of training in Canada because of equipment shortages, administrative policies 
and obsolete weapons are examined at length, as are the effects of the inefficient training 
structure in England. These difficulties, at least in England, were finally resolved w hen: 
the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada was created in December 1916, 
although the effect was to create two armies, one in Canada and the other overseas. 
Coordinating these two armies was difficult since neither controlled the other and it was 
notuntil Militia Headquarters acquiesced to the Overseas Forces in December 1917 that 
some measure o f unity was achieved. : ^
Little has been written of the policies and procedures for providing
y
reinforcements from England to units at the front and Chapter 7, therefore, discusses this 
at length. Also considered in this chapter is the nature of the wastage which dictated the 
need for reinforcements: battle losses, sickness and postings to other units. Even when 
this wastage was promptly replaced, battalions were still short of men because of those 
on command, on course or left out of battle. All in all, the average battalion, even when 
fully manned, could put only two-thirds of its strength into the trenches, a manning 
shortfall that was of deep concern to the units at the front. ;:
Chapter 8 discusses the evolution of the reinforcement system in Canada from 
regional depots in 1914 to territorial depot battalions in 1918. This chapter argues that no 
long-lasting coherent reinforcement structure could be created because of manning 
decisions made by Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, and Sir Robert 
Borden, the Prime Minister. Arguably it was not until Hughes resigned that Militia 
Headquarters, after an ill-fated experiment with militia depot companies, was able to
create territorial depot battalions affiliated with reserve battalions in England, an . 
organization that stood up well under the unprecedented demands of the Hundred Days.
Chapter 9 argues that at the beginning of the war, the reinforcement system was 
based on prewar doctrine with training units in England and base depots in France along 
the Channel coast. These two components were neither well-organized nor coordinated, 
with the result that units were either starved of men or provided with reinforcements who 
only partially trained. By late 1917, however, the prewar, system had been largely 
discarded arid the reinforcement structures in England and France were well-organized 
and coordinated. Within the limitations imposed by external factors such as the irregular
flow of men from Canada, this system was able to provide sufficient numbers of well-
/
trained reinforcements in a timely manner. Moreover, part of this system, the Canadian 
Corps Reinforcement Camp, was largely designed by Canadians to suit Canadian . • 
requirements.
A number of Canadian historians have dealt with the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, but, with the exception of Desmond Morton, most have viewed Canadians in 
isolation without considering if the experiences of other dominions were similar.7: 
Canadian Forces overseas were treated as an integral part of the British army and were 
governed by British policies and instructions. To put developments in Canadian policies 
and organizations into context, therefore, parallel developments elsewhere in the British 
Expeditionary Force have been considered. In a few instances, developments in the 
Australian Imperial Force have also been considered since the Australians were governed 
by British instructions as well.
6
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. Some of what has been written about the Canadian Corps in particular not only 
views the Corps in isolation but relies on numbers and is tinged with patriotic 
chauvinism. Canadian historian Shane Schreiber, for example, has attributed much of the 
success of the Corps in 1918 to the fact that, unlike the British Expeditionary Force that 
reduced infantry divisions to nine battalions, Canadian divisions retained twelve infantry 
battalions each.8 This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The New Zealand Division also 
maintained twelve infantry battalions throughout the war.9 Moreover, these battalions ■ 
were maintained at full strength and the average monthly strength of the New Zealand 
Division during the Hundred Days was 11,496 infantrymen as compared to the average 
Canadian division with 10,027 infantrymen.10 But, it appears that the New Zealand
. . f  .
Division was not as effective during the Hundred Days as the Canadian Corps. It seems 
clear, therefore, that the size of the Canadian divisions was not the decisive factor that : 
made them superior to other divisions.
Peter Simkins, a British historian, has analyzed battles fought by British, 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand divisions during the Hundred Days and has 
concluded that the average success rate in opposed attacks by British divisions in the 
Fourth Army was “70.7 percent -  identical to the average success rate of the five 
Australian divisions (70.7 percent), only slightly lower than the average for the four 
Canadian divisions (72.5 percent) and higher than that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 
per cent).”11 While other analysts may arrive at different conclusions, the fact remains 
that some of the British divisions were virtually as effective as the Canadians. This in no 
way detracts from the outstanding achievements of the Corps during the Hundred Days, 
but it does indicate that by 1918, it was not only the Canadians who had developed hard­
hitting, professional assault divisions. The level of competency in the Canadian Corps 
needs to be firmly situated within developments elsewhere in the British Expeditionary 
Force to put matters into context.
To date, there has been no comprehensive study of administration in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force or the British Expeditionary Force, apart from Ian Brown’s ground­
breaking study of British logistics in France and Belgium.12 However, Brown was 
concerned only with the organization of transportation and the supply of materiel and did 
not touch on the vital question of reinforcements.
Seldom considered by historians is the development of Canadian staffs, both in 
Canada and overseas, as well as the subordination of military interests to civil direction. 
Stephen Harris’s book Canadian Brass provides a good overview of the development of a 
professional army in both peace and war and is essential to understanding the functions of 
the Minister , of Militia and Defence, the Militia Council and Militia Headquarters itself.13 
Canadian Brass includes the development of staff functions in Canada and overseas, but 
given the chronological scope (1860-1939), only the broad outline of developments in the 
Great War are discussed. Richard Walker’s dissertation'on Canadian military and 
political relations also provides some useful insights, but is concerned with developments 
from 1898 to 1945 and discussion on the Canadian Expeditionary Force is therefore 
limited.14
Both official histories are indispensible. The Official History of the Canadian 
Forces in the Great War 1914-1919 and the accompanying volume of appendices and 
maps contain a wealth of information.15 However, the sole volume of the projected eight- 




Belgium in September 1915 and is therefore limited. Colonel Nicholson’s Canadian 
Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 , on the other hand, is concerned with matters in Canada, 
England, France and Siberia from the creation of the 1st Canadian Division in 1914 to 
demobilization in 1919.16 The book is a ‘must’ for any serious historian, but much of Í 
what is discussed concerns Canadian Corps operations on the battlefield and as Nicholson 
himself admitted, the scope was such that events could be covered “only in broad outline, 
for the limitations imposed by the covers of a single book have ruled out the inclusion of 
much detail.”17 There is also a one-volume history of Canadian medical services 
produced by Sir Andrew Macphail in 1925.18 While the book contains some valuable
information and background, it is by no means clear if Macphail had complete access to :
. /  
the relevant documents. Moreover, in the case of Canadian Command Depots, it has not
been possible to reconcile Macphail’s account with the archival evidence.
Desmond Morton’s book A Peculiar Kind of Politics discusses the Ministry of the 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada at length and is the only comprehensive history of 
the development, structure and impact of this Ministry, unique in Canadian military 
history. Broad in scope, the book offers a sweeping, definitive summary of the Ministry 
and its operations; However, Morton’s approach is top-down and does not include the 
effect of the Ministry on training or the provision of reinforcements at the individual or 
unit level.
There are several divisional histories that deal with training. Shoestring Soldiers 
by Andrew Iarocci is concerned with the 1st Canadian Division: mobilization, training 
and operations in France and Belgium in 1915.19 But the.book is an operational history 
and the discussion of mobilization and training is used only to put the performance of the
division in battle into context. Despite this. Shoestring Soldiers is a useful introduction to 
the issues of individual and collective training in the early stages of the war. We Lead. 
Others Follow by Kenneth Radley is also concerned with the 1st Canadian Division.20: 
Unlike Iarocci, Radley discusses developments in the division from mobilization in 1914 
to the Armistice in 1918. Radley is one of the few Canadian historians to acknowledge 
that the Canadian Corps was but one of twenty-three corps in the British Expeditionary 
Force and he has considered the effects of some British policies and direction. We Lead.; 
Others Follow, however, is limited since it deals only with the 1st Canadian Division and 
not the Canadian Corps or the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. No academic 
studies of the remaining three divisions in the Corps have been published, although David 
Campbell of the University of Calgary produced a dissertation in 2003 on the 2
\
Canadian Division.21 The dissertation offers some useful insights into the way in which 
the division handled untrained reinforcements in December 1916 and briefly considers 
the role of the base depots but his terminology is questionable. Campbell considers 
‘wastage’, for example, but it appears that he refers to battle casualties only and not theV
overall losses, all of which had to be replaced.
Training depended to a very great extent on the availability and use of both: 
equipment and weapons. Both Tim Cook’s No Place to Run and Bill Rawling’s Surviving 
Trench Warfare contain useful insights into gas warfare as well as technology and its 
impact on operations. Unfortunately both deal with the Canadian Corps in France and 
not to the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. A useful summary of Canadian 
infantry equipment is contained in Jack Summers’s Tangled Web.23 There is, however, 
no authoritative account of the types, characteristics and limitations of Canadian weapons
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used in the First World War apart from Roger Phillips’s and Francis Chadwick’s The 
Ross Rifle Story.24 The book is useful, but is concerned mainly with the Ross Rifle 
Factory and not the use of the Ross rifle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Although 
dated, Major Reynolds’s The Lee-Enfield Rifle contains some useful information on what 
became the standard Canadian rifle in 1916.25
Several historians have produced statistical analyses of recruiting and manpower 
in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge in 1982 
examined regional variations in recruiting, the role of the militia and local organizers and 
the factors which forced the government to adopt conscription in 1917.26 Their article 
contains some useful insights, but their analysis is confined to the infantry only and 
ignores the many battalions allowed to recruit outside of their parent district. Census data 
of males age 15 and older is also used, although The Canada Year Book 1918 contains a 
summary by province of all males of military age (18-45).27 Nor is any allowance made 
for immigrants from enemy countries who, for the most part, were unable to join in 1914- 
1917, but were freely conscripted in 1918 provided they had been naturalized. No attempt 
has been made to account for American residents who trekked north to enlist nor do the 
authors differentiate between those enlisted in Canada and those enlisted in Bermuda, 
Britain, France, Belgium and the United States.
. Chris Sharpe has produced a regional analysis of enlistments in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918.28 Like Brown and Loveridge, his article offers 
some food for thought. However, his analysis suffers from the same shortcomings. As 
well, he makes no attempt to reconcile census figures with the summary of enlistments, 
presumably prepared by military districts whose boundaries did not always coincide with
t
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provincial boundaries. Nor does he consider the fact that two districts were not created
until 1917: Military District 7 in New Brunswick and Military District 12 in
Saskatchewan.
This dissertation deals with recruiting, training and the provision of 
reinforcements as separate, although closely related, functions. However, in some cases, 
the same agency was responsible for two or more of these functions. The creation of 
Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada, for example, is discussed in both 
Chapters 6 and 9. However, the former discusses the influence of the Headquarters on 
training while the latter is concerned with the impact of the Headquarters on the 
reinforcement structure. Similarly, the same agencies in Canada appear in both Chapters 
3 and 8. But, one chapter deals with recruiting while the other is concerned with 
reinforcements. The emphasis, then, is on the function and not the entity. :
The dissertation is lengthy although efforts have been made to reduce the length. 
However, manpower has not been examined in depth by Canadian historians and there is 
no body of published works to draw from. For that reason it has been necessary to discuss 
various aspects of personnel administration in detail.
Prior to 1916, Canada was organized into six divisional areas and three military 
districts. To avoid confusion with divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the 
term ‘military district’ is used in place of ‘divisional area’ from Chapter 2 onward 
although, strictly speaking, the term is inaccurate in discussing developments in 1914-
1915.
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This dissertation deals -with non-commissioned reinforcements and ignores the 
complex issues of training and providing officer reinforcements. Similarly, the discussion 
is restricted to entry-level training only. It is acknowledged that there was considerable 
specialist training as well as training conducted in the forward area by the Canadian 
Corps, but these are separate subjects best dealt with elsewhere.
As noted earlier, all things being equal, success in battle depends on an ample 
supply of well-trained reinforcements. However, providing these reinforcements meant 
the creation of an efficient system of recruiting, training and forwarding men to replace 
wastage at the front. Developing this system was not easy. In the early years, 
arrangements were ad hoc and inefficient. By 1918, however, Canada had created an 
efficient system of providing reinforcements that stood the test of battle. In the process, 
the Canadian Forces moved from an amateur militia force to a professional army. There 
were broader aspects as well that touched on both the state and society. This dissertation 
is the story of how Canada’s wartime military manpower policies marked these changes.
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. Chapt er  1 ■
Militia Roots
From first to last, the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was a product of the 
peacetime militia. Admittedly militia influence diminished as the war ground on, but 
nonetheless it persisted throughout. The growth and development of the CEF was 
influenced by a wide variety of factors, but most of it was shaped by its peacetime roots -  
the Permanent Active Militia (known as the Permanent Force or PF), Canada’s tiny full­
time army and the part-time soldiers in the Active and Reserve Militia.
The PF was small and, in the case of technical corps, inexperienced in field 
operations. Despite the linguistic duality of the nation, the PF had little or no French 
language organizational or instructional capability, a shortcoming that persisted 
throughout the war. Command was difficult and co-ordination by Militia Headquarters 
was limited. The staff, both in Ottawa and at the various divisions and districts, was small 
and devoted mainly to administration. The upshot was a considerable degree of 
decentralization and a sense of autonomy on the part of subordinate units and formations, 
characteristics that were later evident in the CEF. \
Militia regiments were not simply military units, but social organizations that 
provided diversions for members. In many cases, the need to prepare for war was 
overlooked and considerable emphasis was placed on public ceremony, which did much 
in the minds of the participants to justify the existence of the unit. The bonds forged in 
peacetime were carried over into war, and there was considerable confusion and 
inefficiency as regiments tried to maintain their corporate identity. Because of these 
bonds, loyalty to members took precedence over regulations, and men who were overage 
or physically unfit were enrolled or retained.
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; . Training was severely limited by funding and ceremonial activities together with
a lack o f equipment served only to reduce the standard further. The high absentee rate at 
summer camps and the annual turnover in units also played a part. The training standard 
in many cases was poor, but there were also conscientious and dedicated officers who ■ 
tried to make training as comprehensive and realistic as possible.
Although logistics is vital in wartime, there were few technical units and little or 
no training for specialists in administration. In many cases, accommodation for militia 
units was inadequate and there was also a lack of central training camps. Mobilization for 
war demanded both equipment and training facilities; in 1914; Canada had neither.
: Unlike the CEF, which in the early stages of the war, was predominantly British-
bom, the militia was more representative of the nation in terms of ethnicity. Moreover, 
ethnicity was not necessarily a bar to enrolment, and a handful of visible minorities and 
Aboriginals were able to enlist. This does not mean that racism did not exist; obviously it 
did, but, for some units, the colour line was not a barrier. The militia was also much more 
youthful than the CEF, and was also prepared to accept recruits who were manifestly 
underage. There was the paradox of 1914-1918: the militia that provided the foundation 
for the CEF was not the force that went to war.
In 1914, Canada’s army was known as the Canadian Militia and was divided into 
an Active and a Reserve Militia. The former consisted of volunteers between the ages of 
18 and 45 and paraded either on a part-time basis (Militia) or was embodied on a full­
time basis (PF). Both the Militia and the PF were armed, equipped and paid. The Reserve 
Militia was the vestige o f the nineteenth-century Sedentary Militia, and consisted of all
males between the ages of 18 and 60 who were British subjects and capable of bearing 
arms in the event of a l e v é e  e n  m a s s e .  The Reserve Militia, with no arms or equipment, 
was for all intents and purposes defunct by 1914, although a number of units were 
authorized during the First World War. These war-time units received littlé or no support 
from the Department o f Militia and Defence, but their existence diverted local 
enthusiasm for the CEF and added to the workload of the small, over-stretched staff at 
Militia Headquarters.1 Rifle clubs and associations were not part of the Canadian Militia, 
but were provided with weapons and ammunition, and, in an emergency, could be drafted 
into the Militia. Men could also be balloted under the Militia Act although this was 
rejected in 1917 in favor of selective conscription. <
The PF was the logical base for mobilization, but was hampered by its dual role 
and limited size. Intended to provide instructors for the Militia and garrisons for Halifax, 
Québec, and Esquimalt, the PF had only 247 officers and 2,656 men in scattered
•J
garrisons across the country. PF units consisted of an under-strength infantry battalion, 
the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), two small cavalry regiments, the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons (RCD) and Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH), two Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery (RCHA) batteries at Kingston, and companies of the Royal Canadian Garrison 
Artillery (RCGA) at Halifax, Québec and Esquimalt. There were also small detachments 
from the technical corps attached to each division and district.4 The PF should have been 
an invaluable source of expertise for the Militia but in practice, the high turnover rate 
limited the number o f instructors that could be provided. In 1912, “the percentage of men 
discharged [from the PF] was greatly in excess of enlistments.”5 As well, service in the 
PF did not appéal to most Canadians; between 1905 and 1913,458 volunteers from the
c . . .
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British Army joined the RCGA and RCR which had a combined establishment of about 
900 men.6 : ' , :
r PF technical corps were limited because they had to spend much of their time on 
house-keeping duties. In the case of the Canadian Engineers (CE), the routine : : • r
maintenance o f works and buildings prevented any training in field engineering, their 
primary raison d’être in war. The Canadian Army Service Corps (usually referred to as 
the CPASC, or Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps) had the same problems. More 
than half of the corps supported the Halifax garrison and the CPASC was neither trained 
nor equipped for field operations. The Inspector-General considered individual members 
of the CPASC to be proficient, but British Army instructors were needed if  the Corps was
m /
to progress beyond a basic level.
While Militia units were responsible for their own training, the PF Instructional 
Cadre provided assistance and staffed central schools to train officers and NCOs. The . 
Cadre was small, however, and in 1913 there were only 115 infantry and cavalry NCOs 
available for the whole of the Militia, not even one NCO per unit.8 Despite this, PF 
Instructors could be vital to unit efficiency. In St Catharines, for example, the 7th Field 
Battery was issued with the new 18-pounder field gun on 3 May 1912 and simultaneously 
warned o f an artillery concentration at Camp Petawawa starting 8 June 1912. But thanks 
to Sergeant-Instructor W. Hopkins from the RCHA who taught gun drill three nights a 
week, the battery, was able to master the new equipment and perform creditably at camp.9 
The virtues of the PF Instructor were also celebrated in fiction, such as a short story about 
an anonymous RCR drill-sergeant published in 1910 by Lieutenant Frederick Curry o f , 
the 41st Brockville Rifles.10
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. Apart from the limited number of instructors available, there were other problems. 
The PF was an English-speaking force with no room for unilingual francophones, and 
few members of the Instructional Cadre could speak French.11 As a result, English- 
speaking NCOs were sometimes detailed to francophone units. 12 The RCR maintained 
eight francophone instructors at No. 5 Regimental Depot in Québec City, but this 
benefited infantry units in the 5th Divisional Area only, and ignored French-speaking 
units elsewhere, such as the 65th Carabiniers Mont-Royal in the 4th Divisional Area. 13 The 
language problem was exacerbated by the lack of training manuals. Only Regulations et 
Ordonnances à l’usage de la Milice du Canada. Manual d’infanterie à 
l’usage de la Milice Canadienne. Traite de tactiques à l’usage des Trois Armes: traduit du 
Combinëd Training 1905. and an English translation of the standard pre-war reference, 
Infantry Training 1911 were available before 1914.14
The Canadian Militia had seen tremendous changes in the decade before 1914, in 
part because of deficiencies exposed during the Boer War, a need to curb the powers of 
the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a British officer frequently at 
loggerheads with the Canadian government, and a desire to modernize the Militia.15 The 
most important of these changes was embodied in a new Militia Act introduced in 1904 
by Sir Frederick Borden and based on recent reforms in the British Army prompted by 
Lord Esher’s War Office (Reconstitution) Committee. In brief, the British reforms did 
away with the position of Commander-in-Chief and created a general staff, with four 
branches headed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the Adjutant-General 
(AG), the Quartermaster-General (QMG), and the Master-General of Ordnance (MGO). 
None of these branches had primacy, although the CIGS was considered p r i m u s  i n t e r
20
p a r e s .  Coordination and general guidance was provided by an Army Council headed by 
the Secretary of State for War as chairman, with the CIGS, AG, QMG and MGO as 
military members and two civilian appointees who cared for financial matters and civil 
matters.16
■ In Canada, the new Militia Act followed the British model with a Militia Council 
broadly similar to the Army Council.17 The Minister of Militia and Defence was 
President, while the Deputy Minister acted as Vice-President. The Accountant and 
Paymaster General (a civilian appointment) was the Finance Member and the Assistant 
Deputy Minister was secretary. Military members consisted of the Chief of the General 
Staff (CGS) who was responsible for operations and training, the AG who was 
responsible for personnel policies, medical services and cadets, the QMG who handled 
supply and transport, and the MGO who looked after surveys, engineer services, works, 
and buildings.18 Like his British counterpart, the CGS did not have primacy and each 
military member was responsible to the Minister for his particular branch.19 Unlike the 
Army Council which had some executive authority, however, the Militia Council was 
restricted to advising the Minister “on all matters relating to the Militia which are referred 
to the Council by the Minister.”20
In principle, the new organization was sound, with the Minister and his staff 
meeting frequently on a weekly or fortnightly basis. Although the Council was advisory 
in nature and (in theory at least) restricted to discussing only those issues raised by the 
Minister, Borden adopted a collegial approach and under his direction, “the Militia 
Council met often [and] produced serious political-military consultation.”21 But the
success of the system depended entirely on the personality of the Minister and hisAM
willingness to meet with his Council.
The collegial atmosphere established by Borden abruptly changed in 1911 with 
the appointment of Sam Hughes, a forty-five-year-old newspaper proprietor and long­
standing militia officer, as Minister of Militia and Defence. Under Hughes, the Militia 
Council was reduced to impotence, and after a clash with the CGS, Major-General Colin 
Mackenzie, Hughes either disregarded the Council or used it simply to implement his 
orders. The upshot was that staff branches at Militia HQ operated in isolation and there 
was no effective consideration of problems or coordination o f effort, a situation that 
continued to exist as long as Hughes was in office. ;
Hughes was a controversial figure, although his biographer has described him as 
“popular, dynamic, progressive and decisive.”24 This may have been true to some extent, 
but Hughes was impulsive, eccentric, and ruthless, and did much to bring about chaos, 
particularly after the war broke out. Some of what he did had a positive effect on the 
Militia but, as Sir George Foster wrote in 1915, his methods brought about “widespread 
feelings of bitterness and insecurity induced by the continuous displays of strong and 
insulting language and indiscretions.”25 From first to last, Hughes did not understand the 
nature o f his position. As one historian has commented, “the opportunities for damage 
were incalculable when the minister of defence happened to be impetuous, imperious, 
and unable to understand the peculiar complexities of managing armed forces in a 
democratic polity.” After the war, W.A. Griesbach, a prominent Edmonton lawyer and 
Conservative Party organizer, acknowledged Hughes’s accomplishments, but added that 
“He had little or no idea of the proper functioning of the staff and was despotic, if  not
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tyrannical. How the wretched staff at National Defence Headquarters carried on,'I do not 
know. I suspect that they did not carry on at all.”27
The “wretched staff’ at Militia HQ staff was small in relation to their r 
responsibility for a large and complex organization that stretched from one coast to the 
other. In March, 1914, on the eve of war, there were only thirty-five staff officers at V 
Militia HQ, including the Director of Cadet Services in the AG Branch. Surprisingly, the 
largest was the MGO Branch with thirteen staff officers, although this included eight 
officers employed on survey and inspection duties. The CGS Branch had seven officers 
employed in Operations, Training, Musketry, Intelligence, and Signalling. Significantly, 
there was no staff officer with responsibility for mobilization, although in practice this 
was handled by Major G.C.W. Gordon-Hall, the Director of Military Operations.28
Command and control with such a small staff was difficult, and responsibility for 
training had to be delegated to subordinate Headquarters. Militia HQ issued annual 
instructions outlining the conduct of training, but these were not mandatory and were 
“merely a guide to officers, in the training of those units under their command;”29 To' 
compensate for this, there was an Inspector-General charged with general supervision, 
but the sheer number o f units meant that most o f the inspections had to be carried out by 
local commanders.30
Decentralization of training meant that Divisional and District Commanders . 
enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, which in turn was passed on to units. At 
Camp Sewell in 1914, for example, “Every effort was made to decentralize the work of 
training, and to make the Officers of the Militia responsible for the training of their 
Units.” Under the circumstances, decentralization with its attendant autonomy may
22
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have been inevitable, but it meant that uniformity was difficult to achieve. This was not 
an issue in peacetime, when units operated only within the bounds of their particular 
division or district, but later became a major problem during the war, when units from 
across Canada arrived in England with varying standards of training.
The need for a larger staff was recognized during the war; as summarized in Table 
1, there were eighty-nine staff officers at Militia HQ by July 1918. But at this point in the 
war, responsibilities had shifted. The M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t  (MSA) which provided 
draftees was administered by the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice 
and responsibility for training had been largely handed over to Headquarters Overseas 
Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) in England. The revised HQ organization reflected 
the new division of responsibilities, and most o f the increase (forty-two officers) was in 
the AG Branch and the newly created Judge Advocate General Branch. Only four officers 
were added to the General Staff Branch, which indicates that Militia HQ had become an 
administrative body only. Despite the increase during the war, the HQ remained 
understaffed in relation to its responsibilities. The CGS, Major-General Sir Willoughby 
Gwatkin, routinely worked until well after midnight and shouldered a workload that 
brought him to the verge of a nervous breakdown. Others suffered as well. In 1920, the 
AG wrote to Brigadier-General R.J. Gwynne, who was forced to leave because of ill- 
health, to express his regrets “that your unremitting devotion to your duties during the 
war made it necessary for you to retire.”34 Under the circumstances it is, perhaps, no 




Militia HO Staff Appointments 1914 and 191835
' Branch 31 March 1914
; 1 , 1 July 1918 Difference
c g s  ; 7 11 ■ .+4 ■■•■
AG 7 40 +33 ;
QMG 4 6 +2
MGO 13 12 -1 -
Finance 4 3 ; . .-1 '




Totals 35 89 +54
Notes: (1) In 1914, the Inspector-General was part of the CGS Branch.
(2) In 1915 the War Purchasing Committee assumed responsibilities for
equipment procurement from the MGO.
Militia HQ did not exercise command directly, but through divisions and military 
districts, each with specific boundaries. Divisions, located in the Maritime provinces, 
Québec, and Ontario, were intended to counter the threat of an invasion by fielding 
formed bodies of troops. Each division was divided into brigades and, on paper, had the 
requisite number of arms units.36 But the structure was not balanced and the divisions 
were administrative and not operational entities. Units such as cavalry regiments were 
therefore allocated to divisions other than their own. This seems to have been a paper 
exercise, however; there is no record, for example, of the 24 th Grey’s Horse, from the 1st 
Divisional area, training with the 3rd Division.37 Districts, on the other hand, were 
intended to be geographic entities responsible for training and administering units.38
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; Table 2
District and Divisional Organization 
: . 31 March 191439
Division of District Headquarters Province Remarks
1st Divisional Area London Ontario South-west Ontario
2nd Divisional Area Toronto Ontario Central and northern 
Ontario
3 rd Divisional Area Kingston ■ Ontario Eastern Ontario and 
western Québec
4tn Divisional Area Montréal Québec
5“  Divisional Area Québec Québec




Military District 10 Winnipeg Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan
/
Included Districts of 
Thunder Bay and 
Rainy River in 
Ontario
Military District 11 Victoria British Columbia' 
and Yukon Territory
Military District 13 Edmonton Alberta Included the 
Territory of 
Mackenzie
Notes: (1) Divisions were redesignated as districts in 1916.
(2) Military District 12 (Saskatchewan) was created in 1916.
(3) Military District 7 (New Brunswick) was created in 1917.
The structure o f each Divisional or District HQ was similar to Militia HQ, with a 
small staff that reflected the emphasis on administration rather than operations and
* L
training. HQ 6 Division in Halifax, responsible for the Maritime provinces, was perhaps 
typical, with three staff officers handling operations, training, signals, and intelligence 
with eleven other officers employed in administrative positions. Like Militia HQ, the 
ability o f the 6 th Division HQ to plan and conduct operations or training was limited, and 
much o f this responsibility had to be delegated to units. Most o f the units in the 6th 
Division were grouped into three infantry brigades (16th, 17th and 18th), but the brigade
commanders were part-time militia officers, had no HQ staff beyond a part-time brigade-
26
major,.and, like their subordinate commanding officers, were lieutenant-colonels; 
depending on the personalities involved, this could turn command into an exercise in tact 
and diplomacy.40 Under the circumstances, close supervision was impossible, and units 
had a substantial amount of discretion and autonomy.
In 1914, there were 235 Militia units scattered across the country. The force was 
dominated by the arms, the 163 artillery, cavalry and infantry units. The remaining 
seventy-two units were provided by the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC), CASC, 
Canadian Engineers (CE), and the Canadian Signal Corps. Although small Militia 
detachments of the Canadian Ordnance Corps (COC) and Canadian Army Veterinary
Corps (CAVC) were in the process of being formed by 1914, most of the technical corps
. /
existed in the PF only. Units were predominantly English-speaking and there were only 
seventeen infantry battalions, one regiment of garrison artillery, and one field battery 
with French as the working language.41
..  ’ Table 3












; Apart from these units which actually existed, a further seventy-four units had 
been authorized but not organized.43 For the most part, these were technical and 
administrative units without the glamour attached to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
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an important consideration in a volunteer force with few material benefits. Still, they 
were necessary if  the Militia ever mobilized and took to the field for more than a few 
days. • ■ . ■' ;
Table 4
Authorized Units Not Formed 
As of 31 March 1914
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Total 74 ' 84 158 :
For practical reasons, some of these units could not be fully organized in 
peacetime. The six CASC Divisional Trains, for example, had a combined establishment 
of 1080 vehicles and 1,920 draught horses.44 The cost of purchasing and housing all of 
these animals and vehicles would have been prohibitive. A reduced establishment could
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have been adopted for training purposes, but there is no evidence that this was ever 
considered.
Most Militia units had a high annual turnover, which affected both administration 
and training. There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence, but statistics are available for 
only a few units, such as the 7th Fusiliers of London, 22nd Oxford Rifles of Woodstock, 
and the 13th Royal Regiment in Hamilton. The 13th seems to have had the highest ■ 
turnover. Based on a sample of 897 men who j oined between 1899 and 1909, the 
Regiment took in 75 recruits annually to replace its losses. However, this is only a partial 
sample of men with surnames between ‘A’ and ‘E’, and it is probable that, on average, 
about 200 recruits joined every year.45 In the 7th Fusiliers, which had six companies and 
an establishment of about 400 all ranks, 1,563 recruits were enrolled between 1899 and 
1909 -  an average of 142 every year.46 Lastly, in the 22nd Regiment, with a smaller 
establishment of only four companies, 301 men joined between 1910 and 1913.47
: The poor retention rate, and the pressure on units to attend camps with as many 
men as possible, meant that recruiting was geared to the collective training cycle. In the 
7 Fusiliers, there were two distinct intakes every year. The spring draft averaged 108 
recruits and was intended to bring the unit up to strength for summer camp, while the fall 
draft, which averaged 34 men, served to reinforce the unit for the annual Thanksgiving 
sham battle.48 The 13th Regiment had a similar routine, with intakes in spring and 
autumn. Both units paraded from March to October only, and the two intakes meant a 
proportion of the unit’s NCOs were permanently devoted to recruit training. As well, 
recruits tended to join over a two- or three-month period. Those who joined in March, for 
example, were reasonably well trained for the summer camp at the end of June, while
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those who were enrolled in May were virtually raw. recruits. Units spent a 
disproportionate amount of their time and energy on recruiting and basic training at the 
expense of refresher training for the trained soldiers. More importantly, the large numbers 
of inexperienced soldiers effectively prevented the unit from conducting advanced 
training in a meaningful way.
- Not all recruits were untrained; In the 13 th Regiment, 185 (or 21%) of the 897 
men who joined between 1897 and 1909 were re-enlistments (177) or serving militiamen 
re-engaging after their three-year term of enlistment (8).The high proportion of recruits 
with former service suggests that, in the 13th at least, militia service had some attractions, 
but whether these were economic, patriotic or militaristic is not clear. This is an isolated 
example, however, and further research into other regiments may present a substantially 
different picture.
The voluntary nature of the Militia called for a considerable degree of consensus 
on the part o f those involved. Commanding officers might have had substantial 
autonomy, but they were not omnipotent and could be forced to resign if there was no 
consensus among the officers. Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Hamilton, for example, was 
removed from command of the 2nd Regiment (Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada) in 1896, 
largely because he did not enjoy the support of the officers and senior NCOs.49 In 1915, 
disagreements arose between Lieutenant-Colonel F.B. Ross and the officers of the 13 th 
Regiment which led Ross to resign, “believing it to be in the best interests of my old 
regiment.”50 The need for collegiality and consensus within units was generally ; 
recognized, and inspection reports frequently commented on this aspect. Comments made 
in 1913 by the AAG 2nd Division about the 48th Highlanders were typical: “An excellent
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Esprit de corps prevails throughout all ranks and the Commanding Officer [J.A. Currie; 
MP] is well supported by his officers in all matters affecting the welfare of the
Regiment.”51
But there were drawbacks to Militia collegiality and consensus, especially in rural 
units, as Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Currie noted in 1913: the 104th Regiment was “largely 
recruited from small towns and rural districts where the officer and private are often 
intimately associated in civil life. Too often the officer fears that insisting on things being 
done in a regimental way may interfere with his relations with his men in civil life.”52 
The same trend was evident in other corps: In Winnipeg, the 79th Cameron Highlanders 
was perhaps more fraternal than military. Recruits were charged a five dollar enrolment 
fee, while officers, who contributed their pay to Regimental funds, had to pay $12.87 per 
soldier to make up the difference between the actual cost of highland uniforms and the 
Government grant. The 79 was an exclusive unit: “The selection process for 
candidates closely paralleled that of such men’s organizations as the St. Andrew’s 
Society; no outside man was permitted to join companies without the approval of the 
members of that particular company. Each name was put before a committee, voted on by 
the company, and finally approved by the officers of that company.”54
Most units insisted on financial contributions from members. The 7th Fusiliers 
demanded that all ranks, with the exception of bandsmen, contribute their pay to 
Regimental Funds. But in compensation, all Fusiliers were able to take advantage of the 
Regimental Rifle Association and the Men’s Recreation Room, while the Athletic 
Association organized a series of sporting events.55 Regimental institutes such as these 
were an important part o f unit life, as Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell emphasized in 1911:
“the Officers were unanimously of the opinion that a man’s reading and recreation room 
was absolutely necessary in order that the Regiment might be able to compete in some 
measure at least with the numerous outside attractions.”56,In Kamloops, A Squadron of 
the 30th British Columbia Horse, presumably using funds donated by members of the, . 
squadron, “rented rooms to establish a mess and club room, and although the men were to 
sponsor frequent dances in the drill hall, it was at the mess where the riflemen and their 
friends had their ‘smokers’ and more intimate entertainment.”57 Elsewhere, the 63rd, 
Halifax Rifles not only fielded a baseball team, but leased the Reform Club Hall in ■ 
Dartmouth and fitted up a gymnasium and club room “where the men have been able to
co
get physical instruction and to spend many a social hour.” ; ;
y
The recreational side of the Militia not only encouraged retention, but helped 
bring in recruits. A study of the 22nd Oxford Rifles in Woodstock, Ontario, suggests that 
organized sports broadened the appeal of militia service by allowing workingmen to 
participate in activities normally reserved for non-manual workers. With the camaraderie
of the mess and canteen, the 2 2nd was, in effect, “a male social club, without the dues of
\
a fraternal order.”59 In military terms, militia recreational activities were thought to 
benefit the unit directly. The Commanding Officer of the 7 Fusiliers believed that the 
low rates of pay at summer camps discouraged recruiting, and that city corps should “be 
provided with reading-rooms, gymnasiums and swimming baths for the men in order to 
offset the attractions which are being offered them in other directions and, thereby, 
preventing them from enlisting.”60 • ¡
Recreational activities and messes were necessary in a chronically under-funded 
volunteer organization that paraded from March to October only, and units organized a
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wide variety of activities for the benefit of their members. In Toronto, each unit fielded 
an officers’ baseball team which competed for the Toronto Garrison Championship at the 
University Avenue Armoury, while in London, the 7th Fusiliers stood down after 
Thanksgiving and spent “a few months of relaxation and pleasure in the form of athletic 
contests, basketball and baseball, on the floor o f the Armouries, shooting competitions in 
the gallery [indoor range], and Company dinners.”61 Rural units without armouries made 
a valiant effort to find facilities. In 1912, the 12th York Rangers (a rural unit) was allowed 
to use unheated municipal buildings in Toronto, although it was not “easy to enjoy club 
and gymnasium privileges in a room without heating or lighting, and the reek of horse 
manure from the city stables below.”62 The 12th, however, was better off than other rural
d /
units, such as the 23 Northern Pioneers which borrowed agricultural halls for drill and 
had no recreational facilities to keep the units together.63
Who were these militiamen? Few memoirs exist, and those that do were written 
by officers. Archival holdings are scanty and most units appear to have destroyed their 
personnel records. Still, enough has survived that some general observations can be
made. Records of the 22nd Oxford Rifles indicate that 63% of those who joined between
!
1910 and 1913 were British-born, but this may have been an anomaly.64 The 
Commanding Officer o f the 7 Fusiliers complained that 75% of the recruits in 1910-
1911 and 60% of the recruits in 1912 were British-born, but this is at odds with earlier
¿ r  i t
recruiting patterns. In the 7 Fusiliers, 85% of a sample of 157 men enrolled between 
1900 and 1902 had been bom in Canada while 4% were bom in the United States and 
11% in Great Britain. The 13 th Royal Regiment had a similar pattern, with 79% of those 
joining between 1894 and 1909 bom in Canada and 18.5% in Britain. There was also a
small number from Germany and Russia.66 The birthplace of recruits in the 7th and 13th is 
roughly consistent with the 1901 Census which showed that London was 18% British- 
born and Hamilton 19.6% British-born.67 r
The peacetime militia was a youthful force. The age of recruits in the 13th Royal 
Regiment between 1894 and 1909 ranged from thirteen to fifty-eight, with an average of 
23.2 years or 22.5, if  men over forty-five are discounted. In the 7th Fusiliers, ages ranged 
from sixteen to forty-four with an average of 21.4. However, the 157 Fusilier recruits 
found inthe 1901 Census present a somewhat different picture. Ages varied from . 
fourteen to forty-three, with an average of 20.6. Forty-four of the recruits, or 28%, were 
under the minimum enrolment age of eighteen, a trend that continued during the war.68
Regulations specified that recruits had to be between the ages of eighteen and 
forty-five, but boys of good character aged fourteen to seventeen (or in special cases 
thirteen) could be enrolled as musicians with the consent of their parent or guardian.69 
While no doubt some of these youthful soldiers had their parents’ consent, it seems 
unlikely that the 7th Fusiliers needed forty-four bandsmen in a three-year period. ;
Why were these boys enrolled? Many of them must have been obviously 
underage. Neither the unit history nor surviving unit records refer to a shortage of 
recruits, nor is there any apparent correlation between ages and enrolment dates. The 
simplest explanation may lie in the fact that units saw no harm in using enthusiastic 
juveniles, either in or out of uniform. At the Thanksgiving maneuvers in 1912, for 
example, Colonel Logie’s brigade from Hamilton employed boy scouts as messengers on 
the battlefield. There was also a contradiction between the minimum enrolment age of 
eighteen and the school-leaving age, which in Ontario was fourteen.71 Perhaps recruiting
c »
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sergeants (and others) felt that if a boy could legally make his own way in the world at 
fourteen, there was no reason why he could not serve with the militia.
Although Canada has been regarded as an intrinsically racist nation, there was a 
small number of visible minorities in the militia. ‘B. Devisie’ from India joined the 13th 
Royal Regiment in Hamilton in 1905, while the 23rd Alberta Rangers took Privates Chang 
Soo and Wong Hung as cooks to summer camp in 1907, and Privates Quan Quam and 
Lee Sing-in 1909. The enrolment of Chinese Canadians did not violate any regulations 
or orders. Militia HQ were well aware the men were Chinese, and were only concerned 
that they were British subjects who had been properly enrolled.73
Blacks had been part of the Canadian Militia as early as 1793, when a number 
enrolled in the Kent County Militia in Ontario. A Coloured Company fought at 
Queenston Heights in 1812 and the Coloured Corps of the Incorporated Militia was 
stationed along the Ontario border from 1838 to 1850.74 In British Columbia, blacks 
formed the Colony’s first militia unit, the Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps, in 1860.75; 
Although it has been argued that this tradition was not continued after Confederation, 
blacks served in the militia as individuals, although the names of only a few are known: 
Willard Taylor o f the 7th Fusiliers, Joseph Madden of the 19th Lincoln Regiment, Edward 
Murree o f the 29th (Yarmouth) Field Battery and William Robinson of the 56th Grenville 
Regiment, to name a few. There was at least one black in the PF: Ernest Smyth, from 
Antigua, who enlisted in the RCR at Three Rivers in 1913.76 No doubt there were others 
but, given the relatively small number of blacks in Canada at that time, there could n o t . 
have been very many. . ’
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In the case of the First Nations, much has been made of a supposed national 
policy issued in 1914 prohibiting Indians from enlisting in the CEF. However, very little 
has been said about First Nations military service before the war, a tradition that extended 
back to the American Revolution. The 37th Haldimand Rifles, in particular, had a very 
strong Native component and by 1913, six of the eight companies were recruited 
exclusively on the Six Nations Reserve.77 In the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry, four 
companies were based on Reserves at Moraviantown, Muncey, and Sarnia. Aboriginals 
also served in the regimental band.78 Further north, the 32nd Bruce Regiment band was 
drawn from the Cape Croker Reserve while C, F and G Companies recruited at the Cape 
Croker and Chippewa Hill Reserves.79 Other units recruited native soldiers as well. E 
Company of the 49 Hastings Rifles, based in Tyendinaga, recruited men from 
Deseronto, while B Company of the 18th Franc Tireurs de Saguenay recruited from the 
Roberval Reserve.80 :
' First Nations militiamen were regarded as good soldiers who took their training 
seriously and showed an aptitude for scouting and night operations. In 1912, the Six 
Nations companies of the 37th were regarded as very good, while the “White Companies 
[were] young & not up to the others.”81 Native soldiers were regarded as a valuable, k 
commodity, and in Québec, the 18 Franc Tireurs de Saguenay were pressured by the 
Division Commander to raise at least one company of Montagnais.82
First Nations militiamen were not only soldiers; some were commissioned as
officers in the 37th Haldimand Rifles, such as A.G.E. Smith (joined later by his brother,
'  0*1
C.D. Smith), T.P. Galbraith, J. Cronk, and C.D. Brant. Inspecting Officers considered 
them to be capable officers, and in 1908 A.G.E. Smith was singled out as a “Clever
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officer with good judgment & tact, even temper and self-reliant.”84 Native soldiers were 
also employed as NCOs and specialists. In the 32nd Bruce Regiment, Color-Sergeant 
Walter Shawbedees, of the Chippewa Hill Reserve, was responsible for discipline in C 
Company, while Corporal Alex Johnston of Cape Croker commanded a section in G
o  C  i L
Company. In the 26 Middlesex Light Infantry, First Nations militiamen were also 
employed as NCOs, with most, if  not all, of the Stretcher Bearer section being native as 
well.86 ;.
Training in the peacetime militia depended on a number of factors, of which the' 
most important was whether the unit was urban (a city corps) or rural. The former were 
concentrated entirely in cities, while the latter were dispersed in small towns, villages, 
and townships in companies, batteries, or squadrons of about fifty men each. The 102nd 
Rocky Mountain Rangers was based entirely in Kamloops, while the 26th Middlesex 
Light Infantry, a rural unit, had isolated companies scattered throughout Middlesex 
County in Ontario.87 ■ '
City Corps were able to train throughout the year using dedicated armouries. Most
\
of the rural units, however, were usually able to gather only for the annual or bi-annual 
twelve-day summer camp. Some of the rural companies had drill halls but for many, this 
was a luxury. In Lethbridge, the 25th Independent Field Battery had “no building in which 
to house the guns, for these were lean years for the Militia. [Major] Stewart [Battery 
Commander] stowed them in the open behind his house, protected only by muzzle and 
breech covers. The full establishment of harness he kept in his bam, which thus became 
the first artillery armoury on the western prairies.”88 In Central Ontario, the 12th York 
Rangers approached the City o f Toronto and was able to scrounge “various odd comers
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in its buildings where the captains [company commanders] can store their forty-two rifles 
and their stocks of coats, overcoats, canteens, water bottles, and all other the pomp of 
glorious war entrusted to their charge.”89
To a great extent, training was dependent on whether or not the unit was 
concentrated in an armoury with offices, a drill hall, lecture rooms, and Quartermaster 
Stores. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, ideally, city corps would have access 
to drill halls, rifle ranges, miniature ranges,90 and “a site where week-end camps can be 
held.”91 Most city armouries offered these facilities but, as Sir John French noted in 1910, 
only Ottawa and Halifax had a nearby maneuver area. Considerable use was therefore
t i l
made of private property at both the unit and District level. The 30 British Columbia 
Horse, for example, built a rifle range on private property near Vernon.93 In the 1st. 
Divisional Area, use was made of “leased ground known as the Attrill Farm near 
Goderich which lacks area for maneuver notwithstanding the use of 2 farms nearby.”94 
Private property was a useful stopgap, but field firing could not be conducted, trenches 
could not be dug, and the need to avoid damage inhibited training.
\
Central training camps were limited and not all provinces had adequate training 
facilities. In Prince Edward Island, the Charlottetown Camp Commandant wrote in 1914 
that the Prince Edward Island Light Horse had made average progress in their training, 
although “there is not a sufficiently large training area available.”95 Camps at Barriefield, 
Famham, Levis, and Sussex were too small for brigade-level training, while others such 
as Carling Heights in London and Sarcee near Calgary were slowly being engulfed by 
development.96 In 1914, Major-General F.L. Lessard reported that “The restricted area of 
this training ground [Niagara-on-the-Lake] is well known, and has been fully reported
t
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upon in the past. Nevertheless, with the kind co-operation of the inhabitants, and the 
appointment o f a committee of adjustment, it has been found possible to maneuver and 
practice Field Training within an area of some 20 miles from Niagara-on-the-Lake.”97 
Large camps with artillery ranges and maneuver areas suitable for brigades existed only 
at Camp Sewell, Manitoba, and Petawawa, Ontario, although these were usable only in 
the summer. /•..■■■■■ *
Militia training comprised local Headquarters [LHQ] training (at least for the city 
corps) and central summer camps. In general, artillery units were authorized to train for 
sixteen days at summer camps and all other corps for twelve days. But there were 
exceptions. In 1913, the 3rd, 4th, and 11th Brigades Canadian Field Artillery, the 3rd ‘ 
Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery, and the Prince Edward Island Heavy Brigade, 
Canadian Garrison Artillery, had to demonstrate their efficiency by training for four days 
at local headquarters before going to camp for twelve days. City corps were allowed to 
combine LHQ and central training, provided that the total did not exceed sixteen days, 
but rural units were given only twelve days in total.98
\
In 1913, for example, the 57 Peterborough Rangers trained for eleven days at 
home and five days at camp.99 The eleven days spent at LHQ were not calendar days, but 
rather evenings, each of which counted for a half day. The unit training schedule could be 
fairly intense, considering that the majority of militiamen worked during the day. In 
1914, the 57th recruit course started in Peterborough in April 1914 and ran three nights a 
week for twenty-two evenings until mid-June, when the Regiment went to a five-day 
camp at Barriefield, near Kingston. Other units followed a similar routine. In 1904, the 
41st Brockville Rifles trained for twenty-four evenings before attending summer camp at
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Rockcliffe, while in 1912-13, the 7th Battery in St Catharines recruited in March and 
April and trained three evenings a week in preparation for summer camp at the end of 
June.100:
Spring training for experienced militiamen was intended to cover as much ground 
as possible to gain the maximum benefit from summer camp. In the 1st Division, units 
were advised that “In order that the best value may be obtained from the period spent in 
Camp, efforts should be made to perform some of the preliminary training at Company, 
Squadron or Regimental Headquarters before June.”101 At Edmonton, Major Griesbach of 
the 19 Alberta Dragoons wrote that, in 1914, “Although only twelve days were spent in 
camp, we endeavored to bring our troops into camp with a good deal of the syllabus of 
training completed before arrival. Therefore, we were able to get on with maneuvers in 
the field without loss of time.” 102
But the 19 ¡was fortunate. Rural units were usually unable to train throughout the 
year, and during their twelve-day stint at summer camp, recruits had to be trained, 
musketry practices fired and collective skills exercised with a one- or two-day sham fight 
- a tall order considering that the twelve-day camp did not represent twelve training days. 
Sunday was a day of rest and traveling time (usually two days) was also included.103 In 
the case of city corps, this effectively reduced their training to three days or less. In 1913, 
the Governor General’s Foot Guards arrived at Petawawa on a Saturday, rested Sunday, 
trained Monday and Tuesday, and returned to Ottawa on Wednesday. The unit had “no 
knowledge of field work and it was quite impossible to [sic] in two training days to carry 
out tactical or field training with any profit. It seems questionable whether it is worth 
while to pay a unit for five days in order to do two days training.” 104 The combination of
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training in drill and ceremonial at LHQ and five days at camp, in most cases, did not 
produce either trained soldiers or trained units.
Training problems were exacerbated not only by the high proportion of new 
recruits, but also by a high absentee rate from summer camp. At Barriefield in 1913, only 
60% of the militia turned out for camp, although the 3rd Divisional Commander thought 
that “excellent progress was made considering that a very large proportion of those 
trained, probably 80%, were recruits without previous training.” 105 The problem existed; 
elsewhere. In 1912, the 5 Division found only a small proportion of the men attended 
more than one camp, 106 while at Halifax, the Inspecting Officer despaired of any progress 
in Number 2 (Montreal) Siege Company : “Given each year a large proportion of green
y* .
men of but little education it is obviously impossible to make any steady and continuous 
progress in raising the standard of training to what is required for Siege Artillery.”107
Absenteeism from summer camp varied between units. The 12th York Rangers 
historian thought that the turnout in rural units was higher than in city corps, because “the 
night drilling population and the camp going population are two rather distinct 
classes.” 108 There was some truth in this statement. At the Nova Scotia camp in 1912, two 
city corps (63rd and 66 th Regiments) paraded 386 all ranks with 708 absent. The 
remaining fourteen units, all rural, had 2,652 with only 369 absent.109 On the other hand, 
in 1912, only 65% of the troops of eight rural units in the 1st Division turned up at 
Goderich as opposed to 72% in the five city corps. At Lévis, Québec, the same year, 69% 
of the rural militia appeared at camp, while at Barriefield in 1913, rural units were able to 
field only 59% of their establishment. In Military District Number 10, only 283 all ranks 
from the newly-organized 52nd Prince Albert Volunteers, a city corps, attended Camp
J
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Sewell out of an establishment of 540. In Calgary, 2,635 men attended.summer camp 
with only 674 absent. It is striking, however, that 466 of the absentees, or 69%, came 
from two city corps, the 101st Edmonton Fusiliers and the 103rd Calgary Rifles.110 The 
strength of Militia units tended to vary widely because of personalities and local 
circumstances, but it appears that city corps, generally considered to be more efficient, 
had lower attendance rates at summer camps. Since summer camps were intended.; 
primarily for collective training in the field, the general standard within these units could 
not have been very high. : :
The apparent reluctance of city dwellers to attend camps may have been due to 
other factors. In 1908, a company of the 28th Perth Regiment refused to attend “on
s  111
account of prohibition of sale of beer. The men of it were mostly Germans.” Camps
were traditionally held at the same time every year and rural units, in particular, had
difficulties in adapting to changes. F Company of the 23rd Northern Pioneers, for
example, could not attend summer camp in 1908 when the date was changed from July to
110June, because the men were absent on ‘river drives’ and could not be contacted. \thSimilarly, the 4 Chasseurs Canadien complained in 1912 that attendance was low 
because the camp was held before the lumber drives and seeding had been completed.113
Militia pay was low in comparison to civilian wages. In 1911, Lieutenant-Colonel 
A. A. Campbell of the 7th Fusiliers in London thought “It is unreasonable to expect a 
mechanic, or a man, who is earning, at least, from $3 to $4 a day to give up his work and 
go out to camp for twelve days and receive the magnificent sum of 50 cents per day” and 
“it is unreasonable to expect that you can get first class men to make such a sacrifice even 
for the honour and. integrity o f their country.” 114 At Lévis, Québec, in 1913, attendance
was thought to have dropped because men working as unskilled labourers on construction 
projects were paid up to $3 a day. The same year, at Barriefield, the 46th Regiment 
paraded with only 224 all ranks, an abysmal turnout attributed by Lieutenant-Colonel * 
John Hughes to high wages for all classes of labourers.115 A year later, the high absentee 
rate in the 103rd Calgary Rifles was attributed to an ‘unusual’ speculation in oil stocks.116 
These were not merely peacetime problems; both occupational and economic factors 
would hinder recruiting for the CEF. .
City Corps tended to emphasize the ceremonial aspects of the military in contrast 
to less glamorous field work. The 48th Highlanders managed to avoid summer camp 
altogether in 1913, and the AAG 2nd Division wrote a damning report on the unit, saying
y'/
that morale was high but the Regiment had not taken the time to conduct field firing: 
“There is a tendency to indulge in too much ceremonial which I hope in time will give 
place to more Infantry training.” The tendency is, perhaps, understandable. With no 
immediate threat on the horizon, a club-like atmosphere and a desire for public parades to
bolster self-confidence, it was difficult to avoid spending training days on ceremony and
\
drill. The emphasis on drill was reinforced by Sam Hughes, who directed the CGS to 
notify Divisions and Districts that “Officers will be judged by their bearing on parade, 
and their powers of command and leadership will be tested by the number of different 
movements their units can complete, in rapid succession but without confusion, in a 
given space of time.” 118
The last annual Militia training plan issued in February 1914 directed that training 
was to be “systematic and progressive; [with] that at local headquarters leading up to the 
training in camp, which will be devoted entirely to tactical instruction.” 119 The LHQ *
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schedule for infantry battalions was a mixture of individual and collective training and 
emphasized basic drill from squad to battalion level, with and without arms. For some 
obscure reason, funeral drill was also included. Units were directed to fire their annual 
musketry practice prior to camp, but weapons handling was not included in the schedule. 
The field portion o f the prescribed syllabus covered a variety of topics including, 
scouting, minor tactics, entrenching, and construction of obstacles, all of which 
demanded a convenient maneuver area, which most city corps did not possess. ... The 
actual routine likely varied, but most units probably divided their preparatory evenings at 
LHQ between drill and lectures on tactical subjects, leaving the actual practice to summer 
camp. Field training was a practical and not a theoretical subject. The more experienced 
and receptive militiamen may have benefited from LHQ training, but not the newly 
enrolled men from remote areas, such as those at Levis Camp in 1913, who thought the 
newly-installed shower baths were latrines.
Other corps were required to complete refresher training as well. In the 1st 
Division, CASC companies were expected to parade twice a week for two months to 
review both musketry and corps training. The evening parades, which lasted for two 
hours, were evenly divided between drill and lectures on judging meat, flour, hay and 
oats, ration accounting, care of horses, and fitting of harness. In addition, NCOs were 
expected to master wagon drill.124 The scope of training did not cover CASC 
responsibilities in the field, but was rather an accurate reflection of the peacetime role of 
the Corps at summer camps.
Specialist training was a problem in general, not only because of the limited 
training time available but also because many of the men attended only one camp. In
1912, the CGS asked the QMG for recommendations on farrier training because “The 
Farrier Sergeants who go to camp have, as a rule, no knowledge of farrier work and I do 
not consider it is worth while trying to instruct them in camps, especially if it is realized 
that the same men are not likely to turn up year after year.” 125 Farrier training at summer 
camp continued however and in Calgary at least, short courses were conducted by 
officers from the newly-organized Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.126
There were no cooks’ courses in the Militia, although the CASC ran a Cookery 
School for'unit Cook-Sergeants in Kingston.127 For the most part, units had to rely on 
men who were cooks in civil life. In general these men did well although some had
difficulties coping with such esoteric subjects as portion control and ration scales. In
./
1908, an Inspecting Officer wrote a scathing report on cooks at the Three Rivers Camp:
“I found the cooks at Three Rivers were very stupid. It is true enough some of them were 
old bushmen and seemed to be fairly good cooks, but when asked if they knew whether 
or not they had the right quantity... nearly all of them said they ignored the fact, except
the men complained that they had not enough to eat.” 128 However, not all cooks were this
\
bad and the same report noted that kitchens at both Charlottetown and Sussex, New 
Brunswick, were exemplary.
Individual training at summer camps was problematic, not only because of the 
limited time available but also because the purpose of the camps was to conduct 
collective training. Both infantry and cavalry units at Sussex in 1913 devoted fewer than 
three of the ten days available to individual training. Artillery units, in particular, had 
difficulties, and in 1912, the Inspector-General commented on the low standard of gun­
layers, range-takers, and signalers.130 In London, Colonel W.E. Hodgiris, Commander of
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the 1st Division, thought in 1912 that “At present, most specialists are unfit to carry out 
their duties in the field, as the whole time in Camp is devoted to the preliminary training 
of their branch, and little, if any, combined work [collective training] is possible.”131 T o ' 
remedy this, he recommended that all specialists be trained at local Headquarters during 
the winter. In the case of rural units, specialists were to be recruited in the same location 
to facilitate winter training.
Training in the peacetime Militia may have been spotty and focused on 
ceremonial, but there were conscientious and imaginative units that were surprisingly 
progressive, considering the institutional limitations. The OC 16th Light Horse in 
Saskatchewan, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Gwynne not only published his own training 
manual in 1907, but attempted to enroll women to ride with the unit and provide first-aid
t T)
on the battlefield. Not surprisingly, nothing came of this proposal for a Canadian
|
version o f the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.
Other units made a conscious effort to make training as realistic as possible. In 
1912, the Composite Cavalry Brigade conducted field firing at Petawawa, “firing 15 
rounds per man. Three screens were placed as targets, representing the successive 
positions taken up by a rear guard retreating, while the cavalry squadrons acted as the 
advanced guard o f a pursuing force.” 134 The same year, the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry 
made a point o f marching fifty miles under active service conditions from their 
Headquarters in Strathroy to the Divisional camp at Goderich, a feat made possible, 
according to one observer, by the fact that the “men, farmers and Indians, were well 
hardened.” 135 Western units were also innovative, and in 1912, the 22nd Saskatchewan 
Light Horse suggested a two-day exercise in the field under active service conditions.
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The plan was promptly approved by Militia Headquarters, although it was specified that 
the General Staff Officer Western Canada should have a hand in planning the scheme.136 
The following year, in Nova Scotia, the 63rd Halifax Rifles completed eight days’ training 
in 1913 under canvas, a tactical scheme in October, and “a night’s bivouac in July, under, 
service conditions.” •;
: Exercises at LHQ were sometimes regarded as public spectacles; in 1912 1st 
Division units had difficulty maneuvering during the Thanksgiving maneuvers because of
i i o
the crowds of spectators. However, field training involved considerable ingenuity. An 
exercise in 1910 for units in the Toronto and Hamilton area saw the 10th Royal
Grenadiers using a section of motorcycle scouts, while the unit’s baggage and camp
/
equipment was transported in a borrowed truck at the amazing speed of seven miles per 
hour. . In 1912, Thanksgiving maneuvers included a machine-gun detachment from the 
2nd Queen’s Own Rifles and wireless detachments from Hamilton.140 .
The 1st Division summer camp in 1914 was both ambitious and imaginative.
Rural units were to train at Goderich for eleven days, at the end of which city corpsv
would gather at Lucan. The two forces would then advance and meet in an encounter ; 
battle. Both forces were equally balanced in terms of composition, with infantry, artillery, 
cavalry, medical, and service corps elements. The rural units were to use horse transport, 
while the city corps would employ trucks provided free of charge by the Gramm Motor 
Truck Company, with the Department of Militia and Defence paying for wages and fuel. 
The aim of the exercise was not only to train units in an all-arms setting, but also to 
demonstrate the superiority of motor transport. Unfortunately, the exercise, scheduled to 
take place 22-27 August 1914, was overtaken by the outbreak of war and had to be
(
cancelled. Perhaps, it was just as well. Gramm trucks taken overseas by the First 
Contingent in 1914 were later condemned as unserviceable in England.141
The question of whether or not the Canadian Militia was well trained on the eve 
of war is difficult to answer. Training standards, after all, are relative. However, the value 
of both local and summer training seems questionable, if basic subjects such as 
proficiency with firearms are considered. Inexperienced and poorly trained militiamen 
called out in August 1914 had difficulties handling their weapons, sometimes with tragic 
consequences: fifteen year-old Private Gordon Betts of the 5th Regiment, Royal 
Highlanders of Canada, was accidentally killed by another sentry at the Soulanges
Canal.142 At Depot Harbour, Ontario, the picquet furnished by a rural unit, the 23rd :
y
Northern Pioneers, was withdrawn by 21 August 1914, after the Chief Commissioner of 
Police in Ottawa received a complaint that a number of shots had been accidentally fired 
by sentries and “the lives of the people around the elevator are unsafe.”143
The Militia was also hampered by a chronic shortage of equipment. While the 
Departmental budget had leapt from $6,909,211 in fiscal year 1910-11 (the last Liberal 
budget) to $10,988,162 in fiscal year 1913-14 (an increase of 59%), three-quarters of this 
increase was accounted for by pay, engineer services, and building maintenance.
‘Warlike stores’ more than doubled, from $334,548 to $703,375, but much of this must 
have been attributable to the purchase of 18-pounder and 60-pounder guns. The budget 
for construction of some fifty-four armouries, drill halls, and gun sheds increased over 
the same period by 143% to $1,611,180 (or 277% if Department of Public Works funds 
are included), but this was offset by the creation of new companies, squadrons; and 
batteries. The budget for uniforms did not increase in proportion and amounted to
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$916,991 in fiscal year 1913-14. To put this into perspective, the budget allowed for the 
purchase of about 26,000 new and replacement uniforms for the PF, Militia, and reserve 
stocks.144 : v
Uniforms may seem like a trivial concern, but they are utilitarian in the field and, 
as a visible mark of modernity, important for morale. Traditionally, the militia wore 
scarlet, green, or blue serge uniforms, both in the field and on ceremonial parades. The 
drawback to these uniforms became evident in the late nineteenth century, and in 1899
„ J
the 2 (Special Service) Battalion of the RCR wore khaki in South Africa. Following the 
Boer War, Canada adopted khaki uniforms for general wear by the militia in 1903.145 • ;
The issue of new uniforms proceeded at a glacial pace, and some units purchased 
their own. The 13 Royal Regiment in Hamilton was one of the first, and in 1903 
adopted khaki because the scarlet uniforms “smacked too much of the parade ground and 
church parades and not enough of the stem realities of war.”146 The 86th Three Rivers 
Regiment, on the other hand, expected members to buy their own, although as late as 
1913, there were a number of holdouts who still wore the old scarlet.147
Most units were content to wait until uniforms were issued. In Toronto, the 2nd 
Queen’s Own Rifles did not receive khaki uniforms until the eve of their departure to 
England to participate in the 1910 British Army maneuvers.148 The following year in 
Québec, the 11 Argenteuil Rangers attended summer camp wearing the “new khaki 
issue”149 The 52nd Prince Albert Volunteers and the newly-organized 60th Rifles of 
Canada were issued with khaki in 1913, although the 60th asked that the brass buttons on 
the new uniforms be replaced by rifle-regiment black buttons.150 The 48th Highlanders in 
Toronto received khaki service dress in June 1914, just in time for summer camp at
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Petawawa, but many units that spring went to camp partially clothed in the traditional 
uniforms.151 The 4th Chasseurs Canadiens at Lévis had only one company with khaki 
shirts and trousers, while the Prince Edward Island Light Horse at Charlottetown had 
squadrons wearing both the old and the new.152 At Niagara-on-the-Lake, the 2nd Field 
Company thought “the red serge is very unsuitable for Engineers during training”153 
while Major-General Lessard urged “that an early issue be made to those Corps not yet 
furnished with this clothing. The red and green clothing is obviously quite unsuitable for 
work in camp.”154 Even after the outbreak of war, old uniforms remained in use. As late 
as 1915, the 63rd Regiment manning the Halifax defences still had men dressed in the old 
uniforms, while CEF recruits from Cobourg, Ontario, appeared at the Artillery Depot in 
Montréal clothed in the peacetime blue serge.
Other uniform items, such as boots, were non-existent in the pre-war militia and 
members were expected to provide their own.156 Not surprisingly, many could not afford 
to purchase boots that would stand up to use in the field. In 1913, Major-General W.H. ;
Cotton inspected the 38th Dufferin Rifles and found that “About 50% of the boots worn
\
would be useless for active service.”157 At Camp Aldershot, Nova Scotia, the 
Commandant noted in 1914 that “Dress used by troops in camp was satisfactory with the 
exception of boots, none being issued. It is respectively submitted that a regulation boot 
be issued, on Repayment, to every NCO and man training, at a nominal price.”158 The 
same year, Major-General Lessard noted similar conditions at Niagara-on-the-Lake and 
recommended to Militia HQ that boots be issued with repayment provided the soldier 
attended at least three summer camps.159
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Unit equipment was also in short supply. CASC companies, amalgamated in 1913 
at the summer camp at Sussex, New Brunswick, to form a Division CASC Train, lacked 
vehicles and had to rent forty wagons from local farmers. Water carts were non-existent 
and sugar barrels were temporarily mounted on some of these wagons as a substitute.160 
The composite CASC Train was issued with obsolete military pattern harness from 
Divisional stocks; “A number of old pattern head-collars were recently issued to this unit 
from 6th Division”, complained Colonel R.W. Rutherford. “These head-collars are very 
old, evil-smelling of old manure, and are not fitted to take the bit.”161 CE Telegraph 
Detachments also lacked equipment. By 1914, each of the eight authorized detachments
was equipped with two cable wagons for carrying reels of telephone line and one airline
y
wagon for stringing telephone lines in the field, a scale of issue perhaps adequate for 
training individuals but inadequate to support collective training.162
Wireless Detachments came into being before‘1914, although there was a 
shortage o f equipment and enthusiastic militiamen had to purchase equipment out of their 
own pocket.163 A communications demonstration staged by the 2nd Engineer Field 
Company of Toronto in November 1910, for example, was possible only because a unit 
enthusiast, Lance-Corporal Richardson, provided the wireless sets. By 1914, “Wireless 
telegraphy stores became an Ordnance supply”164 but left unsaid was the actual amount 
of equipment available. As well, the establishment of a specialist unit or detachment did 
not necessarily mean that equipment would follow. In 1913, the QMG did “not approve 
issuing Signalling Equipment to newly organized units [60th Regiment] -  not until they 
have shown proficiency in other work.”165 In the event, the 60th received the equipment, 
but only after the CGS intervened.166
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. Mounted units did not possess horses on a year-round basis and these had to be 
rented; during the summer months, this could be difficult unless riding horses were 
available from local farmers or commercial stockyards. Horses obtained under these 
circumstances were not trained and had to be broken before training could start. In
i L
Alberta, the 25 Field Battery used untrained horses from a local stockyard to pull their 
vehicles and equipment to Sarcee from the Calgary train station, but at the end of the day 
“only one gun had arrived in camp; the rest of the guns and wagons were strewn all over 
Calgary.” Horses were also rented during the winter for city mounted corps for 
equitation training. This could be both expensive and difficult to arrange, depending on
local prices and availability. In Charlottetown, both driving and equitation in the 4th
y
Regiment Garrison Artillery was considered to be weak because of lack of training at 
local Headquarters.168 In the Okanagan, on the other hand, the 30th British Columbia 
Horse did not conduct mounted training during the winter because they were “much ; 
superior to the average Eastern cavalry as these men c a n  ride and therefore have only to 
put their horses into their places and learn their duties.”169
: The most serious deficiencies were in weapons and associated ancillary stores. 
The standard weapon after Confederation was the single-shot breech-loading Snider- 
Enfield rifle. In 1896, it was replaced by the Mark I Lee-Enfield magazine rifle, which in 
turn was replaced by the Ross rifle in 1905.170 The reasons for the adoption of the Ross 
rather than the Lee-Enfield are not clear. Sir Frederick Borden claimed that British 
companies either could not or would not establish a factory in Canada to manufacture 
Lee-Enfields, but Australia had no difficulty in establishing a Lee-Enfield factory in 1909 
at Lithgow, after calling for tenders in Britain and the United States.171 T
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\  The Ross was obsolete when it first appeared because, unlike the British Short 
Magazine Lee-Enfield introduced in 1902, chargers could not be used and the magazine 
had to be loaded with individual cartridges, as noted in Annex C to Chapter 6.172 The 
Ross magazine also held five rounds as opposed to ten with the Lee-Enfield. The small 
magazine and lack of a charger guide made it impossible to fire fifteen rounds a minute, 
an important part of the pre-war British musketry course. Significantly, a recommended 
syllabus for musketry submitted in 1913 by the 2nd Division did not include a rapid-fire 
practice. A bewildering variety of Ross rifles was issued, but none were designed for 
charger loading until the Ross Mark III was approved in late 1912.174
The adoption of a non-charger loading rifle created other problems. Unlike
y
Canadian ammunition, British ammunition was packaged in chargers. British web i 
equipment, purchased in 1910 to replace the leather Oliver equipment, needed special 
cartridge carriers to hold Canadian ammunition that was produced in ten-round paper 
packages.175 :;i ■■■;:•'
The issue of modem small arms to the Militia proceeded unevenly. Lee-Enfield 
Mark I rifles were first issued in 1896, but it was eight years before the 59th Stormont and 
Glengarry Regiment were able to hand in their forty-year-old Sniders, while the 55th 
Megantic Light Infantry had to wait until 1906 before they received their Lee-Enfields.176 
In the meantime, the Ross was being issued to other Militia units as early as 1905.
Procurement o f all marks of the Ross was painfully slow, and by 1914 the Militia 
was armed with a variety of weapons. The lucky units, such as the 56th Grenville 
Regiment with Lee-Enfields and the 63rd Halifax Rifles with the Ross Mark II, had only 
one type of rifle to contend with.177 Others were less fortunate. The 91st Canadian
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Highlanders in Hamilton had 436 Lee-Enfields and 83 Ross Mark II rifles, made obsolete 
by the introduction of the Mark III in 1913. Similarly, the 48th Highlanders had 200 Lee-
Enfields and 230 Ross rifles Mark'll. Astonishingly, in Québec, the 65th Carabiniers
)
Mont-Royal were equipped with 373 Lee-Enfields, 375 Ross rifles Mark II (short), and 
55 modem Ross rifles Mark III.178 '• i
The profusion of weapons created training problems and the CGS directed in 
April 1914 that musketry training had to be carried out with the Ross rifle and special : 
issues should be made to units equipped with the Lee-Enfield.179 However, the supply of 
Ross rifles was inadequate, and newly-organized militia units arriving at Camp Sewell in
1914 had to be equipped with the Lee-Enfield.180 The CEF in Canada had much the same
y
problems and at least one unit, the 43rd Battalion, arrived in England in 1915 carrying the 
Ross Mark II which could not be loaded with chargers.181
Artillery units were, perhaps, more fortunate than the infantry. The 12-pounder 
field gun, which had been the standard gun in the artillery during the Boer War, had a 
number of disadvantages. With no recoil mechanism, the gun had to.be repositioned for 
each shot, despite the use of a recoil spade. Older models of the 12-pounder had a ‘three 
motion’ breech mechanism, although the few Mark IV 12-pounders purchased in 1902 
had a ‘single motion’ breech. The biggest drawback, however, was the lack of a sighting 
mechanism for indirect fire, which meant the target had to be visible from the gun 
position before it could be engaged. The 18-pounder, introduced in 1907 to replace the 
12-pounder, was an infinitely superior weapon with hydraulic recoil mechanism, dial 
sights, and an indirect fire capability.182 A total of 136 guns were purchased,.but 
deliveries from England were slow and as late as November 1913, only 88 had been
1 S Idelivered. With the introduction of the new gun, the old 12-pounders were not :
disposed of, but were placed into storage to be issued later to the CEF.
Ancillary equipment was also in short supply. At the heavy artillery camp in 
Halifax in 1913, Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Thacker noted that the 2nd Montréal Siege 
Company was “Armed with two B[reech] L[oading] 6” Mk 1* Howitzers which are not 
yet fully equipped.” The company also arrived in Halifax without its technical equipment, 
“as all was available locally, but I am informed by the CO that Dial Sights, Observation 
of Fire Instruments and other technical equipment [are] not yet folly issued.”184 The same 
problem existed in the field artillery, and in 1912 a number of batteries arrived at 
Petawawa lacking equipment such as dial sights and aiming posts.185 In some cases, guns 
were available but were issued only for summer camp. In 1914, the Aldershot Camp 
Commandant recommended “That the guns and equipment of the 11th Brigade, CFA, be 
sent to their local Headquarters” and that the brigade should be sent to Camp Petawawa 
where the guns could be fired.186
The absence of guns and ancillary equipment at local Headquarters had an 
adverse effect on training. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, although he was 
surprised by the standards attained by artillery units, “in many batteries the detachments 
are not properly grounded in elementary gun drill” and went on to suggest that all gun 
crews receive instruction in basic drills at home armouries to allow them to receive the 
maximum benefit from summer camp.187
In 1914, the militia was of uneven quality in terms of equipment and training. 
Many o f its characteristics - decentralization, collegiality, regimental identity, loyalty to 
members, pomp and circumstance, initiative and dedication - were to be carried over to
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the CEF. The basic organization was sound, but how well Canada tapped this potential 
depended very much on war-time manpower policies. ;
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' Chapter 2
Manpower and the Canadian Expeditionary Force
The First’World War was Canada’s first modem war in the sense that the whole 
of society was involved, not just the armed forces. Inevitably there were competing 
demands for manpower from agriculture, industry, and, above all, the military. The 
problem was not unique to Canada. Manpower allocation was perhaps the most difficult 
economic problem faced by combatant states, all of which found it difficult to strike the 
right balance between the needs of the armed forces and the domestic production of food 
and material.1
Although most nations were eventually able to impose some measure of control 
on manpower, the Canadian government, from first to last, was never able to come to 
grips with the need to control manpower resources and instead relied on gradualism, 
voluntarism, and expediency. Competing demands of agriculture, industry and the CEF 
were never resolved, the growth of the CEF continued right up to the end of the war, and 
thousands of Canadians were diverted to British industry or other armies with the 
blessing of the Canadian government. The effect of this was to create a military 
manpower crisis in 1917 with profound and long-lasting effects on the nation. The crisis, 
however, could have been averted had the nation adopted a coherent manpower policy 
earlyon. : ■ -.u
To be fair, the need for a national manpower policy was not apparent in 1914- 
1915. The war was expected to last a few months only and, with an abundant supply of 
volunteers for the CEF, there was no apparent need for manpower controls. Instead,
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government manpower policies were concerned with offsetting the effects of the 1913- 
1914 recession. These were particularly severe in western Canada, where the construction 
industry had collapsed and both the Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern 
Railways had ceased laying track, idling thousands of company workers and contract ' 
labourers.2 The outbreak of war and the initial economic uncertainty aggravated this 
problem and large employers, such as Massey-Harris, laid off thousands of workers in 
Toronto and Brantford because European markets were effectively closed. The effect on 
the CEF was immediate, and many of those who volunteered for the 1st and 2nd Divisions 
in 1914 did so because they were unemployed.4;
Men did not enlist simply because they were jobless, but concerns with
s '
unemployment were pervasive. In London, Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Shannon, AAG 1st 
Division, asked for instructions in dealing with “cases of hardship caused by volunteers 
for the first Expeditionary Force giving up their permanent employment and not being 
accepted. Many of these men find a difficulty at this time of year in securing 
employment.”5 In reply, Militia HQ simply reminded Shannon that another overseas 
division had just been authorized arid presumably would provide jobs for the unemployed 
volunteers.6 A similar attitude prevailed in Winnipeg, where recruiting was viewed as a 
khaki relief project, and militia units recruiting for the CEF were instructed that “the first 
choice is to be made out of all unemployed members of their corps or other unemployed 
who present themselves for enlistment. The above are to be enlisted prior to any men who 
already hold positions or who are in good circumstances.” In Toronto, the 13 (Militia) 
Brigade CFA assembled a full-strength battery in anticipation of mobilization and 
requested permission to keep the men in the University Avenue Armoury because “The
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men being out of work are apt to drift off.”8 No detailed statistics are available, but one 
historian has estimated that perhaps 20% of all recruits came from the long-term 
unemployed.9
Despite the general surplus of manpower in the early stages of the war, there were 
local shortages of specific trades. CASC recruiting was suspended 18 August 1914, but it 
took until 3 September to enlist almost 500 Mechanical Transport (MT) drivers, cleaners, 
and artificers, and in the Maritimes, advertising funds had to be allocated to attract J 
sufficient drivers.10 Even so, the 1st Division was short thirty farriers, saddlers, and; 
shoeing-smiths and in January 1915, special authority.had to be sought from the War ' 
Office to recruit these specialists in Britain.11 At about the same time, the 1st Canadian 
Field Butchery was organized at Larkhill and had to call on the 9th and 12th Canadian
19Infantry Battalions for men who had been butchers in civil life. In Canada, men were 
enlisted in the 2nd Divisional Supply Train as MT drivers, although some had never 
driven before. The shortage persisted and in AprilT915, the 4 Brigade CFA in 
Toronto, which had no difficulty finding would-be gunners, had to appeal to Militia HQ 
for advertising funds to attract shoeing-smiths.14
The economic downturn persisted for much of 1915, particularly in areas with 
large numbers of transient workers. In Vancouver, thousands of unemployed workers, 
mostly immigrants, rioted in April 1915, when city officials decided to stop providing 
relief to non-residents.15 But by the end of the year, employment had been restored to 
normal peacetime levels, because of increasing employment in munitions plants, 
enlistments, and a sharp reduction in immigration.16 But there was still considerable slack 
in the labour force, and in Alberta, the 63rd Battalion reported in July 1915 that although
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recruiting had ceased, the unit was still “over-run with applications for enlistment.” In 
Medicine Hat, there were 250 applicants for 100 positions and the AG at Militia HQ 
directed that these men be enlisted and, if necessary, another battalion would be 
authorized for MD 13.18
The general slack that persisted for much of 1915 meant there were skilled 
workers who were not gainfully employed, and over 3,000 Canadians were hired to work 
in Britain and Russia. The largest group was the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, hired 
on behalf of British factories in the spring of 1915 by two Britons, G.N. Barnes, MP and 
William Windham of the Board of Trade; A total of .1,699 workers were hired, mainly 
machinists or members of allied trades. Hiring was done directly by Barnes and
y
Windham, or their agents, but the Canadian Department of Labour paid separation 
allowances to the workers’ families in Canada, retained copies of the contracts, and 
provided offices and clerical staff for the recruiters. The Canadian Munition Workers 
Unit was not regarded as a burden, but as an opportunity for employment.19 Additional 
workers followed and in January 1917, Prime Minister Borden announced that at least
3,000 munitions workers had been sent overseas.20 Although men sent overseas were 
British workers, the Canadian government retained a vested interest and in 1917 made 
arrangements for some of those drafted under the British M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t  to be 
transferred to the CEF.21
; In addition to the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, at least 600 track layers, 
blacksmiths, locomotive drivers, fitters, and bridge carpenters were hired in September- 
October 1915 by the British firm of Pauling and Company, to help build the Murman 
Railway in northern Russia.22 The enterprise was civilian in nature, but had been
approved by Andrew Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who encouraged 
the Canadian government to cooperate.23 The first group of 500 sailed from New York on 
13 October 1915, and the remainder followed shortly thereafter. Difficulties arose in 
Russia, however, because of poor equipment, harsh conditions and injudicious decisions 
by Russian authorities and in March 1916, the group, considered by the Russians as 
incompetent troublemakers, returned to Canada.24
Employment picked up considerably in 1916 and in November, labour bureaus 
reported that only 45% of all unskilled labour positions had been filled, perhaps because 
the labour force had been further diminished by 176,919 enlistments.25 War contracts 
continued to flow and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics described 1916 as “a year of
y
almost abnormal activity.”26 Skilled labour was increasingly hard to come by and in 
Brantford, “it was found very difficult to secure men for war work, so difficult that wages 
up to $8 and $10 a day were paid to machinists working on munitions.” The problem 
existed elsewhere and in August 1916, there were general complaints from manufacturers 
in Ontario that orders could not be filled because of the lack of skilled workers.28 Interned 
aliens were released in April 1916 to reinforce the labour force and the A l i e n  L a b o u r  A c t
• 70
was suspended to allow employers to import skilled workers from the United States.
The relief was short-lived, however; relatively few aliens had been interned in the first 
place and the supply of American labour dried up in April 1917 when the United States 
entered the war.30
But despite the increasing shortages of skilled industrial workers, the Canadian 
government made no real effort to regulate manpower or to redirect workers from non- 
essential industries, although the Department o f Militia and Defence attempted to restrict
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the enrolment o f skilled workers. The reasons for the Department’s interest in manpower 
are not clear, but emerged fairly early in August 1915, when Militia HQ directed that 
expert mechanics could be enlisted only if their expertise was required for technical 
positions. The policy, which was limited in scope, was subsequently expanded and in 
November 1915, the AG forwarded lists of munitions firms to all Districts and Divisions, 
with instructions to “keep in touch with these firms with a view to ascertaining whether 
they are in need of skilled labour, in order that all such men offering their services will
1
not be enlisted until it is ascertained whether they can be of use to these manufacturers.” 
To some extent, this had the effect of turning recruiting offices into employment bureaus 
and Recruiting Officers in Toronto, Hamilton, and St Catharines were directed to “take 
all possible steps for mechanics offering at your Depot to be placed with the above firms. 
They are only to be enlisted if unable to be so placed.” .
Although the A G ’s instructions clearly applied only to potential recruits, 
employers were under the impression the CEF was a manpower pool that could be tapped 
as needed. In Toronto, for example, the District AAG was deluged with letters from 
factories looking for skilled workers. Headquarters 2nd Division was sympathetic to these 
requests, but at the same time was reluctant to lose soldiers. Very few seem to have been 
released at the request of their former employers, although a handful of soldiers were 
given furlough to return to their workbenches.33 Recruiting officers and commanding 
officers were understandably reluctant to cooperate and in January, 1916, the Waterous 
Engine Works Company Limited of Brantford complained that units were refusing to 
release men: “We propose taking this up with the local corps but at the same time our 
previous efforts along these lines have not been crowned with any success. The Officers :
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are anxious to get men and they have no inclination, and seem to have no power, to allot' 
the men offering for enlistment, as is indicated in your circular letter of November 29th 
they should do.”34 Commanding Officers elsewhere were as obstreperous as those in 
Brantford and in June 1916, a battalion commander in Toronto told the head of a 
munitions plant that a skilled tool-maker would be released only if the plant provided twov I f  ,
recruits to take the man’s place. : ;
Further restrictions followed and Recruiting Officers were forbidden to enlist 
officers, engineers, and wireless operators of the merchant navy, as well as sailors from 
the Royal Navy. In 1916, cable operators could not be enlisted without the consent of 
Militia HQ, steel and coal employees in Cape Breton could not be recruited without
y” ■*
permission from District HQ, recruiting was prohibited in the coal, smelter, and coking 
areas of southern British Columbia, and in 1917, it was ruled that telegraph operators 
could not join without the consent of their employers.36 It was not only manufacturers 
who were concerned with the shortage of skilled workers. In 1918, the GOC MD 11 in
British Columbia recommended that recruiting for the Canadian Forestry Corps and
\
Railway Construction Corps be stopped because of the importance of these industries to 
the province.
Even with the full co-operation of units, the military’s efforts to coordinate 
manpower could have not succeeded, simply because there were no legislative or 
regulatory means to force ex-soldiers to return to their former jobs. The AAG 2nd 
Division remarked in A pril! 916, “This is a free country and a man cannot be compelled 
to work on Munitions if  he does not so desire.”38 The AAG’s remarks were echoed by 
others, such as Private O’Brien in Kingston, who defied his commanding officer and said
that if He were released at the request of the Canadian Locomotive Works, he would work 
elsewhere.39 Other soldiers were equally intransigent and threatened to join units 
elsewhere under assumed names, while others were careful not to declare their true 
occupation on enrolment. In some cases, men who had been identified as skilled workers 
by various companies claimed to have been common labourers, thus leaving the military 
in the unenviable position of adjudicating conflicting claims. In the face of such 
resistance, the policy was clearly unworkable, a fact recognized in May 1916, when 
Headquarters MD 2 advised the 129th Battalion that men who refused to return to their : 
former jobs would not be discharged.40
Apart from the soldiers’ reluctance to cooperate, departmental efforts were
y
doomed to failure because there was no comprehensive inventory of essential jobs. In 
effect, all jobs had the same priority and, had this been followed to its logical conclusion, 
few workers in Canada would have been eligible for the CEF. The problem was neatly 
summarized by the OC 129th Battalion in December 1915, when he complained that “The 
farmers argue that they are being asked by the Minister of Agriculture to produce, 
produce, produce, and that if  they enlist they cannot produce. The manufacturers, whether 
engaged in munition work or not, complain every time an employee talks about enlisting. 
This leaves only the clerks in the stores and labourers available.”41
The agricultural sector was probably worse off with workers moving to urban 
centres from 1915 onwards to take advantage of steady jobs with higher wages. In Brant 
County, for example, it was estimated that the needs of industry and the CEF had left 
only one experienced farm worker for every 250 acres.42 Moreover, farming was also 
seasonal and considerable numbers of labourers were required for short periods to assist
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with seeding and harvesting. Estimates vary, but across the country it was thought that 
about 42,000 seasonal workers were needed in the spring and 54,500 in the fall.43 Under 
ordinary circumstances, there was an ample supply of workers from eastern Canada, but 
by 1916-1917, many had joined the CEF or found more lucrative jobs in the growing 
munitions industry.44 The shortage of workers affected recruiting and in Alberta, the 
GOC MD 13 commented in January 1917 that farmers were actively discouraging men 
from joining the CEF.45
The shortage of seasonal labour persisted throughout the war and by 1917, radical 
solutions were being adopted. In Ontario, the provincial government set up employment 
bureaus to find 3,530 agricultural workers, 8,000 high school students were given
s'
standing, provided they performed three months’ farm work, and the Provincial Women’s 
Farm Department recruited 1,126 young women to work as berry pickers.46 To some ' 
degree the CEF. was able to relieve seasonal shortages by sending soldiers on seeding and 
harvesting furlough as early as 1915.47 The policy remained in effect throughout the war, 
but as men were drafted overseas, the number available for farm work declined
\
dramatically. An attempt was made in 1917 to limit harvest leave to 10% of unit strength 
in addition to farmers’ sons, but a large number of men continued to be lost to the CEF 
every spring and fall.18 Even in 1918 when there was an urgent need for reinforcements 
overseas, 12,744 draftees were given thirty-day furloughs, while ex-farm workers were 
allowed an additional two weeks.49
The policy that had the most effect on manning in the CEF was the M i l i t a r y  
S e r v i c e  A c t  [MSA], introduced in the House of Commons in June 1917 by Prime 
Minister Borden. Although the primary purpose of the MSA was to secure
j
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reinforcements for the CEF, the Act also gave lip service to national manpower needs. As 
Borden explained in the House of Commons, new legislation was needed because the 
existing M i l i t i a  A c t  provided only for balloting, which did not allow for “an intelligent 
consideration of the country’s needs and conditions.”50 The MSA was needed, therefore, 
to allow men to be called up selectively, with provisions to exempt essential workers. The 
preamble emphasized the dual purpose of the MSA: “by reason of the large number of 
men who have already left agricultural and industrial pursuits in Canada to join such 
Expeditionary Force as volunteers, and of the necessity of sustaining under such 
conditions the productivity of the Dominion, it is expedient to secure the men still 
required, not by ballot as provided in the M i l i t i a  A c t ,  but by selective draft.”51 The dual
i  y
purpose of the MSA was further emphasized by the Department of Justice manual that 
stressed the need for CEF reinforcements, but added that local tribunals were required to 
consider t>oth the civil and military requirements of the nation in granting exemptions to 
military service. However, the manual continued, the needs of the nation were complex, 
circumstances varied widely depending on local and individual situations, and no detailed 
guidance could be offered. Instead, local tribunals should consider the importance of the 
production of food, coal, steel, metal, wood, and other manufactured articles as well as 
the need for the continued operation of railways, steamships, telegraphs, telephones, 
light, heat, and power plants, and financial institutions. All were equally important and 
local tribunals were expected to exercise common sense, “having regard to local 
conditions and to their general knowledge of the domestic and world situation from the 
point of view of production, manufacturing and commerce.”
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In effect, the bulk of the labour force enjoyed some degree of immunity from 
conscription, as borne out by a sample of 469 MSA infantrymen. Only 6% (28 men) were 
industrial or munitions workers while 61% (286 men) were either farmers or labourers. 
Even allowing for the scale of agriculture in Canada at this time, the difference is 
striking. However, not only individuals but employers as well were allowed to submit 
requests for exemption, a process that favored wage-earners but not the self-employed: 
There may have been some intent to use the MSA as a means of rational allocation of ' ■ 
manpower, but it does not appear that this was translated into practice. :
However, despite its shortcomings as a means of controlling national manpower
resources, the MSA made a considerable difference to manning within the CEF. The
y
most obvious difference was that under the volunteer system, men were free to apply to 
whichever unit took their fancy. By 1917; this invariably meant almost any corps but the 
infantry, which had the highest casualty rate, a fact that the majority of applicants 
realized. But the MSA, for the first time in the war, made it possible to allocate recruits 
where they were needed, not where they wished to serve. Men who were medically unfit 
for the infantry were no longer rejected outright, but directed to less demanding positions 
where their medical category was acceptable.
: The MSA, together with the adoption of standard medical categories in 1917 and 
the transfer of all men on full-time service to the CEF in 1918, made it possible to comb 
out the fit men in Canada and replace them with those who could not be sent overseas.54 
In April 1918, the Canadian Garrison Regiment (CGR) with eleven battalions was 
formed as part o f the CEF, to guard vital points and internment camps. Militiamen on 
full-time duty were invited to transfer to the CGR; those who declined were released, and
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in a few cases simultaneously drafted under the MSA.55 The CGR contained a large 
number of unfit men; a study o f 134 members who died between 1918 and 1922 shows 
67 MSA draftees, 38 of whom were unfit, and 26 volunteers, only one of whom was fit to 
go overseas.56
Unlike militiamen, members of the CGR were also members of the CEF and 
could be sent overseas if their medical category was raised. They could also be redirected 
to other areas, regardless of whether or not they consented. In July 1918, MD 10 and MD 
12 provided 146 troops from the local CGR to guard prisoners of war working on Nova 
Scotia railways, while MD 10 provided an additional company to augment the Halifax
Garrison.57 Apart from the number of reinforcements provided by the MSA, the act made
/
the intelligent and rational allocation of manpower possible within the CEF.
At the end of 1917, the newly returned Union Government was aware of the need 
to address the problem of “more fully and intelligently utilizing Canada’s man and 
woman power in the prosecution of the war.”58 Government action was prompt, and on 
16 January 1918a conference was convened with representatives from provincial :
governments, industry, and unions to consider, “ways and means of quick and effective 
mobilization of Canada’s man-power.”59 Unfortunately, there was no unanimity and the 
results of the conference were inconclusive. T.H. Auld, Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
for Saskatchewan, encouraged the use of tractors to reduce the need for labourers while a 
, special committee recommended that conscripts rejected as medically unfit should be 
drafted to farms. It was also felt that federal labour exchanges should be established and a 
registration scheme put in place to determine the availability of labour. The Railway War 
Board asked that members of the Chinese Labour Corps, in transit from Victoria to
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Halifax for service in France, be detained for essential track laying, while farmers from 
Ontario and British Columbia wanted to make use of indentured Chinese workers.60 
However, most of these proposals were rejected by union representatives who opposed 
the conscription of labour and the use of Chinese workers, although they grudgingly 
agreed to national registration and coordination of the labour supply.61
Faced with this intransigence, the government backed off and no attempt was 
made to emulate the British Ministry of National Service, set up in the fall of 1917 with 
the power to allocate manpower for both military and civilian purposes.62 A sub­
committee of Cabinet was formed in January 1918 to deal with registration of labour and 
classification of industries, but the emphasis was placed on cooperation and not 
compulsion.63 A Dominion-Provincial Employment Service was set up, but this was 
intended only to facilitate the exchange of information between the provinces and the 
federal government. Sixly-six employment offices were organized by the end of the year, 
but the Employment Service had an annual budget of only $50,000, which suggests the 
priority assigned by the Union Government.64 An Order-in-Council (the Anti-Loafing 
Law) was passed in April 1918, making it an offence not to be gainfully employed or 
actively seeking employment, and a few months later, in June, some five million men and 
women were registered. Names and addresses were passed to employers and local 
authorities, but no attempt was made to make use of the information to redirect labour, 
effectively leaving the MSA as the only control over national manpower.65
Whether or not Canada was in a position to control manpower is very much a 
moot point since the government was in no position to control the war-time economy. 
Canada’s ambiguous status as a Dominion meant that the British government felt free to
place orders in Canada without reference to the Canadian Government. As early as 1914, 
orders were placed by the War Office in Canada and the United States for 1,300,000 
uniforms and 900,000 greatcoats with no regard for the needs of the CEF.66 The contracts 
were viewed as beneficial, and the T o r o n t o  G l o b e  felt that “as a result of war contracts 
which will be placed in Canada from the other side of the Atlantic many important 
industries throughout the Dominion will be in a position to keep their men in steady 
employment during the coming winter.”67 In other cases, however, British contracts were 
an obvious intrusion. In 1914, without consulting the Canadian Government, the 
Admiralty ordered ten H-class submarines from Canadian Vickers of Montréal. American
supervisors and technicians were provided by Bethlehem Steel and local militia units
/
furnished a security detail. Informed of this in January 1915, Prime Minister Sir Robert 
Borden was livid, especially when he found out that repairs to the Canadian icebreaker 
J . D . H a z e n  had to be suspended because the shipyard was fully occupied with the ; 
submarines.68
The largest commitment of Canadian manpower under British control was the • 
Imperial Munitions Board [IMB], established in November 1915 to coordinate the 
purchase of munitions for the British Government. Under the direction of Sir Joseph 
Flavelle, a Toronto businessman, the IMB flourished and by 1918 almost 700 Canadian 
plants with 300,000 workers were churning out supplies, not only for the British Ministry 
of Munitions but also for the United States Ordnance Department. The IMB did not 
answer to the Canadian Government, but to the Ministry of Munitions.69 The relationship 
seems to have been regarded with equanimity by the Canadian government and by 1918, 
military work parties were being provided to IMB plants in MD 2, MD 3, and MD 6.
!c
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However, the establishment of the IMB meant that “the most significant economic 
activity generated in Canada by the Great War was not supervised by the Government of 
Canada.”71
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Apart from men diverted to industry, substantial numbers of potential recruits 
were lost to the CEF because they were reservists or had been recruited by other nations 
in Canada. The total number of potential recruits lost to the CEF is uncertain but was 
probably in excess of 60,000 men, or substantially more than the number of MSA 
conscripts posted to the Canadian Corps in 1918. However, not all of these men could 
have been diverted to the CEF. It would have been difficult if not impossible, for
s'
example, to have prevented the 21,000 British and Allied reservists in Canada from 
returning to their home countries. To do so would have required a rigid manpower policy 
from the beginning and a degree of independence in foreign affairs that Canada did not 
enjoy. However, there were substantial numbers of men recruited in Canada by other 
nations, representing a genuine loss to the CEF. v •: r
The most prominent group were British Army reservists who had permission to 
reside in Canada during their five-year stint in the Army Reserve.72 At the outbreak of 
war in 1914, there were 3,294 of these men living in Canada, of whom 149 were 
members of the PF .73 The latter, all of whom were experienced soldiers, were clearly 
important to the CEF as it mobilized, a fact eventually recognized by the War Office, 
which ruled in March 1915 that “all imperial reservists now serving in the Canadian 
Permanent Force shall be allowed to continue in such employment.”74 But the situation 
was different for Reservists who were not members of the PF, and the British Army
Council ruled that “Army Reservists reported to be in Canada should not be used in the 
formation of Canadian units which may be placed at the disposal of the War Officé. They 
should be sent home as soon as possible.”75 Notwithstanding this decision, at least 150 
reservists joined the CEF and in December 1914, the War Office made an unsuccessful 
attempt to recall medically fit reservists serving with the First Contingent.76
British authorities coordinated the repatriation of reservists using the peacetime 
militia camp at Lévis, presumably staffed by the PF, as a transit camp. By the end of 
August 1914, more than 2,000 men had been returned to England with another 106 
accompanying the First Contingent at the end of September. The final number returned
is not certain, but in early 1917, the Minister of Militia and Defence told the House of
• • - ■ - -  - ■ . . .
Commons that 2,779 reservists had been returned to Britain.
Not all reservists domiciled in Canada were British. By January 1917,18,100
French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian citizens living in Canada had been returned to their
homelands. As with the British reservists, the Canadian Government assisted where
possible, going so far as to commission two French doctors as militia officers in
November 1916 for the express purpose of examining French reservists before their
departure for France. Not all reservists returned to France and at least twenty-nine,
including Raymond Brutinel who later became head of the Canadian Machine Gun
Corps, joined the 1st Division. One, Private Klein, who had joined the 14th Battalion, was
served with his call-up papers by the French Consul in Montréal. Concerns were
expressed about the legal status of these men, some of whom were naturalized British
subjects, but after some discussion, the British Ambassador in Paris reported that French
authorities would not press for the return of their reservists if  the men concerned were
;
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serving with the CEF.80 An estimated 5,000 Russian reservists living in Canada were also 
returned under arrangements made by the Russian Consul General in Montréal, although 
the trip could not have been easy. The Russian Government also took the position that 
Russian subjects were liable for military service regardless of their résidence but this was 
resisted by both the CEF and the men concerned. In June 1915, therefore, the Russian 
Government relented, and all Russian subjects domiciled in Canada, including reservists, 
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Apart from reservists, other Canadians also served with British forces, although 
the number is far from certain. In June 1919, E.H. Scammell, Assistant Deputy Minister 
for the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment, estimated that about 50,300 
Canadians served with the British. On the other hand, in January 1942, Edwin Pye of the 
Historical Section claimed a total of 17,498.83 Neither Scammell nor Pye outlined their 
methodology or sources. However, the Veterans Affairs Canada data-base lists 1,794 
Canadians who died while serving with the British Army.84 Assuming the British death 
rate to have been roughly the same as the Canadian death rate (9.6%), then approximately 
18,500 Canadians served with the British Army.85 Pye’s estimate appears to exclude 
members of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force as well as civilian physicians and
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nurses while if these groups are deducted from Scammell’s estimate, then the total of 
those who served with British forces can be reduced to 27,500.
However, Scammell’s figures include an estimated 2,000 men who made their 
own way to Britain to enlist and 12,000 who left the CEF in England to join the British 
forces. Neither figure can be confirmed, but there is no doubt that many Canadians ; ■ 
managed to join the British Army one way or another. There were a small number of 
expatriate Britons who joined the CEF because they could not afford the passage home, 
such as Alwyn Bramley-Moore from the 11th Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the 
23rd (Sportsmen’s) Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers on arrival in England, and Charles de 
Fallot of the 12th Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the 6 th Battalion Loyal North 
Lancashire Regiment and was killed at Gallipoli in July 1915. Others, such as 
Lieutenant V. Michie of the 5th Canadian Infantry Battalion and Captain G.M. Brew of 
the 1st Regiment CGA, made their own way back to England to rejoin their old 
regiments.87
The largest group of Canadians serving with the British Forces were those in theV
Royal Flying Corps [RFC], the Royal Naval Air Service [RNAS] and (after 1 April 
1918), the Royal Air Force [RAF]. Some were seconded from the CEF, but most were 
enlisted in Canada. The total is far from certain. Some years ago, the Directorate of 
History compiled a data-base listing 13,160 aircrew, including 1,736 known non- 
Canadians, primarily Americans, who were enlisted and trained in Canada. Together with 
7,453 men enlisted in Canada as mechanics for the RFC/RAF training scheme, the total is 
20,613. On the other hand, a panel in the Memorial Chamber of the Parliament Buildings 
in Ottawa claims that 22,812 men served with British flying services. An exact total,
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therefore, is impossible to determine, but it would be reasonable to assume that about
22,000 Canadian officers and men served with the RFC, RNAS or RAF.88
Recruiting of personnel for the RFC and RAF was done with the agreement of the 
Canadian government. No quota was imposed, but by October 1918, the drain on the 
CEF was such that restrictions had to be placed on transfers to the RAF.89 RFC recruiting 
in Canada was initially coordinated by Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Stanton, the Governor- 
General’s private secretary, with the assistance of Militia Headquarters, and successful 
applicants were sent to England for training. In the case of the RNAS, potential pilots 
were recruited by Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa and then trained at Curtiss 
Aeroplanes and Motors Limited of Toronto before proceeding overseas. A special 
holding company of the Royal Navy Canadian Volunteer Reserve was established at 
Halifax for potential naval aviators waiting for training.90
In December 1916, the War Office decided, without consulting the Canadian 
government, to establish a large RFC training organization in Canada. In the event, the 
Canadian Government had no objections and for the remainder of the war, the 
Department of Militia and Defence provided administrative and logistical support for 
RFC Canada, as the new organization became known. The IMB constructed airfields at 
Camp Borden, Rathbun, Tyendinaga, Armour Heights, and Leaside with ground training 
facilities at the University of Toronto. Two of these facilities (Camp Borden and 
Tyendinaga) were established militia training areas, while the remainder were leased or 
donated to the Department of Militia and Defence for use by RFC Canada.91 The 
manpower cost o f supporting not only RFC Canada, but British flying services in general, 
was significant. Although the Canadian contribution directly aided the Empire war effort,
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the unchecked diversion of manpower was a direct loss to the CEF and precluded any 
control over national manpower resources.
. ; Canadians served with a wide variety of other British units including a number 
that catered to men from the Dominions: 1st and 2nd King Edward’s Horse (The King’s 
Overseas Dominions Regiment) and the 17th (Empire) and 25th (Frontiersmen) Battalions 
of the Royal Fusiliers. However, apart from British flying services, the two largest 
contingents were those with the Inland Water Transport (Royal Engineers) and the 
mechanical transport section of the Army Service Corps [ASC].
The Inland Water Transport [IWT], from its humble beginnings in 1914, grew
rapidly and by 1918 had 10,164 men in France and Mesopotamia as well as 41,940 Y
y
African and Asian labourers.93 A large proportion of the IWT was Canadian and Captain 
W.W. Murray, a Canadian who served in the Middle East, later wrote about the IWT , 
crews on the Tigris River: “just to illustrate Canadian ubiquity during the war, let it be 
known that a large percentage of the officers and men of those river craft [on the Tigris 
River between Basra and Baghdad] was made up of British Columbians.”9- ,
Recruiting for the IWT in Canada did not start until November 1916, when Royal 
Engineer Detachments were established in CEF recruiting offices in Montréal, Toronto, 
Fort Frances, and Vancouver with instructions from Militia HQ. that districts were 
expected to facilitate recruiting.95 From 1916 to 1918, at least 3,108 men were either 
recruited in Canada by the Royal Engineers or transferred from Canadian units.96 
Recruits had to be skilled mariners and advertisements called for master mariners, marine 
engineers, bargemen, riveters, and calkers. Men were paid according to British pay scales 
(less than Canadian) and medical standards were less stringent, although this seems to
>
have boomeranged in 1917, when the IWT complained that CAMC doctors were passing 
men with tuberculosis, Bright’s Disease, chronic heart disease, and rheumatism.97 Once 
enlisted, the men were Royal Engineers and not members of the CEF. Nonetheless, they 
seem to have retained their Canadian identity and ex-Sergeant-Major R.W. Gomall of 
Vancouver later claimed that men recruited in Canada wore Canada badges on their 
shoulder straps during their service with the IWT. Not all IWT recruits were civilians 
and some came from the CEF, with the 1st Canadian Pioneer Battalion, for example, 
providing a draft of twenty-three men.99
At least 1,035 men were also recruited in Canada for the Mechanical Transport 
section of the British ASC. Recruiting started in October 1916 with the agreement of the 
Canadian government with a hoped-for quota of 2,470 men, although in the end only 
1,100 were enlisted.100 Applicants had to be skilled driver-mechanics, wheelers, fitters, 
electricians, or blacksmiths and an elaborate system was set up in Canada to test trade 
proficiency.101 However, Canadian standards were evidently suspect and further tests at 
the Grove Park ASC Depot in England weeded out some 500 Canadian volunteers who 
were unsuitable for one reason or another.102
Disposing of unsuitable Canadian volunteers was a problem and initially they 
were sent to the CASC Training Depot at Shomcliffe, where a batch of ninety-eight men, 
many of whom had been without a bath or change of underclothing for a month, arrived 
with no warning. The incident provoked an outburst from Major-General J.W. Carson, 
Hughes’s representative in London:
I would think that with the terrific demands that are being made on Canada for the 
purpose of keeping up the present and future Divisions in the Field, we can use all 
the men that Canada can give us, without turning over these fine boys to the
c
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•British Service and then find that they are treated in anything but the proper
spirit.103
The rejected volunteers were eventually given the opportunity to join the CEF at 
Shomcliffe, but more than half declined the offer and were returned to Grove Park for 
repatriation to Canada.104
Many of those who were accepted at Grove Park were drafted to British forces in 
German East Africa, where a British officer thought Canadians were “A little difficult at 
first, apt to chafe at the restrictions that, though perhaps not necessary for themselves in 
particular, were yet essential in preserving discipline.” 105 Like their counterparts in the 
IWT, Canadian ASC men maintained their Canadian identity and Corporal J.R. McNeice 
of Toronto wrote that he and his comrades felt they were only on loan to the British 
Army and that some wore CASC badges rather than ASC insignia.106
Apart from the ASC and IWT, other units recruited in Canada as well, including 
the Jewish Legion, which originated in September 1917 at the behest of the Jewish 
community in Britain. The original intention on the part of the War Office was to raise 
five battalions of Royal Fusiliers (38th, 39th, 40th and 41st with the 42nd as a regimental 
depot) from British Jews.107 However, it soon became evident that the pool of recruits in 
Britain was too small to sustain the Legion, and the War Office decided to recruit in both 
Canada and the United States.108
Recruiting for the Jewish Legion in Canada was controlled by the British- 
Canadian Recruiting Mission [BCRM)] in New York City, an unusual arrangement that 
was approved by Militia Headquarters in March 1918. To assist recruiting, the BCRM 
organized Jewish Recruiting Committees in Montréal, Toronto, and Winnipeg.109 Each 
Committee was to “enquire into the antecedents and bona fides of the applicants and
85
86
furnish each applicant with a Certificate to the effect that he is not within a class called- 
out for service under the Military Service Act of Canada, and that he is in all respects a 
suitable recruit for enlistment in the British Army.” 110 There was some ambivalence 
about ethnicity and religion and the BCRM instructed local committees that Russian, 
Polish, and Rumanian Jews were acceptable, but “Armenians and Syrians ought to be 
classed as enemy aliens.” 111 Recruits attracted by the Committees were processed by CEF 
recruiting centres and then transported by the Department of Militia and Defence to the 
Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova Scotia.112
However, there was no rush to the colours, perhaps because Jews who were 
British subjects were eligible for conscription under the MSA while many had already 
joined the CEF. Canadian Jewry was also divided and Zionist support for the Legion 
may have inhibited recruiting, particularly in the Orthodox community. In Winnipeg, 
Rabbi Herbert J. Samuel of the Shaarey Zedek synagogue not only recruited on behalf of 
the Legion, but announced he would volunteer as well.114 However, in a confidential 
letter to Prime Minister Borden, he opposed the Legion unless Jews bom in enemy 
countries were included as well. 115 By mid-July 1918 it was apparent that recruits were, 
few and far between and the Jewish Recruiting Committees were disbanded.116 The - . f 
number o f men enlisted in Canada is uncertain and official figures were never compiled, 
although Vladimir Jabotinsky, a former officer of the Jewish Legion, estimated that about 
300 Canadians were recruited, a figure confirmed by another veteran, Hyman Sokolov of
117Winnipeg.
A handful of men joined other British units. In December 1916, three men from 
the 3rd Canadian Pioneer Battalion and the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion joined the
c
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Royal Engineer Wireless Detachment at GHQ while four others managed to join Number 
6 Wireless Depot Company, Royal Engineers, by May 1917. . There were also 182 
veterinarians, eight chemists, twenty-five men with the motor boat patrol and Lieutenant 
F.C.C. Devlin of the 102nd Regiment (Rocky Mountain Rangers) in Kamloops, who was 
seconded to the Gambian Company of the West African Frontier Force and died at Dar 
Es Salaam in 1917.119
Table 6
Canadians Serving with British Army
Component Number Remarks
Flying Services 22 ,000
Inland Water Transport 3,108
Mechanical Transport 1,035
Jewish Legion 300 /
Minor units 250 Estimate
Sub-total -  confirmed cases 26,293
Joined from CEF 12,000 Scammell’s estimate





Canadian expatriates also served with other nations. It is estimated that about 200 
Canadians served with the French Army, although some of these may have been pre-war 
Regulars.120 Contrary to popular belief, only a handful served with the Foreign Legion 
such as Harley Gianelli Smith, a Toronto broker serving as an officer with the 12th 
Canadian Reserve Battalion at Shomcliffe, who was court-martialled in May 1917 for 
scandalous behavior, desertion, drunkenness, and escaping from custody. Smith made his 
way to France after being cashiered, joined the Foreign Legion, and was killed in 1918 
after being decorated for gallantry.121 Some 2,485 Montenegrin and 8,894 Rumanian 
recruits were sent overseas from Canada under arrangements made by the Department of
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Militia‘and Defence. 122 The majority were probably from the United States but judging 
by the Polish Legion which drew 1.7% of its recruits from Canada, about 193 were 
Canadians.
The Serbian Army also recruited in Canada. The campaign was headed by Nicola 
Pavlovich, an agent of the Serbian Legation in Washington, who had been authorized by 
the CGS in February 1917 “to superintend the recruiting of Serbians resident in Canada, 
not for the Canadian Expeditionary Force but for the Serbian Army.” 123 Like the Jewish 
Legion, recruiting was done by local committees formed by the S r p s k a  N a r o d n a  
O d b r a n a  or Serbian National Defence League. Recruits were interviewed, provided with 
identity cards, and quartered at the nearest Militia District HQ before proceeding to a 
central Serbian Mobilization Camp, originally at the Sussex militia camp in New 
Brunswick, and then at Lévis, Québec. Costs were shared by the British and Serbian 
Governments.124
The Serbian National Defence League, however, had a pan-Serbian outlook and 
considered all ethnic Serbs, including those bom in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as 
potential recruits. But the League’s efforts to recruit men who were classed as enemy 
aliens created difficulties and in June 1918, the Serb Legation asked that the Canadian 
government certify ethnic Serbs as friendly aliens despite their formal citizenship.
The League’s activities were not confined to Canada and men were recruited in 
the United States, a gross violation of American neutrality condoned in February 1917 by 
the CGS who wrote “efforts will be made to enlist Serbians in Canada and (the fact is not 
to be disclosed) in the United States [and] it is desirable to attract as little attention as , 
possible.”126 The number of Serbs recruited in Canada and the United States is not
89
certain; although returns submitted by the Commandant of the Serbian Mobilization 
Camp at Levis between 17 March 1917 and 28 November 1918 show 6,203 Serbs were 
sent overseas.127 To this can be added an additional thirteen men who died at the Levis 
Mobilization Camp: ten from influenza, two in an altercation, and one who was 
accidentally electrocuted.128 Again, using the Polish Legion as an example, it is probable 
that about 106 Canadian Serbs were recruited.
In some cases, national armies were raised for nations that did not exist. 
Czechoslovakia, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was recognized by Britain as a 
distinct nation in August 1918, but did not have an army, although Czech units were
f00
serving on both sides with the Russian, French, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian armies. 
There is no evidence that Czech legions actively recruited in Canada, although an 
estimated 3,000 Czechs were recruited in the United States, and it would be surprising if 
some of these were not Canadians.130 However, Czech-Canadians in the CEF were 
willing to join one of the Czech Legions and in October 1918, a handful of men from the 
2nd Battalion Canadian Engineers were discharged and sent to the Czech Legion Depot at 
Cognac. 131 At the same time, Czechs and Poles with the CEF at Bramshott, England, 
were given the option of waiving demobilization entitlements and joining the new 
national armies. The policy did not last long, however, and in December 1918, transfers
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to the Czech Army were banned, although men could still join the Polish Army.
Although Poland had not existed as an independent state since 1792, the ideal of a 
Polish nation persisted throughout the nineteenth century and was given considerable 
impetus on the outbreak of war. In the United States, Polish nationalism was fostered by 
paramilitary groups such as the Z w i a z e k  W o j s k  P o l s k i c h  or Polish Military Alliance
c
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formed in 1894, and other groups, including the Polish Falcon Alliance based in 
Pittsburgh, that conducted military training from 1913 onwards.133 With the outbreak of 
war and the possibility of Polish independence, the Falcons actively searched for a 
sponsor for a Polish national army. In October 1916, Vincent Skarzynski, a member of 
the Falcons, and Andrzej Malkowski, an associate of Joseph Pilsudski, the Polish 
nationalist who devoted much of his life to Polish independence, were introduced to Sam 
Hughes by a mutual acquaintance and took advantage of the opportunity to suggest that 
Canada take steps to train recruits for a new national army. Hughes took their proposal 
seriously, and after some discussions with London, the Department of Militia and 
Defence agreed to train Polish volunteers, with the first batch of twenty-three starting at 
the University of Toronto on 3 January 1917.134
Facilities at the University of Toronto were inadequate and after spending th e : 
summer at Camp Borden, the Polish School of Infantry moved to Niagara-on-the-Lake in 
October 1917, where a Polish Army Camp had been established by, Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.D. LePan of the Canadian Officers Training Corps [COTC}. Recruiting, at least in the 
United States, was initially brisk, Niagara Camp very quickly became overcrowded, and 
at the end of November, 1917, the 1st Depot Battalion under Major H.H. Madill, COTC, 
was moved to the PF barracks at St John’s, Québec. Additional barrack accommodation 
was also made available by the United States Army at Fort George, New York, leaving 
LePan with the job of coordinating Polish Army activities with two nations and two 
Canadian military districts.
Between October 1917 and March 1919, the three camps handled 22,395 Polish 
recruits, of whom 20,720 were sent overseas. The majority of these men were Americans,
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with only 384 claiming Canada as their home.135;Financial costs were borne by the 
French Government, but Canada had to provide the physical infrastructure, equipment, 
and uniforms (some men were issued with peace-time scarlet uniforms withdrawn from 
militia units). Twenty-five officers and several hundred NCOs and soldiers were attached 
to the Polish Legion, many of whom presumably could have been employed elsewhere by 
the CEF.136
Polish recruiting centres were opened in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montréal in 
I October 1917 with the approval of Militia HQ.137 But, with only 384 Polish-Canadians 
joining between October 1917 and December 1918, recruiting could not be described as
brisk and Polish recruiters turned to the CEF. In March 1918, informal arrangements
/
were made with the CO 1st Depot Battalion, Manitoba Regiment, to discharge Polish1 O
conscripts from the CEF if they agreed to j oin the Polish Legion. Evidently this did not 
produce the number of recruits expected and in June 1918, the Polish Recruiting Centre 
in Winnipeg asked for permission to browse personnel files of MSA draftees and post 
; advertisements in the Manitoba Regiment barracks at Minto Armoury. The Recruiting 
Centre also suggested that Polish-speaking MSA draftees who had been born in Germany 
or Austria and who did not speak fluent English should be transferred to the Polish Army 
where they would be more useful. Initially, HQ MD 10 balked at the idea, but by July 
1918, MSA draftees of Polish origin were being handed over to the Polish Recruiting 
Centre.139 '
In Montréal, Number 44 Polish Army Recruiting Centre also sought recruits from 
the CEF and in May 1918 , was able to persuade MD 3 to hand over twenty-one soldiers 
from the Polish settlements at Wilno and Barry’s Bay in Ontario. Presumably, the men
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concerned agreed to their discharge from the GEF and enlistment in the Polish Legion, 
although this is far from clear. 140 -
Table 7
Canadian Recruits in Foreign Armies
Foreign Armies Canadian Recruits Remarks
Poland 384 22,395 recruits overall
Montenegro 42 Estimated. 2,485 from 
Canada and United States
Romania 151 Estimated. 8,894 from 
Canada and United States
Serbia 106 Estimated. 6,216 from 
Canada and United States
Czechoslovakia ?
Total 683
Note: At least 1.7% oJ■ the Poles lived in Canada and it has been assumed that the
same proportion applied to other nationalities.
s
The total loss of Canadian manpower to other nations is difficult to determine, but the
estimated numbers are summarized in Table 8 .
Table 8
Canadians in Other Armies






Recruits -  British army 18,500 Includes Jewish Legion
Recruits -  British flying 
services
.22 ,000 Includes men enlisted by 
British-Canadian Recruiting 
Mission
Recruits -  Polish army 384
Recruits — Romanian army 151
Recruits -  Serbian army 106:




Note: (1) Table 8 excludes a landful of men from neutral countries who were
recalled. At least two reservists serving with the CEF in Saskatchewan were 
discharged after being recalled by the Dutch army.141
(2) George Forgeon, an Italian reservist, was discharged from the CEF after 
being recalled by the Italian army although he was a naturalized British 
subject. No doubt there were a handful of other foreign reservists in the same 
position.142
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Valuable as these contingents were, Canada’s maj or contribution was the CEF in 
general and the Canadian Corps in particular. Almost 620,000 officers and men were 
enrolled, no small feat for a nation of fewer than eight million people.143 But ’’neither 
Borden nor his ministers appreciated the strain this large commitment would place upon 
the voluntary system of recruitment and upon the nation’s economy.” 144 It can also be
added that neither Borden nor his ministers had a clear idea of the size, purpose,
y
composition, or control mechanisms of the forces required. Politics ruled all and Borden 
has received considerable credit for cleaning up the chaos created by Sam Hughes and 
asserting control over Canadian Forces overseas by creating the Ministry of Overseas 
Military Forces of Canada, [OMFC]. However, while the OMFC may have solved the 
immediate problem of the administrative control of Canada’s army overseas, it also 
meant that effective command of the bulk of Canada’s army was exercised by a cabinet 
minister in England, far removed from Militia HQ in Ottawa, who did not have to 
concern himself with the larger problem of coordinating national requirements for 
manpower.
Most of Canada’s soldiers overseas were concentrated in five divisions, all raised 
under differing circumstances. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were offered to Britain in 1914 
as independent forces with no plan to join the two to form a corps. However, in’April 
1915, Hughes, apparently on his own initiative, suggested the creation of a corps to the
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Canadian representative at GHQ in France. The offer was promptly passed by GHQ to 
the War Office and on 13 September 1915, the Canadian Corps under the command of 
Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson was formed in France. Alderson, an experienced 
professional officer, considered that a corps with only two divisions was unbalanced and, 
at his suggestion, Canada offered two additional divisions to bring the corps up to four 
divisions.145 The offer was accepted and the 3rd Division arrived in France in December 
1915, with the 4 Division, delayed by the need to provide reinforcements to the < 
Canadian Corps, arriving in the summer of 1916.146 Subsequently, in August 1916, 
Hughes ordered a fifth division to be organized, with a sixth division to follow.147 But
manpower was becoming increasingly limited and the creation of the 5 Division was
/
delayed until January 1917, largely because the men earmarked for the division had to be 
sent to France in November to replace the losses on the Somme.148
? The 5th Division was perhaps the most visible indication of the lack of manpower 
planning. It was not formed to meet any identifiable national or operational need but 
simply, it would appear, to save face by honouring a commitment made by the Minister 
of Militia and Defence. Both Hughes and the War Office thought the 5th Division would 
be sent to France but OMFC staff, wrestling with the ongoing problem of finding 
reinforcements for the Canadian Corps, thought otherwise. As early as March 1917, the 
Deputy Minister OMFC warned the War Office that casualties could not be replaced if 
the 5th was sent to France and that it would be difficult to keep the Canadian Corps up to 
strength, even if the 5th were tapped for reinforcements.149 The warning was repeated 
three months later when the Minister of the OMFC, Sir George Perley, again advised the 
War Office that it would be necessary to use the 5th Division to keep the four divisions in
France up to strength.150 By November 1917, it was evident that maintaining the 5th was 
pointless and Perley recommended that the division be broken up to provide 
reinforcements. Prime Minister Borden concurred, but Perley avoided taking action until 
February 1918, perhaps, as one historian has suggested, to avoid losing 5th Division votes 
in the December election.151
i iL
Whether or not the 5 Division tied up manpower that could have been better 
; used in France seems doubtful and in practice, the division was an extension of the 
: Canadian reserve organization in England. For example, the 5th Division was used as a 
holding unit for underage soldiers starting in January 1917, when minors at Shomcliffe, 
who were not employed as drummers and buglers, were posted to 5th Division units. By 
. the end of February 1917, the division held 698 juveniles with 951 on strength at the end 
■ of March 1917. These were the peak months, however, and when the division was broken 
up in February 1918, there were only fifty-nine minors on strength.152
’ The 5th was also used as a training formation and during its twelve-month 
; existence, almost one-third of its infantrymen at any given time were undergoing basic 
training. Needless to say, units were unhappy with this state of affairs and in May 1917, 
the 119th Battalion complained about a batch of 513 men from the 8th Canadian Reserve 
Battalion: “This draft is largely made up of men enlisted in Canada as artillerymen. Many 
of these men have had no shore leave; no P.T., no route marching, no BF [bayonet 
fighting], no armed drill and no squad drill.” 153 The Division was also periodically called 
upon to provide reinforcements and War Office returns suggest that about 4,800 men 
were drafted to France with the largest batch of 1,400 sent in May 1917, a drain
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commented on by one historian who wrote that in the 134th Battalion, “Drafts were called
for regularly and then the numbers would be replaced from reserve battalions.”154
T ab le9 • .. •-.>
Infantry Strength 5th Division155
Month
..... ■ ■-




3,004 7,156 697 10,857 72.3%
March 1917 6,878 3,519 951 11,348 39.4%
April 1917 7,434 3,300 407 11,141 33.3%
May 1917 5,289 3,546 405 9,240 42.8%
June 1917 4,760 5,990 309 11,059 57%
July 1917 6,319 4,489 392 11,200 43.6%
August 1917 9,142 1,681 301 11,124 17.8%
September
1917
9,469 1,204 312 10,985 13.8%
October
1917
9,450 2,842 245 12,537 • 24.6%
November
1917
9,222 1,157 161 ? 10,540 12.5%
December
1917
9,226 1,130 91 10,447 11.7%
January
1918
7,309 1,7 1 7 . 76 9,102 19.7%
February
1918
7,256 . 865 59 8180 11.3%
Average 7,289 2,969 339 10,597 31.2%
Note: The term non-effective is used to denote soldiers who were underage, medically
unfit, untrained or otherwise not immediately available for drafting to France. 
Canada’s willingness to be a helpful member of the British Empire created other 
manpower problems. In March 1917, the Cabinet agreed to a British request for drafts of 
the Chinese Labour Corps [CLC] to land in British Columbia and travel under escort to 
Atlantic seaports for onward passage to Europe. The decision meant that a staging area 
and depot had to be organized on Vancouver Island and transit facilities provided at 
Camp Petawawa. Guards, medical orderlies, and support staff for the various camps, 
together with a thousand men for the Railway Service Guard, also had to be found. While
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most of these men were unfit for overseas service, many could perhaps have been used 
elsewhere in Canada to replace fit men.156 Guards and medical orderlies were also needed 
for CLC transports, most of which sailed from Atlantic ports although a few proceeded to 
Europe via the Panama Canal. Providing the men for these ships was a minor headache 
and small detachments had to be detailed, many with little or no training; a CLC officer 
later commented, “Canadian recruits, still quite raw. They had only their rifles given to 
them a week before they sailed.” 157 Despite this, the detachments seem to have done well 
and in May 1917, a platoon from the 122nd Battalion was singled out for successfully 
putting down a CLC mutiny on the SS M i s s i n a b i e .
Canada was also willing to help with the expansion of the Tank Corps and in
/
March 1918, agreed to form the 1st Canadian Tank Battalion.159 Subsequently, a second 
tank battalion was offered and then, at the request of the War Office, a third. OMFC, 
however, understood what Ottawa apparently did not: apart from the initial cost in 
manpower and future reinforcement needs, three tank battalions meant a Canadian Tank 
Brigade, with the need to find 388 men for a brigade headquarters, supply company, 
signal company, and mechanical transport company. The OMFC CGS, Lieutenant- 
General Sir Richard Turner, thought the job would be difficult “Unless the numbers to be 
enlisted under the Military Service Act are likely to be increased.” 160 Fortuitously, the 
war ended before all three battalions and the brigade components were formed.
Other increases and changes to establishments had manning implications that to 
all appearances were not considered by either OMFC or Ottawa. In 1918, infantry 
battalions in the Canadian Corps were increased by 100 men each, while engineer field 
companies and brigade machine gun companies were grouped into battalions.161 Much
has been made of these increases and one historian has claimed that the effect was to give 
each Canadian division the hitting power of a small British corps. But the claim does 
stand up to scrutiny. Divisions did not operate independently and additional firepower 
resources were allocated from corps and army resources as required. In the opening 
stages of the Battle of Arras on 26 August 1918, for example, the 3rd Canadian Division 
was supported by sixteen guns from the 1st Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion, while the
iL
divisional artillery was tripled with the addition of the 16 (British) Divisional Artillery, 
a field brigade from the 15th (British) Divisional artillery, and the 52nd and 126th (British) 
Army Field Brigades. Nor did the increase in infantrymen have a significant effect and 
in July 1918, the average Canadian battalion with 1,018 men had only eighty-nine more
s '
infantrymen than the average British battalion with 929 men. 164
; Nor was the much-vaunted addition of 100 men to every Canadian infantry 
battalion new or original. In 1916-1917, battalions within the BEF (including the CEF) 
had been deliberately over-manned. The purpose is not clear, but was probably intended 
to compensate for the number of men routinely detached from their battalions for other 
purposes.165 Overmanning started as early as January 1916, when a visitor to the 
Canadian Corps reported that untrained supernumerary men were serving with brigades 
in the Canadian Corps. Official sanction, however, does not seem to have been granted 
until March 1916, when the War Office recommended that Canadian battalions in the ; 
Canadian Corps carry an additional fifty soldiers, presumably to ease congestion in 
England and position reinforcements closer to the front.166
The number of supernumeraries with each battalion varied over time. In August 
1916, the Canadian Training Division at Shomcliffe provided an additional 200 men to
c
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each battalion in France while in December 1916, GHQ directed that all infantry 
battalions (including Canadians) would be “brought up to a strength of 100 other ranks 
above establishment.” 167 The policy was further refined in June 1917 to 100 men per 
battalion in addition to the First Reinforcements held by Entrenching Battalions.168 The 
practice ended in August 1917 over Lieutenant-General Currie’s protests when GHQ 
withdrew all supernumeraries to form part of the reinforcement pool at the base.169
The addition of 100 men to each Canadian battalion in February 1918, therefore, 
simply restored an out-dated policy. However, the devil is in the details, and OMFC did 
not authorize a temporary increase but amended the battalion establishment, probably at 
Currie’s suggestion. Reserve units in England, therefore, became obligated to provide 
more men since reinforcement demands were tied to establishments. Nor did the 
battalions benefit to any great extent from this increase. As discussed in Chapter 7, men 
still had to be detached to a variety of miscellaneous duties and in April 1918, each 
battalion had to provide fifty men to the newly formed machine gun battalions, a shortfall 
that the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp could not make up until the eve of the 
Battle of Amiens in August. The Canadian policy of over-manning did not last long, 
and was quietly done away with in August 1918.172
Other aspects of the Canadian establishment changes created problems and new 
units such as the twelve engineer battalions and four machine-gun battalions required an 
additional 12,243 men to bring them up to strength. 173 There were other consequences as 
well, since the increased establishment meant an increase in wastage which had to be 
replaced. 174 The exact manpower cost is difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that the 
reorganization required an additional 13,868 men, which may explain why “the Corps
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was considerably under strength on the date when operations began [8 August 1918]”.
To put this figure into context, 24,132 MSA draftees were needed in 1918 to maintain the 
11(\Canadian Corps.
; Table 10
Engineer and Machine Gun Increases 1918177
100
Strength > Divisional Engineers Machine Gun Corps
31 January 1918 11,545 4,219
31 July 1918 15,551 (note 2) 8,572
Increase 4,006 4,353
Percentage Increase 35% 51%
Wastage -Hundred Days 8,477 5,006
Added Wastage 2,967 2,542




and Machine Gun Corps
!3,868 .
Notes: (1) I am grateful to Doctor Bill Rawling of the Directorate of History and 
Heritage for reviewing the initial calculations.
(2) The engineer strength for 31 July 1918 and the wastage during the 
Hundred Days have been adjusted to compensate for the pioneer battalions
i , . absorbed during the reorganization.
(3) Twenty-three new units were sent to France in 1918 including three 
engineer field companies and three machine gun companies which were 
absorbed by the Corps.178
Canada also provided a large number of troops that did not directly benefit the 
Canadian Corps or the CEF in general. Unlike Australia, which made a conscious 
decision to provide troops for the Lines of Communications [L of C] only when they 
would directly benefit the Australian Imperial Force [AIF], Canada provided L of C 
troops throughout the war, regardless of whether or not there was any benefit to the 
Canadian Corps.179 As summarized in Table 11, by November 1918, there were an 
astonishing number o f men deployed with units that did not directly support the Canadian 
Corps in France.
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Table 11 1 BfiCanadian Units Outside of Canadian Corps 11 November 1918








' Miscellaneous ' 544
Totals 35,198
\  Notes: (1) The table does not include small detachments such as the nine
man section with the Royal Engineer Messenger Dog Service or 
the two Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies employed as Army 
Troops.181
(2) The 8th Army Brigade CFA were army troops but spent most of 
their efforts supporting the. Canadian Corps. /
There were also troops deployed in other theatres, with the Siberian Expeditionary 
Force being the largest with almost 5,000 officers and men. Two field artillery batteries, 
together with 108 instructors and twenty-six dog drivers with their 251 dogs, served with 
British forces at Murmansk and Archangel, as well as forty-one instructors with 
Dunsterforce in the Middle East. Artillery detachments served in St. Lucia throughout the 
war, while Bermuda was garrisoned by a Canadian infantry battalion from 1914 to 
1916. Perhaps the oddest diversion were the instructors sent to Russia in April 1917 to 
teach men to drive Caterpillar tractors used to pull siege guns provided by the British 
Army. Fifteen Russian-speaking soldiers were selected but in the event, only two were 
actually sent. Both were promoted to sergeant, paid in rubles, and required to wear their 
Canadian uniforms. Amazingly, despite the chaos in Russia, the two were able to make 
their way to a training school near Petrograd and then back to England after four months 
of instructing Russian drivers.183
- A substantial number of troops were also tied up in Canada during the war. For 
the most part, this was decided upon by Canada, not Britain, although clearly the need to 
maintain garrisons at Esquimalt and Halifax, which on the outbreak of war “had 
immediately become the principal base for British forces that protected transatlantic
1 84shipping,” was unavoidable. The number of troops required in Canada for home 
defence was indeterminate, but by 1916, government policy was to retain 50,000 CEF 
troops in Canada in addition to militia units called out for guard duties, although the " 
CGS, for one, thought this was unnecessary. 185
The use of militiamen for guard duties started as early as 4 August 1914, when i
10,000 men were called out: all coast defence artillery units, the Prince Edward Island
/
Heavy Brigade CGA, five infantry units complete, and detachments from fifty others.186 
Guards were deployed along the Welland Canal, at the Niagara Falls power stations, the 
Vickers floating dock in Montréal, the Soulanges Canal, and a variety of other vital 
points in Port Arthur, Fort William, Sydney, and Canso. The number grew steadily as 
additional responsibilities, such as guards for internment camps, were added and peaked 
on 5 August 1915 when 14,782 militiamen were on full-time service. Thereafter, the 
numbers slowly dwindled to 11,084 men on 1 April 1917.188 With the introduction of 
Special Service Companies in 1917 to handle guard duties and their replacement by 
district battalions of the Canadian Garrison Regiment in April 1918, militia units were 
relieved of the responsibility of finding men for full-time service. In June 1918, all 
militiamen on full-time duty, as well as the PF, were compulsorily transferred to the CEF,





The number of militiamen on full-time duty suggests a fairly large pool of 
manpower that could have been tapped for the CEF, but this was not the case. Initially, 
many of the militiamen called out seem to have been fit for the CEF, but as time went on, 
manpower became scarcer and fitness declined as medical standards were relaxed. By 
April 1916, there were sufficient concerns over the quality of militia manpower that the 
Militia Council decided to use members of the CEF rather than militia wherever 
possible. 190 Their concerns were justified. In 1918, for example, members of the thirty- 
five man detachment o f the 107th East Kootenay Regiment at the Morrissey Internment 
Camp in British Columbia, were, on average, forty-nine years old. Twenty-five were well
beyond the maximum age for enrolment (the oldest was sixty-seven) and of the
/
remaining ten, eight were medically unfit.191 The Welland Canal Force had similar 
problems and in September 1918, Major-General Lessard, the Inspector-General for , 
Eastern Canada, wrote, “These men were all of lower category than ‘A’ and were not 
particularly intelligent. There was a sprinkling of aliens in the Force, some of whom 
could not speak English. As a whole the men were of rather poor class and physique.” 192 
There are no definitive strength returns for militia on full-time duty during the 
entire war, but the following partial return illustrates the extent to which the militia was 




Militiamen on Full-Time Duty193
Date Strength
5 August 1915 14,782
1 October 1915 12,831
1 November 1915 12,753
30 November 1915 11,874
31 January 1916 11,321
18 March 1916 13,000
1 September 1916 12,500
30 November 1916 11,783
28 February 1917 11,050
1 April 1917 11,084
By 31 December 1916, there were almost 50,000 members of the CEF still in
Canada, a strength consistent with the government policy discussed previously.
/
Recruiting, which had fallen off since June 1916, appeared to have stabilized and in 
December 4,930 men joined the colours.194 Since Militia HQ was planning to send 5,000 
men overseas every month, the anticipated intake of recruits meant the strength of the 
CEF in Canada would remain roughly the same. But as the CGS noted on 7 January 
1917, if the newly formed 5th Division was committed to battle and there was intense 
fighting with heavy losses in a short period of time, there was a distinct possibility that all 
CEF troops in Canada would have to be sent overseas regardless of the need to retain 
troops for home defence. The manning issue as seen in January 1917 was two-fold: _ 
providing the requisite number o f reinforcements for overseas; and maintaining a force of
50,000 men for home defence. The Canadian Defence Force [CDF] was therefore 
established in March 1917 with the twin aims of recruiting 50,000 militiamen for home 
defence and stimulating CEF recruiting by allowing select militia units to form recruiting 
depots. The plan was a stunning failure and three months of recruiting managed to
produce only 565 militiamen and 1,293 CEF recruits.195 Apart from the lack of recruits, 
the US entry into the war in April 1917 reduced the need for a large home defence 
establishment and by July, the CDF, or ‘Canadian Damn Fool Force,’ as Major-General 
S.C. Mewburn called it, had been absorbed by the CEF.196
Manpower shortages were of concern not only to Canadians, but also to the ; 
British who actively sought to substitute East Indians, women, and juvéniles for 
physically fit men who could then be sent to the front. In April 1917, GHQ suggested that 
blacks could be attached to divisional ammunition columns, reserve parks, and auxiliary 
horse transport companies. The issue was examined by the War Office and the upshot
was a program to place 134 Indian drivers in each of the fifty-two British and ten
/
Dominion divisional ammunition columns.197 There were concerns over the abilities of 
non-whites, however, and it was not until May 1918 that the 36 (Ulster) Division, for 
example, received “a proportion of Indian personnel for its DAC to replace English 
drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as gunners.” By November 1918, 
Indian soldiers had been posted to thirty-one British ammunition columns.199 While no 
Indian soldiers were sent to Canadian ammunition columns, GHQ manpower planning 
included the Canadian Corps and it is entirely possible that had thè war dragged on into 
1919, the shortage of reinforcements may very well have led to the acceptance of non­
white substitutes.
The principle of substitution was applied elsewhere in the BEF after Lieutenant- 
General Sir Henry Lawson completed his report on manpower utilization in January 
1917.200 There is no indication that the report was considered or adopted by Canada, but 
copies appear in OMFC files and it appears that his principles were taken to heart. As
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early as April 1917, HQ OMFC considered the use of British boy scouts or underage 
Canadian soldiers at HQ OMFC as orderlies and messengers, while in 1918, provision 
was made for fourteen-year-old boys and girls to work at OMFC.201 Women were also 
employed as substitutes and by May 1917, there were fourteen female drivers at OMFC 
Headquarters. The experiment was a success and the following year, CASC Mechanical 
Transport Companies were opened to British women serving with the Women’s Army 
Auxiliary Corps [WAAC].202 Other British women from the WAAC, Voluntary Aid 
Detachments, and the Almeric-Paget Military Massage Corps were also employed with 
Canadian hospitals in Britain.203 The WAAC or Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps as 
it was later known, also provided mess staff for the Canadian Training School at Bexhill 
and the 1st Canadian Tank Battalion, while a proposal to use women with Canadian 
Forestry Corps companies was only scotched by the Armistice.204
In the First World War the Canadian government was never able to come to grips
with the thorny issue of controlling manpower. No attempt was ever made to allocate
1 ' X 
manpower on a rational basis and no measures were taken to economize manpower. Nor
was there any serious consideration of the size and composition of the military forces that
could be raised and sustained. Instead, national policies and measures focused almost
exclusively on allocation, as though the nation’s manpower resources were infinite and
simply had to be pointed in the right direction. The only meaningful manpower policy
that emerged was the MSA which, in the short term, may have headed off a military
manpower shortage, but in the long term, helped to create problems that later came to a
head in the Second World War.
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Clearly the government had no rational basis understanding for manpower needs 
in wartime. Despite this, the government nevertheless embarked on an ambitious 
recruiting program. The military management of this program forms the central theme of 
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Chapter 3
The Recruiting Structure 1914-1918
CEF recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public
• i
demonstrations, posters and recruiting sergeants on the streets, was a highly visible 
process that has been examined by a wide variety of historians. But, this ignores the 
organizational framework created by Militia HQ and the nine district headquarters across 
, the country that made recruiting possible. Recruiting was not simply a social or cultural 
event, but also a military process controlled and guided by the Canadian Forces with 
varying degrees of success until 1918 when the Military Service Branch of the 
Department o f Justice assumed responsibility for calling up recruits conscripted under the
M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t ,
Many of the studies of recruiting for the CEF. have focused on the recruiting crisis 
of 1915-1916 arid the chaos, confusion and gross inefficiency that resulted when Sam
Hughes created almost a hundred infantry battalions overnight. Without denying that 
there was a genuine recruiting crisis, it should be noted that more than one-third of all
recruits (36.8%) were not infantrymen. These men were recruited by a variety ot 
agencies: corps depots, reserve squadrons, depot batteries, district recruiting offices and 
in the case of some of the forestry and railway units, by the unit itself. For these units,
V
there was no crisis. Having said this, the infantry was not only the largest component but
\t
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Forestry Corps 22,195 3.7%
Railway Troops 21,768 : 3.6% :
Medical Corps 17,593 2.9%
Service Corps 16,719 2 .8%
Machine Gun 14,954 2.5%
Labour 11,263 1.9%
Cavalry 8,344 1.4%
Forestry and Railway 
Construction
6 ,212 1.0%
Miscellaneous 20,906 ' 3.5%
Total 598,020 y
From August 1914 to November 1916, recruiting was periodically modified as a
result o f snap decisions by Sam Hughes, the eccentric Minister of Militia and Defense,
and it is easy to see him as the cause of all problems. But in practice, Hughes’s authority
was not absolute. First o f all, he did not concern himself with the overall policy and
organization but instead dealt with specific issues as they arose. Secondly, the staff at
Militia HQ, to their credit, persisted in trying to put CEF recruiting on a rational basis. In
April 1916, for example, the Militia Council took advantage o f Hughes’s absenceTrom
Ottawa and decided that new battalions would not be created until the existing ones had
reached full strength. The action ran counter to Hughes’s penchant for creating new units
at the drop of a hat and, not surprisingly, A.E. Kemp, the acting president of,the Council,2deferred any action until Hughes returned to Ottawa.
i
120
As discussed in Chapter 1, district commanders expected to be consulted on 
matters concerning units in their district and to be kept informed of any decisions 
affecting their district. Not even Hughes could ignore these long-standing conventions 
without provoking a backlash. In August 1915, for example, Colonel W.A. Logie, the 
commander of MD 2, complained to the AG that he had been directed to organize the 
92nd Battalion in Toronto with a full slate of officers but that Hughes had appointed : 
Colonel J. A. Currie as the CO. Even worse, Logie learned of the appointment from 
Currie and not Militia HQ. Logie’s outrage was palpable: “I am at a loss to know whether 
I am organizing this Battalion or whether he [Currie] is organizing it...May I be informed 
therefore, authoritatively, what status I have.”3 The reply from the AG was succinct: 
Currie would not command the 92nd and a CO would be appointed based on Logie’s 
recommendations.4 The issue here was not Currie’s suitability to command the new 
battalion, but adhering to established military conventions. A few months later, in 
November 1915, Hughes appointed Lieutenant-Colonel R; Belcher as the CO of the 138 
Battalion in Edmonton although Colonel Cruikshank, the District Commander, thought 
that Belcher was not fitted for command because he was sixty-six years old and 
“occasionally drinks to excess and then becomes unmanageable. I have been obliged to 
admonish him for this on two occasions.”5 In this case, there was no protest from 
Brigadier-General Cruikshank because he had been consulted and allowed to make 
recommendations.
The district commanders’ powers with regards to creating of new units remained 
unchanged throughout the war. However, the means by which men were enlisted to fill 




based recruiting) and district-controlled recruiting offices. These agencies were not 
created sequentially and at various times all three operated together, sometimes in the 
same place. In many cases, recruiting agencies had multiple functions. Militia units not 
only enlisted men but processed them or, in other words, conducted medical . 
examinations, completed documentation and then drafted the recruits to their new units. 
CEF units, on the other hand, not only recruited and processed volunteers but also trained 
them for overseas deployment. Lastly, district-controlled recruiting offices had the same 
responsibilities as militia units, but starting in 1915, acted as personnel depots by holding 
recruits until they could be drafted to units.
Large-scale recruiting was not a wartime phenomena but had been considered as 
early as 1911 when Canada’s first mobilization plan was drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.G. Gwatkin, who later became CGS. Two possibilities were considered; a levée en 
masse in the event of war with the United States and an overseas contingent with an 
infantry division and a cavalry brigade drawn from the militia in the event of a European 
war.6 Plans were drafted for the latter contingency, but there is no evidence that a levée 
en masse was seriously considered.
Ideally, the overseas contingent should have been formed by select militia units to 
preserve regimental and regional identities but as discussed previously in Chapter 1,. 
peacetime units were nowhere near full strength. Some of the stronger units could have 
been brought up to full strength with new recruits, but there would have been howls of 
protest across the country from units not selected, many of which had politically well- 
connected honourary colonels. In the end, Militia HQ decided to form the overseas
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division with composite units made up of men from ninety-six militia infantry regiments 
with quotas ranging from a machine gun section to five companies.*
Volunteers for the planned overseas division were required to be single, 
physically fit and between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, standards that excluded a 
significant number o f serving militiamen.7 Perhaps because of this, the mobilization plan 
also provided for recruiting. Both district and unit commanders retained a general : 
oversight, but the actual recruiting was to be done by the squadron, battery and company 
commanders who would actually command the men enlisted. In effect, the prewar 
mobilization plan relied not only on militia units for recruiting, but also the newly- 
mobilized units themselves, almost precisely what happened in the early days of the war. 
Finally, in keeping with British practice [Chapter 7], composite units were to form 
regimental depots to hold both recruits and reinforcements.8
The prewar scheme was not perfect: there were limited reserve stocks of clothing, 
equipment and weapons, no plans existed for detailed reports or pay services, and the 
reliance on militia units with inexperienced staffs left much to be desired. Still, the plan 
was useful, because it was based on a rational consideration of national manpower 
resources and provided a clear start point. Unfortunately, the scheme was abruptly 
cancelled by Hughes on 31 July 1914 and the orderly mobilization envisaged before the 
war was replaced by an improvised concentration at Valcartier, a temporary camp created 
on the spur of the moment.9 In the short term, the abrupt cancellation of the scheme had 
little effect on the structure of the First Contingent, which resembled the 1911 plan with 
an infantry division and a cavalry brigade.10 But, in the long term, the abandonment of
* The peacetime establishment called for eight companies.
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prewar plans meant that recruiting and mobilization would be an improvised business 
until alternative arrangements could be put into place.
, The story of the First Contingent and the resultant chaos at Valcartier in August 
1914 is too well known to be repeated here. Raising and dispatching the contingent in 
less than six weeks was a considerable achievement, but the process was anything but 
orderly and in practice amounted to nothing more than shoveling militia volunteers into 
Valcartier, leaving a hard-pressed group of twenty-five staff officers under the direction 
of the camp commandant, Colonel V.A.S. Williams, the AG, to sort things out as the 
troops arrived.11
Calling on the militia to provide recruits for the First Contingent was not a 
straightforward process. Few, if any, units had a full-time staff and instructions from 
Ottawa had to be sent to commanding officers at their home or business and then passed 
to the troops by runners or through newspaper advertisements. City corps could react 
quickly but rural units could not. Urgent telegrams from Militia HQ took two or more 
days to reach the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry in south-western Ontario, for example,■ . V• 19because the CO lived near Ilderton, “a considerable distance from a telegraph station.” 
Elsewhere in Prince Edward Island, the CO of the 36th Light Horse complained that his 
men were scattered across the province and it was impossible to contact all of them in a 
reasonable period of time. - :
Units also had some initial difficulties with recruiting and processing because 
Hughes chose to bypass district headquarters.14 As a result, ordnance officers had no 
authority or basis on which to distribute uniforms and equipment from district stocks 
while district paymasters lacked the authority (and funds) to pay recruits or to call out
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unit staff. The 24th Kent Regiment in Chatham, Ontario, for example, was forced to 
recruit in the evenings when officers and NCOs were free from their civilian jobs.15 But, 
this was only a temporary glitch and by mid-August 1914, many units had called out staff 
to handle the influx of recruits.
The number called out by each unit varied. In Stratford, the 28 Perth Regiment 
called out the CO, second-in-command, medical officer and quartermaster together with 
nine clerks, medical orderlies and storemen to process 156 volunteers from 12-23 August 
1914.16 In Galt, the 29th Regiment used the, CO, adjutant, medical officer, Quartermaster 
and Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant to process 117 volunteers, while the 25th 
Regiment in St Thomas was content to rely only on the CO and an orderly room 
sergeant.17 Even small units called out regimental staff; in Calgary; Sergeant-Major 
Barker supervised recruiting for the 14th Company, CASC.18 In a few cases, support 
personnel were also called out by rural units that chose to concentrate recruits from' 
outlying companies at regimental headquarters. In Parry Sound, for example, the 23rd 
Northern Pioneers called out unit cooks to feed the influx of recruits.19
Some militia units were needed for home defence duties and were unable to 
recruit for the First Contingent. In New Brunswick, the 73rd Regiment, a rural corps, 
abandoned its outlying armories when the regiment was called out at the beginning of the 
war, leaving nobody behind to take in recruits. Providing guards for strategic installations 
was important, but so was recruiting for the First Contingent and HQ MD 6 ordered one
i
officer from each outlying company to return home and reopen the local armoury to 
receive recruits.20
\
- One unit was unable to call on the militia for recruits. Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) was a wartime creation with no ties to the peacetime 
militia. But regimental enthusiasts opened improvised recruiting offices in Montréal, 
Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Calgary and the regiment was quickly brought up to 
full strength.21 ..
; Almost immediately after the First Contingent sailed to England, Canada 
offered a Second Contingent. Unlike the First which had been concentrated at Yalcartier, 
the Second was dispersed across the country in improvised barracks under the command 
of district commanders. In the case of the fifteen infantry battalions, each district was 
assigned a specific quota by Militia HQ on 18 October 1914.22 MD 1 (South-Western 
Ontario), MD 3 (Eastern Ontario), MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (Alberta) were 
responsible for recruiting one battalion each, MD 2 (Central Ontario), MD 4 (Western 
Québec), MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) and MD 11 (British Columbia) were tasked to recruit 
two battalions each, while MD 10 (Saskatchewan, Manitoba and North-Western Ontario) 
had to raise three battalions.
As with the First Contingent, militia units were called upon to provide recruits 
and district commanders kept a grip on the process. In Toronto (MD 2), twenty militia 
regiments provided recruits to the 19th and 20th Battalions. City corps in Toronto, the
aL
Niagara Peninsula and Sault Ste Marie sent men to the 19 while rural corps sent their 
men to the 20th Battalion.24 Further west in Winnipeg, HQ MD 10 assigned quotas to all 
infantry and cavalry units in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the Lakehead. The 79th, 90th, 
100th and 106th Regiments in Winnipeg as well as the 98th Kenora Light Infantry and the 
99th Manitoba Rangers in Brandon recruited men for the 27th (City of Winnipeg)
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Battalion while four Saskatchewan regiments and the 96th Lake Superior Regiment from 
the Lakehead recruited for the 28th Battalion. Lastly, each of the nine cavalry regiments 
in the district was required to provide 116 recruits for the 32nd Infantry Battalion.25 In 
Québec, both MD 4 and MD 5 sent French-speaking recruits from the 9th, 65th and 85th 
Regiments to the 22nd Battalion.26 Militia units were also provided specialists as required 
and October 1914, for example, the 79th, 90th and 100th Regiments were each given a
i L
quota of two cooks, four buglers and four signallers for the 27 Battalion àt Tuxedo 
Barracks near Winnipeg.27 ;
Not all districts were able to rely on the militia for recruits.' In the Maritimes, the 
25th and 26th Battalions had to recruit for themselves, probably because the strongest
s'
militia units had been called oût for home defence and the remaining units were not 
sufficiently well organized to process recruits.28
In contrast, Colonel Cruikshank of MD 13 (Alberta) used a variety of methods to 
find recruits for the 31st Battalion. Edmonton recruits, for example, were enlisted by a 
battalion officer, Major Hewgill, originally from the 16 Light Horse (a Saskatchewan 
unit).29 Further south in Calgary, Captain Morfitt of the 103rd Calgary Rifles was 
appointed by Hughes to recruit men for the 31st and then the 56th and 63rd Battalions.30 
Outside of Edmonton and Calgary, recruiting was delegated to militia units. In 
Lethbridge, Major Stewart of the 25th Independent Field Battery enlisted a hundred 
infantrymen for the 31st while in Medicine Hat, Captain Oakes o f the 21st Alberta Hussars 
and his medical officer, Captain Orr, recruited another hundred volunteers, also for the 
3 1st Battalion.31 -
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For those units that recruited for the Second Contingent, procedures were 
broadly similar to those followed in August 1914. In Stratford, five members of the 28th 
Regiment (second-in-command, medical officer, hospital sergeant and two sergeant- 
clerks) were called out on 22 October 1914 to process ninety-three recruits from Perth 
County for the 18th Battalion at Queen’s Park Barracks (today’s Western Fair grounds) in 
London. The recruiting campaign was brief and on 4 November 1914, the 28th staff 
downed tools and returned to their civilian jobs .32 Other militia regiments in MD 1 also 
called out staff to recruit for the 18th Battalion: the 24th in Chatham, 29th in Galt, 33 rd in 
Goderich and the 27th in Sarnia.33 In some cases, outlying companies were used; the 30th
Wellington Rifles opened recruiting detachments at company armories in both Fergus
/
and Guelph.34 Other districts also called out militia staff for recruiting purposes. In MD 2 
the 23rd Regiment in Parry Sound, the 32nd in Walkerton and the 34th in Oshawa all 
recruited on behalf o f the 19th and 20th Battalions.35 Non-infantry units also recruited for 
the Second Contingent and in Alberta (MD 13), the 14th Company CASC employed two 
officers and one private from 30 November to 3 December 1914 to recruit and process 
thirty-two volunteers for the 2nd Divisional Train.36
Prewar French-speaking militia units in eastern Québec were weak and in 1914 
were unable to recruit enough men for the 22nd Battalion. The shortfall was made up by 
posting men from two western Québec battalions (the 23rd and 24th) to the 22nd, but 
English-speaking recruits then had to be transferred from other districts to replace the 
losses in the 23rd and 24th. A draft of 135 recruits for the 23rd Battalion came from far-off 
Alberta (MD 13) while Lindsay, Ontario, (MD 3) provided a complete platoon for the
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24th. Other recruits from MD 11 (British Columbia) and MD 10 (Manitoba) also joined 
the 23rd and 24th Battalions.37
j
The 2 Divisional Artillery also relied on recruits from militia units. In 
Fredericton, recruits for the 2.3rd and 24th Field Batteries came from all three militia field 
artillery brigades in Atlantic Canada.38 In Toronto (MD 2), five batteries in the local area 
sent their recruits directly to the 4th CFA Brigade. Further west in Winnipeg (MD 10), 
only one of the three local militia batteries (13th Independent Field Battery) was required 
to enlist men for two batteries and the ammunition column of the 5th CFA Brigade while 
the third battery was raised by the 26th (Militia) Field Battery in Regina.39
Men with technical skills not found in peacetime militia units were also needed 
and a variety of methods were used to recruit these men. In Montréal, the 1st Canadian 
Heavy Battery turned to the Canadian Pacific Railway shops to find skilled artificers.40 
There was also a shortage of skilled electricians to operate searchlights and electrical 
equipment in the Halifax fortress. Fortunately, in August 1914, the Canadian General 
Electric Company offered to recruit and pay for twenty-five electricians. Militia HQ 
accepted the offer and the men were enlisted in the Royal Canadian Engineers (PF) and 
sent to Halifax, where they remained until at least February 1916.41 In Toronto, the 2nd 
Canadian Field Butchery did not turn to local militia units but recruited experienced ’ 
civilian butchers from December 1914 to April 1915 with the aid of Sergeant Lilley, an 
ex-Royal Marine butcher trained at the Army Service Corps School at Aldershot, 
England.42 Further east, Number 5 Depot Unit of Supply* in Montréal did not turn to the
* The Depot Unit of Supply was concerned with ration accounting at the corps railhead. The staff therefore 
needed both clerical and accounting skills, talents not usually found in a peacetime CASC company 
responsible for delivering rations to a camp kitchen at an annual summer camp.
militia either and conducted its own recruiting campaign from December 1914 to 
February 1915.43
The role of militia units in recruiting for the CEF in 1914 was not a flash in the 
pan and the practice continued for much of 1915, albeit on a more organized and 
systematic basis for longer periods of time. In Ottawa, the Governor General’s Foot 
Guards actively recruited for the 38th and 59th Battalions from February to July 1915.44 
Further west, in Owen Sound, the 31st Regiment recruited for the 37th and 58th Battalions 
in February 1915 and again from April to June 1915.45 In some cases, militia units were 
literally manning depots in that they not only recruited men, but held them until drafts 
could be assembled and dispatched to CEF units. In MD 3, the 57th Peterborough Rangers 
provided men to the 39th and 80th Battalions from February to September 1915. For much 
of this period, recruit drafts were forwarded weekly, but in September 1915, recruits were 
forwarded on a daily basis to the 80th Battalion in Belleville. As a recruiting agency, the 
57th was remarkably successful, bringing in as many as fifteen men a day and 198 in the 
month of September 1915.46
After the initial rush in 1914, the fixed affiliations between militia units and CEF 
battalions were largely done away with and those enlisted by the militia were posted on 
the basis o f need. In August 1915, for example, the 109th Regiment of Toronto, tasked to 
recruit for the 84th Battalion could not find enough volunteers and a draft from the 108th 
Regiment, intended for the 83r<? Battalion, was diverted to make up the shortfall. This was 
not an isolated case. Men recruited by the Governor General’s Body Guard in Toronto for 
the 75th Battalion were sent instead to the under-strength 58th Battalion. The shortfall in 
the 75 was then made up when HQ MD 2 gave Toronto militia regiments a fresh quota
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of 255 men each.47 Not all of these quotas were needed by the 75th and by September 
1915, local militia units were holding a substantial number of unallocated recruits leading 
the District Commander, Colonel Logie, to request authority to raise another because 
“There are at present about 2,500 recruits in this Division of which I am handing over the 
authorized establishment to the 81st Battalion.”48
Units in MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) had little confidence in militia recruiters. As a 
company commander of the 55 Battalion in New Brunswick explained in July 1915, 
civilians were preferred because they would “do much better work than an Officer of the 
Militia, who, as the people would say, should be away himself. Furthermore I consider it 
has a dampening effect on recruiting to have in the centres Recruiting Officers who are of 
age and are not volunteering for overseas service and have no intention of doing so.”49 
HQ MD 6 shared this belief and by the end of July 1915 all but four militia recruiting 
officers in New Brunswick had been sacked because they were unable to produce a 
reasonable number of recruits.50 Civilians were appointed as recruiting agents in their : , 
place but this led to other problems.
\
In Woodstock, five recruiting agents were appointed, including the town 
constable, a bank manager (who was also head of the Woodstock Board of Trade), the 
caretaker of the Woodstock armoury, a Canadian Pacific Railway engineer and a private 
from the 55th Battalion who was at home recovering from an appendectomy.51 But, 
nobody was responsible for coordination and all enjoyed equal status. As well, none o f 
these men were officers and could not attest recruits or provide them with public funds 
for transportation to the nearest CEF unit. In the case of the armoury caretaker, the job : 




surprisingly, he tried “to make money out of the recruits indirectly through his pool 
room .”52 Furthér north in Edmunston, a local commission merchant was considered well 
qualified as a recruiter since he spoke both French and English,’was too old for military 
service and had a son with the 55th Battalion. On the other hand, “he occasionally gets on 
a drinking bout, which though over fairly quickly is pretty bad while it lasts.”53 The man 
may have been well qualified, but he was a civilian and could not be controlled or 
disciplined by the military.
Using militia units as recruiting agencies worked well in the short term, but in the 
long term part-time staff could not sustain the pace since most militia officers and NCOs 
had jobs and could not be called out for prolonged periods of time. The 28 Regiment in
y
'  t hStratford was able to call out staff in July and August 1915 to recruit a draft for the 34 
Battalion, but this was the last time the regiment was able to respond, although one : 
subaltern and two sergeants were called out that autumn to assist the 71st Battalion.54
. ! By the fall of 1915, militia units that had been foremost in recruiting had closed, 
as those officers who had been instrumental in recruiting joined the CEF. In Alberta, 
Major Stewart from Lethbridge joined the CEF in November 1914 and six months later, 
Captains Oakes and Orr from Medicine Hat followed suit.55 There is no record of any 
further drafts from either the 25th Independent Field Battery or the 21st Alberta Hussars.
Other militia units were in a similar position and by June 1916, most had lost a 
large proportion of their officers to the CEF: the 28 th Regiment in Stratford had lost nine 
of its eighteen officers, the 50th Regiment in Victoria had lost seven of its eleven officers; 
the 8th Regiment in Québec City seven out of fifteen and the 7th Company CASC in Saint 
John, New Brunswick, five out of six officers.56 With so many key officers joining the
CEF, many units stopped parading and were dormant by mid-1916. Their status was 
acknowledged in August 1916 by the Militia Council, which approved a request from the 
QMG to transfer stores and equipment from these units to district ordnance depots for 
redistribution to CEF units.57
Despite the loss of key officers to the CEF, the militia continued to be involved in 
recruiting. In Toronto, HQ MD 2 was given authority by Militia HQ in June 1915 to 
recruit on a continuous basis. Militia units as such were not responsible for this but 
instead, each provided one lieutenant and four sergeants to work for the Toronto 
Recruiting Depot.58
s
With the end of militia recruiting, CEF infantry battalions started to recruit for 
themselves. The concept was not new, but had been the custom in the peacetime militia 
and was part of the prewar mobilization plan scrapped by Hughes in July 1914. No 
instructions concerning recruiting were issued at the beginning of the war, although it 
seems to have been understood that militia units would be responsible for finding recruits 
for the CEF. However, this changed 29 March 1915 when Militia Order 161 was issued 
charging CEF commanding officers with the responsibility “for the recruiting, 
organization, clothing, equipment and training of their units.”59
CEF unit-based recruiting became the norm after the autumn of 1915, not only 
because the militia was declining in strength but also because of two successive increases 
to the CEF. The first increase, announced by Hughes on 30 October 1915, boosted the 
CEF ceiling to 250,000 men, while the second, announced 1 January 1916 by Prime 
Minister Borden, set an establishment of 500,000. In neither case was there much
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forethought. As one historian has remarked, Borden’s announcement in particular was 
made “without any serious consultation with his [cabinet] colleagues. Certainly his : 
decision was made without the benefit of any planned study o f all that this large-scale 
commitment of Canada’s manpower would involve.”60 ;
The two announcements were a substantial headache for the Department of 
Militia and Defence. The War Purchasing Commission, for example, was caught off­
guard and did not discuss the purchase of additional uniforms, let alone other equipment, 
until the end of January 1916. As late as 19 April 1916, contracts had not been let for the 
kit needed to provide for Hughes’s increase announced in October 1915.6-
With only l91,654 officers and men with the CEF at the end of December 1915, 
the new establishment announced by the Prime Minister was clearly unreasonable. After 
factoring in the average monthly wastage rate for 1915, (1,918 men), the CEF would 
have to enlist 26,613 recruits every month to reach Borden’s goal by the end of 1916.62 In 
other words, the CEF needed a lot of men in a very short period of time. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister did not concern himself with details such as the desired establishment for 
each corps! The result was, perhaps, inevitable. Recruiting offices had been created for 
non-infantry corps, but they were small and few in number and the simplest way to meet 
the Prime Minister’s goal was to create a large number of infantry battalions with the 
expectation that each could recruit its own men. A
From November 1915 to July 1916 181,438 men were enlisted in the CEF, a large 
number that placed a considerable strain on both Militia HQ and district headquarters 
which had not been given any warning of the increases.63 A Recruiting Officer was added 
to each district HQ in August 1916 but this appointment had little effect since
r
responsibilities were largely advisory.64 In Toronto, Major-General Logie of MD 2 
suggested in August 1916 that a system of deferred recruiting be adopted, patterned after 
the earlier Derby Scheme in Great Britain.65 Militia HQ staff supported the idea and in 
early September 1916 the AAG submitted a proposal to the AG calling for “enlistment 
for the CEF on a deferred basis, i.e. subject to call for training and service on notice of 
one, two or three months; the men remaining in their civilian occupations, but after 
medical examination and acceptance, receiving say twenty-five cents a day, to be paid 
when called and possibly receiving elementary training at night during the interim.”66 1
The proposal was then forwarded to districts for comment, but only four of the ten 
districts were in favor and by the end of October 1916, the idea was effectively dead. The 
concept may have been useful if it had been introduced to coincide with the increases 
announced in October 1915 and January 1916 but, by the fall of 1916, as HQ MD 4 
pointed out, there were not enough men to fill existing units and deferring recruiting, 
therefore, did not make sense.67
Recruiting men for the new battalions was complicated by Hughes’s policy of 
allowing units to recruit outside of their parent district without, however, coming under 
command of the district commander concerned. The practice started in October 1915, 
when the AG, probably at the behest of Hughes, announced that CEF battalions were free 
to recruit outside of their parent district with no reference to Militia HQ. District
/o
commanders involved had to be notified, but not consulted. The policy caused no end of 
confusion and animosity and was cancelled in March 1916. However, specialist units 
such as pioneer battalions, forestry units and tunnelling companies were still allowed to 
recruit outside of their area as were infantry units favoured by Hughes or, as the acerbic
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Director o f Mobilization later described them, “marginally Gilt edged Infantry 
Battalions.”69
Even though the number of units allowed to recruit outside of their parent district 
was limited, the policy still hampered local recruiting efforts. In December 1916, for 
example, HQ MD 11 complained to Militia HQ that nine units from outside of British 
Columbia were recruiting in Vancouver and Victoria: the 174th and 197th Battalions from 
Winnipeg, the 230th Battalion from Brockville, the 236th Battalion from Fredericton, the 
239th Battalion from Valcartier, the 244th Battalion from Montréal and the 253rd Battalion 
from Kingston. To add insult to injury, several of these units were Highlanders and 
“Local Highland Regiments 50th and 72nd and 231st Battn strenuously protest against 
236th and 253rd Highlanders coming here to recruit.”70 Further east, Major-General Logie 
of HQ MD 2 had the same concerns and in December 1916 complained that six units 
from outside of his district were recruiting in Toronto. Commanding Officers of Toronto- 
based units “have communicated to me that this recruiting by outside units is seriously 
interfering with their recruiting campaigns,” noted Logie, who went on to add, “I would 
ask that as many of these units as possible be asked to cease further recruiting in this 
District.”71' ' .. ■ • -■
Civilian agencies were also concerned about the effects of units recruiting away 
from their home base. In October 1916, for example, the Nova Scotia Recruiting 
Association complained that “recruiting appeals from outside the Province is not only a 
mistaken policy but absolutely certain to result in confusion and harm.” The following 
month, the Union of Alberta Municipalities went so far as to submit a resolution to Prime 
Minister Borden complaining that a large number o f Alberta men had been allowed to
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transfer-to battalions in other provinces “which tends to retard our local battalions from 
attaining full strength and battalions from other parts of Canada are permitted to recruit 
men in this province.” The solution, the Union thought, was obvious, transfers should 
cease and “no battalions organized outside the province be permitted to recruit men in r
"t0!
this province until all local battalions are up to full strength.” The policy of allowing 
infantry battalions to recruit outside of their parent districts was clearly counter-. 
productive. But it was not until Hughes resigned that the policy was cancelled. In January 
1917 Militia HQ announced that units were forbidden to recruit outside of their parent 
district and local commanders were able to restore some measure of control to the 
recruiting process.74
s'
In keeping with peacetime militia habits, a few of the newly-formed units were 
not above poaching recruits from other battalions. In one incident, Majors Hughes and 
Knox-Leet from the Montréal based 199 Irish-Canadian Rangers boarded a troop train 
at Smiths Falls, Ontario, and tried unsuccessfully to convince men of the 192 Battalion 
from northern Alberta, to join the 199th. Despite this unsuccessful raid, another 
detachment from the Irish-Canadian Rangers met the troop train in Montréal but, as the 
199th recruiting officer noted, “not one man was persuaded to leave the 192nd, all seeming 
to much prefer to remain with their own officers and men.”75 There were other attempts 
at poaching, but none were as brazen as the 199th raid on the 192nd.
The confusion resulting from units recruiting in other districts was compounded
thby Hughes’s willingness to accommodate local organizers. In October 1915, the 88 
(New Brunswick) Battalion was renumbered as the 104 at the request of the CO of the 
peacetime 88th Irish Fusiliers in Victoria, who had been charged with raising a CEF
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battalion. The rationale for the CO’s request was simply that numbering his CEF 
battalion to correspond with the militia regiment would boost recruiting by linking the 
peacetime militia with the new CEF unit.76 In November 1915, Militia HQ authorized the 
creation o f two new battalions; the 119th Battalion in Manitoulin District and the 134th in 
Sault Ste Marie, Algoma District. Subsequently, W.R. Smyth, the Conservative M.P. for 
Algoma East suggested to Hughes that a second battalion should be recruited in the 
Algoma District. For some reason, Hughes did not approve the suggestion but on 27 
November 1915, only three weeks after the 134th had been authorized, directed that the 
two districts would constitute one recruiting area with only one battalion. The 119th then 
absorbed the 134 and Smyth was commissioned by Hughes and appointed Chief 
Recruiting Officer for the new 119th Battalion.77 The num ber‘134’ was allocated almost 
immediately to a new battalion being formed in Toronto by the 48th Highlanders.78 In 
October 1915, a deputation from Simcoe County, Ontario, visited Ottawa and received 
Hughes’s permission to recruit a new battalion in Simcoe County; Known as the 122nd 
Battalion, the new unit was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, the 
peacetime CO of the 35th Simcoe Foresters. Grant moved quickly. Seven recruiting 
detachments were organized across the Simcoe County and by the end of November 
1915, the 122 Simcoe Battalion had recruited 600 men. However, Hughes then decided 
that a battalion should be recruited in the Muskoka District. Grant, who lived in 
Huntsville, Muskoka District, was a logical choice as CO and he was therefore .. 
transferred to the new unit together with the title ‘ 122nd Battalion.’ D.H. MacLaren, also 
an officer with the 35 Simcoe Foresters, was then appointed CO of the Simcoe Battalion 
which was henceforth known as the 157th.79 The effect of these changes on HQ MD 2 is
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unknown but must have been one of ‘order, counter-order and disorder,’ a state of affairs 
that, to some degree, must have hindered recruiting. „ "
During the winter of 1915-1916, recruits were billeted in their home towns, 
provided that at least twenty-five men or more enlisted.80 The policy was probably the 
result of a general shortage of barrack accommodation, but there was also the hope that 
potential recruits would be attracted by the sight of local boys parading in uniform. The 
concept was well-intentioned but inevitably, in some units, billeting areas were widely 
dispersed. The 151st Battalion in Alberta had men quartered in eleven communities, a 
state of affairs that lasted until the unit was concentrated at Sarcee in the spring of 1916.81
th ' '  .The 119 Battalion in the Algoma District of northern Ontario was even worse off, with 
outlying detachments in fourteen communities spread out over 200 miles. There were 
some advantages to this policy, particularly when troops were billeted in communities 
where there was no militia unit, a factor that the 135th Battalion historian thought 
“undoubtedly helped recruiting to a considerable effect”83 On the other hand, routine 
administrative suffered. Recruiting was difficult to coordinate, training could not be 
supervised on a routine basis and quartermaster sergeants had to struggle to supply the 
outlying detachments. Lastly, small detachments did not have medical officers or clerical 
staff to process recruits and in many cases, detachment officers (if there were any) were 
too junior to complete and approve attestation forms. The presence of uniformed troops 
may have attracted potential recruits, but delays created by administrative complications 
may have deterred some prospective recruits.
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; - With the two increases to the CEF announced in October 1915 and January 1916, 
the number of men joining every month increased steadily, reaching a peak of 33,960 
recruits in March 1916.84 Combined with Hughes’s management style, the result was 
chaos with new battalions being continually created, changes brought about after local 
organizers petitioned Hughes directly with real or imagined grievances and the continual 
competition with units from outside of the district who had been given special 
dispensation by Hughes. In the end, a large number of men were enlisted in a remarkably 
short time but only at the cost, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, of bringing in thousands 
of men who were manifestly unfit and of swamping reserve units in England.
, District commanders tried to bring order to chaos although each adopted a 
different solution. In eastern Ontario, Brigadier-General Hemming noted in August 1916 
that there were nine well-defined recruiting areas within his district, six of which were 
assigned to :newly-formed battalions. Rather than shuffle the recruiting areas to suit 
existing units, Hemming requested that Militia HQ create three additional battalions. Not 
surprisingly, the request was turned down by an unsympathetic AG who suggested a
QC
generic depot battalion to recruit in the three unallocated areas.
In Toronto, Headquarters MD 2 chose not to divide the city among the newly-, 
formed battalions, but to restrict unit recruiting campaigns to specific periods. The 123rd
¿L
Battalion, for example, was allowed to recruit 6-26 December 1915, and the 124 from
th
27 December 1915 to 18 January 1916. However, the system fell apart when the 134 
and 166th were authorized and allowed to start recruiting as early as 12 January 1916. By 
the beginning of March 1916, there were five battalions in Toronto competing for 
volunteers as well as three battalions from nearby Peel County that were recruiting
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outside of their assigned areas.86 Under the circumstances, any attempt to allocate 
recruiting periods to each battalion was futile. As late as December 1916, Major-General 
Logie complained that the 236th McLean Highlanders from Frederiction were recruiting 
in the city although “my arrangement with the Commanding Officer was for him not to 
recruit in Toronto until after .one month from the authorization of the 255 Overseas 
Battalion CEF.”87
Headquarters MD 11 used several methods to control recruiting. In August 1916, 
militia recruiters were instructed to operate only within their parent regiment’s district. 
CEF units, on the other hand, could detail special recruiting parties to tour designated
A A
areas within the district. Despite the apparent freedom given to CEF units, there was 
little competition for recruits. Admittedly five battalions were recruiting simultaneously 
in Vancouver and Victoria, but three had specialized interests: the 143rd was a bantam 
battalion, the 211th an American Legion battalion and the 218th were railway troops. The 
only real competition was in Vancouver where both the 158th and 231st Battalions were 
trying to build up their strength.89
HQ MD 5 in Eastern Québec chose to divide the district into six recruiting areas, 
each manned by militia officers. However, the officers proved to be inefficient and in 
December 1915, the 57th, 167th, 171st and 189th Battalions were each assigned specific 
districts.90 But with the departure of the 57th, 171st and 189th Battalions for England in 
1916, the recruiting structure fell apart and the district had to be reorganized with a 
Director of Recruiting to control district recruiting detachments.91 Three primary district 




Chicoutimi and Grand Mère. Travelling medical boards were also created, each manned 
by two CAMC doctors, to visit to visit recruiting offices as necessary.92
In Alberta, HQ MD 13 allocated specific areas to battalions and then tried to 
suspend recruiting by new units until the existing ones were full. In January 1916, the 
113th Lethbridge Highlanders had enlisted 350 men after a three-month recruiting 
campaign. Despite this dismal showing, Hughes authorized two new battalions (the 191st 
and 192nd) tò recruit in the same area as the 113th. Since there were now too many 
battalions chasing too few recruits, the district commander, Brigadier-General 
Cruikshànk, recommended to Militia HQ that recruiting be deferred for the 191st and 
192nd until the 113th was up to strength. But his efforts were unsuccessful and Hughes 
directed that the 191st and 192nd continue recruiting.93 Not surprisingly, none of these 
battalions reached full strength. The 113 th sailed in September 1916 with 883 men, the 
192nd in October 1916 with 424 men and the 192nd followed in 1917 with a total of 316 
men in two drafts.94 ^  ' Ì ¿ ^
In some cases, battalions imposed controls on recruiting by the individual 
companies. The 135th Battalion, for example, divided Middlesex County, Ontario into 
company areas with Middlesex East allocated to B Company. But Middlesex East was a 
rural area and only 10,666 males of all ages had been enumerated in the 1911 Census. B 
Company was therefore allowed to recruit in the City of London where 21,901 males had 
been counted in 1911.95 Other companies were apparently given the same privilege and 
when the battalion embarked for England in August 1916,496 men or 54.5% of the 
battalion had been enlisted in London.96 Needless to say, recruiting for the 142nd (City of 
London’s Own), which was restricted to London, suffered and that unit embarked for
r
England on 31 October 1916 with only 574 men, 95% of whom had been enlisted in the 
city.97 . ■ : >
Creating community-based battalions broadened the recruiting base with 
impressive results but paradoxically reduced recruiting. In brief, all of these units were . 
organized as conventional battalions with no allowance for recruiting officers and NCOs. 
Recruiting, therefore, was done by officers and NCOs temporarily seconded from their 
platoons and sections. As long as the units remained at their home station conducting 
individual training, these individuals could be spared from their primary duties. But in the 
spring of 1916, the new battalions were removed from their home stations and
concentrated at central camps to conduct collective training from section to brigade level.
/
Officers and NCOs employed on recruiting, therefore, had to return to their platoons and 
sections which meant that recruiting was effectively halted. >
The removal of battalions from their home stations in the spring of 1916 had a 
significant effect on recruiting. In March 1916, 33,960 men enrolled and thereafter, the 
numbers fell as battalions moved to central training camps: 20,200 in April, 14,572 inV
QO
May, 10,059 in June, 7,961 in July and 6,597 in August. While there may have been 
other reasons for declining enrolments, a major cause was the removal of the battalions 
from their home bases, a point made by Brigadier-General Hemming of HQ MD 3 
(Eastern Ontario) in August 1916. “With reference to the 130th, 136th, 139th and 146th 
Battalions [from MD 3] at Valcartier” Hemming wrote to Militia HQ, “I have the honour 
to state that it is impossible to recruit men for these units in view of their present 
location.”99 :
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The 110th Battalion from Perth County, Ontario, enrolled 850 men between 
November 1915 and May: 1916 while they were stationed in the County, but only thirty- 
two after the battalion was concentrated, first at London on 22 May 1916 and then at 
Camp Borden on 20 July 1916.100 Significantly twenty-one of those enlisted after 22 May 
1916 joined in London or Camp Borden while only eleven were enlisted in Perth 
County. 101 In Saskatchewan, the diarist of the 232nd Battalion remarked that with the 
unit’s move to Camp Hughes on 20 July 1916, the battalion recruiting campaign had to » 
be discontinued because “the movement [to Camp Hughes] necessitated the bringing in 
of all our men from outlying points.” 102 The unit diarist did not exaggerate. Of the 450
men who sailed with the 232nd in April 1917, 380 had enlisted before the battalion went
/
to Camp Hughes while a further seventeen joined before the unit moved to winter 
quarters at Battleford and North Battleford on 20 October 1916. Recruiting was resumed, 
but the momentum had been lost and only fifty-three additional volunteers j oined the 
battalion before embarkation.103
The policy of creating new battalions ended shortly after Hughes resigned his 
portfolio in mid-November 1916. His departure was not mourned at Militia HQ, 
particularly by the CGS who openly deplored “the lack of well-regulated and firmly 
administered system of organization [that] has interfered with the provision of 
reinforcements and impeded the upkeep of battalions overseas.”104 As early as 29 
November 1916, the AG rejected a request from HQ MD 10 for a new battalion in 
Selkirk, Manitoba, because if additional units “were raised, they would merely be draft- 
giving Depot Battalions.” 105 A month later, in December 1916, the DG Mobilization, 
Brigadier-General Gwynne, recommended that a proposal to raise another battalion in
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New Brunswick be scotched, adding that “No new battalions have been raised [since] 
General Hughes left, and it would be fatal to once open the door again to do so.” 106 
Gwynne’s recommendation was understandable, but the battalions being shipped to 
England [Chapter 8] as soon as troopships could be organized, constituted the infantry 
recruiting structure. Once they were gone, there was nothing.
Both Militia HQ in Ottawa and the newly-organized HQ of the Overseas Military 
Forces of Canada (OMFC) in London were well aware of the need for a new recruiting' 
and reinforcing structure to replace the battalions being shipped overseas and there was 
an exchange of ideas between the CGS and Major-General R.E.W. Turner, the newly- 
appointed GOC Canadians in England.107 Both felt that the infantry should be organized 
on a territorial basis with three linked battalions: a recruiting unit or depot in Canada, a 
training battalion in England, and a fighting battalion in France. The two differed only on 
the details, with Turner recommending generic recruiting centres and Gwatkin favouring 
militia units.108
Gwatkin’s trust in the militia at this stage of the war was odd, but with the small 
staffs at both Militia and district HQ, creating a large-scale national recruiting 
organization would have taken time whereas the militia was available immediately. 
Linking militia regiments to CEF battalions, Gwatkin thought, might boost recruiting and 
there was also the matter of the hard-won battle honours and achievements of CEF units 
that should be perpetuated in the post-war army.109 Others shared the CGS’s faith in the 
militia and in January 1917, Colonel H. Osborne at Militia HQ wrote, “our greatest hope 
in the present situation lies in the Militia of Canada. Although dormant, with the
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exception of a few Regiments at the present time, it is a powerful agency, if wisely 
employed, not only for providing a defensive force, but also for furnishing recruits for 
Overseas.” 110
Gwatkin’s faith in the militia seemed reasonable at the time since a number of 
militia units had already succeeded in recruiting overseas contingents in 1915, as . 
discussed in Chapter 8 . Militia units had also been able to raise drafts; in 1915, for 
example, the 79th Cameron Highlanders, 90th Winnipeg Rifles and 34th Fort Garry Horse 
raised six overseas drafts of about 250 men each.111 At the same time, the 66 th Regiment 
in Halifax recruited a draft of 250 men while the 63rd, also from Halifax, recruited three 
drafts of 100 men each. With these examples in mind, the CGS circulated a proposal to 
Militia HQ staff on 15 January 1917 to use militia units as recruiting agencies. In brief, 
the CGS noted that sixteen infantry regiments were already recruiting for the CEF and 
that an additional thirty-nine urban regiments should be invited to form “regimental 
depots with a view to raising and training reinforcements for service overseas.” There 
was no disagreement with the proposal at Militia HQ and three days later, districts were 
formally instructed to invite city regiments to form regimental depots to recruit and train 
drafts for the CEF overseas.114
Despite Gwatkin’s optimism, expectations were not high and regiments were 
expected to provide small drafts rather than delay the movement of reinforcements until 
company-sized drafts could be recruited. In February 1917, the 43rd Regiment in MD 3 
was allowed to form a regimental depot, but drafts were limited to one officer and fifty 
men.115 Similarly, in April 1917, the 32nd Regiment in MD 1 was given authority to 
establish a depot in Walkerton, Ontario, to recruit reinforcements for the 160th (Bruce)
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Battalion, then serving with the 5th Division in England. But, as the AG noted when he 
approved the new depot, “It is understood that if men are needed they will be sent over in 
batches of fifty under a lieutenant.” 116
thThe number of recruits obtained by the militia depots was disappointing. The 11 
Regiment in Vancouver was able to find only fifty-one infantrymen, while in MD 1, the 
District Commander reported in July 1917, that six militia regiments had provided drafts 
but the number of recruits “is so small that it is impossible to train them separately and 
get satisfactory results.” 117 The effort to maintain the regimental identity of the militia 
drafts was obviously a lost cause and in August 1917, the AG directed that all recruits
should be posted to the newly-formed depot battalion in London and thus form part of the
/•
I t Rgeneral reinforcement stream.
As discussed in Chapter 2, efforts were also made to use the militia to recruit men 
for the Canadian Defence Force (CDF) for both home defence and the CEF overseas. But 
there was little appetite in Canada for the CDF and even less in England where the War 
Office was concerned that the new force would siphon off potential recruits for the 
CEF. 119 It was widely expected from the start that the CDF would fail because the supply 
of volunteers had long since dried up. The Director-General, Major-General S.C. 
Mewbum, for one, was “convinced that it will be impossible to raise 50,000 men for the 
Home Defence o f Canada on the voluntary enlistment plan.” 120 His sentiments were 
shared by the CO of the 53rd Regiment in Sherbrooke, Québec, who said flatly 
“Compulsory training is the only way in which my Regiment can be gotten together.” 
Further west in Winnipeg, the CO of the 174th Battalion wrote to Militia HQ that “this 
latest scheme for mobilizing the Militia as the CDF is going to prove absolutely
useless.” But the concerns were disregarded since the CDF had a political as well as a 
military purpose. “It has not been made clear to me” wrote the new Minister of Militia 
and Defence to the CDF Director-General in March 1917, “why we should proceed by 
force to enlist men for Home Defence. , .without first proceeding in a voluntary way.”123 
A sa  recruiting venture, the CDF was a miserable failure. Forty-seven militia 
infantry regiments organized depots, but managed to enlist only 565 men for the CDF 
and 1,293 for the CEF after a three-month recruiting campaign. Some districts, such as 
MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (British Columbia), were able to find recruits for the 
CDF but not the CEF, while MD 6 (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward; 
Island) was unable to find volunteers for either component.124 However, a few units 
enjoyed some success and by the end of June 1917, the 48th Highlanders in Toronto had 
found 133 recruits: 116 for the CEF and seventeen for home defence. But the overall 
quality of applicants was poor. At least sixty-four had been rejected, a quarter of whom 
were both underage and medically unfit - boys such as Harry Brennan, an under-sized, 
fifteen-year-old labourer with lung cancer, and seventeen-year-old Victor Callebert who 
weighed only ninety-five pounds. Underage recruits, particularly for the home defence 
component, were also a problem and in June 1917, Lieutenant Haldenby of the 48th wrote 
“We are to have a medical board examine the Depot on Wednesday and I think we will 
kiss the CDF good-by on Friday if they stick to the 18 [year-old] age limit.” 125 After 
three months of effort, it became apparent that few Canadians were willing to volunteer 
for the CDF and recruiting was therefore suspended on 22 May 1917. However militia 
depots continued to recruit for the CEF and over the next three months, the recruits were 
transferred to the newly-organized territorial depot battalions.126
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As the CDF and the militia depots wound down, Militia HQ took stock of CEF 
manpower in Canada. The results were depressing. In May 1917, 6,407 men enlisted in 
the CEF but only 1,208 in the infantry. Figures for June 1917 were similar with only 
1,126 of 6,363 volunteers choosing the infantry. It was clear that the pool of able-bodied 
men in Canada willing to volunteer was virtually drained and that no recruiting 
organization that relied on volunteers, no matter how efficient, would be able to produce 
the numbers required. There; was some relief when the British-Canadian Recruiting 
Mission was established in June 1917 (see Chapter 5) and thousands of American 
residents joined the CEF, but this supply of manpower was dependent on the goodwill 
and cooperation of the US Government. The only solution was conscription under the 
M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t .  However, calling men up (a form of compulsory enlistment) was 
not the responsibility of the military but of the Military Service Branch of the Department 
of Justice. Thus, for the final year of the war, the Canadian Forces lost control of the 
principal means for finding recruits.
A vital part of the process of enlisting men was the conduct of medical 
examinations, completion of personal documentation and the issue of kit to the new 
recruits. Initially this was done by militia regiments or CEF units, or a combination of the 
two. But in practice, this arrangement could not have been very efficient. It is doubtful, 
for example, that many militia units had adequate stocks of khaki service dress uniforms. 
CEF units, on the other hand, could draw from district ordnance stocks. But with the 
requirement to stock uniforms of various sizes, quartermasters inevitably held more 
uniforms than there were soldiers in the battalion. With the overall shortage of uniforms,
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it made no sense to allow units to maintain a surplus. Unit medical sections and orderly 
rooms, staffed to provide services to the unit, must have also been hard-pressed at times 
to handle the influx of recruits. Inevitably, the CEF started in mid-1915 to centralize 
administrative recruiting functions.
The first recruiting depots were established in Toronto and Hamilton after the
introduction of continuous recruiting in July 1915. The functions of these new depots, as
described at the time by the Toronto Star, were straightforward:
Recruiting is to go on even after the quotas for new units have been raised. 
According to the present plans, the [militia] regiments will continue to gather 
Men as rapidly as possible and send them to the central and permanent 
Recruiting stations which are to be opened. From the recruiting depot these 
Men will be sent to Niagara in batches to be trained there until formed into 
battalions.128
Details of the actual process are sketchy, but in the case of the 48 Highlanders, 
recruiters filled out a regimental form for each recruit with the data needed for
documentation and then sent the man to the Recruiting Depot for a medical examination,
*
documentation, attestation and issue of basic kit. In some cases, 48 staff also ensured 
that consent forms were completed by the next of kin of married men and minors.129 
Close ties were maintained between the depot and the militia units that provided the 
recruits. The Hamilton Recruiting Depot, for example, had eight companies to hold 
recruits, two for the infantry and the remaining six for the cavalry, artillery, engineers, 
CASC and CAMC. Each company was affiliated with a specific militia unit.130
Other districts established recruiting centres as well. In Ottawa the MD 3 Base 
Recruiting Office on Sparks Street under Captain A.H. Thobum opened in August 1915 
with a staff of one medical officer, a stenographer (Miss B. Thobum) and four recruiting 
sergeants.131 MD 1 followed in the fall of 1915 with a recmiting depot in London and the
c
following year established a district office in Windsor as well as the 1st Hussars • 
Recruiting Depot in Amherstburg that, despite the name, processed recruits for all
132corps.
Further west, in British Columbia, HQ MD 11 opened the Vancouver Recruiting 
Centre in the fall of 1915, under the command of Charles Grant Henshaw, a local 
commission merchant who retained his civilian status and was paid as a lieutenant- 
colonel.133 His wife, Julia Willmothe Henshaw, was commissioned as a militia officer at 
about the same time by Sam Hughes and called out on a permanent basis as a captain 
with a vague mandate to promote recruiting. Captain Henshaw was later dismissed by the
Militia Council in October 1917, largely because it was not apparent what she did or who
/•
she reported to .134 The Henshaws were, perhaps, the only officially sanctioned husband- 
and-wife recruiting team in either world war.
MD 10 under Brigadier-General H.N. Ruttan adopted a more systematic approach 
to recruiting and in November 1915, with the approval of Militia HQ, established four 
‘regimental areas’ with headquarters in Winnipeg, Dauphin, Moose Jaw and Prince 
Albert.135 Each area was responsible for establishing outlying detachments to find 
volunteers and a central headquarters to process the new recruits. Recruiting Area ‘D’, 
for example, had eight recruiting detachments and a central headquarters in Prince Albert 
staffed by a Quartermaster, Medical Officer and Adjutant together with clerks and 
storemen. The remaining three areas were similarly organized. Whether or not this 
organization would have been an efficient means of recruiting is unknown since Hughes 
almost immediately authorized new battalions to recruit in the same areas. The four areas
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were therefore disbanded in February 1916 and the men used to provide the nucleus for 
the new battalions: 222nd (Area A), 226th (Area B), 188th (Area C) and 229th (Area D) .136
By mid-1916, as discussed in Chapter 4, the number of unfit men sent overseas 
had become a matter o f serious concern and Hughes appointed a newly-commissioned 
CAMC officer, Colonel H.A. Bruce, as a ‘Special Inspector General’, to investigate the 
situation in England. The matter was politically sensitive and in August 1916, after ' 
reviewing a proposal from the AG, Prime Minister Borden suggested to F.B. McCurdy, 
the Parliamentary Secretary to Hughes, that the Militia Council should establish 
mobilization centres across the country to ensure recruits were medically fit. Militia HQ 
reacted promptly, Hughes did not interfere, perhaps because he was in England, and three 
weeks later, on 12 September 1916, the AG directed that all districts form mobilization 
centres where recruits would be documented and medically examined.138
The new mobilization centres were intended mainly to ensure that all recruits 
were medically fit. Medical examinations by unit medical officers and civilian physicians 
were regarded as preliminary only and the final decision regarding fitness was to be made 
at the mobilization centre. Each centre was to be commanded by a combatant officer with 
at least three medical officers, one of whom had to be an eye and ear specialist. Recruits 
determined to be fit would be returned to their parent unit while those who were unfit
1 “iQwould be compensated for their time and provided with free transportation home.
In practice, districts were free to establish mobilization centres to suit local 
conditions as they saw fit. In October 1916, the newly formed MD 12 (Saskatchewan) 
created a total of eight centres across the province while MD 11 (British Columbia) 
considered that centres were required only in Vancouver and Victoria. MD 5 (Eastern
Québec) on the other hand was made up chiefly of rural parishes and from March 1917 
onwards recruits were processed at the Recruiting Depot in Québec City.140
In MD 2, four mobilization centres were formed to service specific regions. The 
Toronto Mobilization Centre handled Peel, York, Simcoe, Halton, Norfolk, Ontario, 
Dufferin and Grey Counties as well as the District of Muskoka, while the Hamilton 
Mobilization Centre processed recruits from Wentworth, Dundas, Brant and Haldimand 
Counties. Smaller offices were established in Sudbury to handle recruits from Northern 
Ontario and St Catharines to process volunteers from the Niagara Peninsula.141 
Temporary mobilization centres were also formed as necessary, such as the detachment
tVithat operated in Owen Sound from April to June 1917 to process recruits for the 248 
Battalion.142
Unlike the early days of the war when militia units processed recruits in 
peacetime orderly rooms, Mobilization Centres were both large complex organizations 
that reflected the increased sophistication of the Canadian Forces. In June 1917, the 
Toronto centre was staffed by 102 officers and men together with twenty female clerks. 
The Sudbury Mobilization Centre was much smaller, but in June 1918 was staffed by 
nine officers and men and one female clerk as well as two NCOs and ten men to escort 
recruits to one of the depot battalions in Toronto.143 The Toronto Centre had four 
sections. The administrative section provided for the needs of the individual recruit and 
consisted of the Main Orderly Room with the OC, adjutant, paymaster and clerks as well 
as quartermaster stores and an attestation room with six clerks. Another section was 
responsible for medical examinations and consisted of thirteen ‘boards’, each with a 
medical officer and an orderly. Lastly, there was a special duties section headed by the
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sergeant-major and a general duties section staffed with eight soldiers that looked after 
routine fatigues. 144
In essence, recruiting was the means by which the CEF tapped the national 
manpower pool. The extent to which this pool could be utilized, however, depended not 
only the size of the pool but on the number of men who met the criteria for military 
service.1 These standards varied throughout the war and both the changes and the effect on 
recruiting form the principal themes of Chapter 4.
t
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the officers concerned. ;
II F6 Vol 68, pay sheets ‘Recruiting 2nd Overseas Expeditionary Force 22 October-4 
November 1914’: Stratford Daily Herald 23 October 1914 p.l
33 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 29 File ‘24th Regt Details August 1914 to October 1914’, paysheets for CO, 
Adjutant and three sergeants 22 October-4 November 1914; LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30 File ‘29th Regiment 
Headquarters August 1914 to December 1914’ paysheets for 21 October-4 November 1914 with CO, MO,
approved by 
3i LAC RG 9
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Orderly Room Sergeant and two privates; RG 9 II F9 Voi 31 File ‘33rd Regiment August 1914 to October 
1916’ paysheets for CO, one major and one private at Clinton 23 October-4 November 1914, Despite the 
title, this file also contains pay sheets for 27“* Regiment detachment of five at Sarnia 22 October-4 
November 1914
34 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30 File ‘30th Regiment August 1914 to December 1914’ paysheets 24 October-3 
November 1914 for Fergus (CO and one clerk) and Guelph (Adjutant, MO and Orderly Room Sergeant)
35 LAC R G 9IIF9 Vol 224'Files ‘MD 2 - 23rd Regiment Aug 1914-July 1915’ paysheets for unit staff and 
recruits for varying periods 27 October-4 November 1914 and ‘MD 2 - 34th Regiment Aug 1914-April 
1915’ paysheets for CO, MO, one captain and one sergeant 26 October-9 November 1914; RG 9 IIF9 Vol 
31 Files ‘32nd Regiment September 1914 to June 1917’ paysheets for CO, MO and one private for varying 
periods 26 October-3 November 1914 and File ‘47th Regiment October 1915 to November 1915’ Despite 
the title, the file contains a paysheet for Captain Tronsdale of D Company, Napanee 1-31 October 1914.
36 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 1535 File ‘MD 13 - CASC No 14 Company April 1914-July 1915’ paysheets 30 
November-3 December 1914
37 Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices 
and Maps, pp.344-345, ‘Note on 22nd Battalion CEF’; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. 
Canadian Expeditionary Force: 23rd Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and 
Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian 
Expeditionary Force: 24th Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. 
(Issued with Militia Orders 1915); A total of 135 men with the 23rd Battalion were enlisted in Calgary or 
Edmonton, the remainder were enlisted in the Province of Québec. In the 24th Battalion, one platoon was 
enlisted in Lindsay, Ontario while the rest of the battalion enlisted in Québec. Reinforcements from MD 10 
and 11, therefore, must have been militiamen when they travelled to Montréal for'attestation.1
38 Hunt. Nova Scotia’s Part in the Great War, p.41 notes that the 3rd, 4th and 11th CFA Brigades (Militia) 
forwarded recruits for the 23rd and 24th Batteries (CEF) in Fredericton. There was no prewar militia battery 
in Fredericton and the city was probably selected as a mobilization point because the PF barracks had been 
vacated when the RCR were sent to Bermuda in September 1914.
39 Quarterly Militia List... corrected to 1st July 1916. pp, 191-210 shows location and date of establishment 
of each militia battery; Strictly speaking, the 13th and 38th Batteries were located in Winnipeg, with the 36th 
housed on the other side of the Red River in St Boniface (now kno wn as Saint Boniface). Nicholson. The 
Gunners of Canada: Volume I. pp.236-238; Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great 
War 1914-1919. Chronology. Appendices and Maps, p.373 lists date and place of mobilization for each 
battery in the 2nd Divisional Artillery.
40 Carr, Lieutenant-Colonel N.O. ‘The Man Behind the Gun’ in Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol VIII 
Number 3 (April 1931) p.374. Carr claimed that the battery’s outstanding maintenance record was entirely 
due to CPR artificers. The author was a PF artillery officer who changed his name from Reiffenstein to 
Carr after the war broke out.
41 Toronto Globe 8 August 1914 p.7 reported the initial offer from General Electric; LAC RG 24 Vol 4331
File 34-1-14, OA RCE Ottawa to CRCE 2nd Division 7 September 1914; GOC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 
16 September 1914 explains that two men did not meet enrollment standards but were sent to Halifax 
regardless. The file contains correspondence up to February 1916 regarding the replacement of GE workers 
who were discharged or joined the CEF ~
42 LAC RG 24 Vol 1166 File 64-82-1 Vol 3, ‘Report of the Annual Inspection 1915 -Field Butchery -  
Toronto’ 1 March 1915 commented on the technical skills of the NCOs; Canada, Department of Militia and 
Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Field Bakery and Field Butchery C.A.S.C.: Nominal Roll of 
Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Collins, Major G.R.N. 
Military Organization and Administration. (London: Hugh Rees Ltd;,T918) p.214 for a short explanation 
on the function of a Field Butchery; Canadian Militia War Establishments (Provisional) 1914. p.94 notes 
that a field butchery consisted of one officer and twenty men divided into three butchery squads capable of 
killing and dressing sufficient meat for one division each day.
43 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5021 File 784 Reel T-10906 ‘War Diary Number 6 Depot Unit of Supply’ 3 
December 1914 and 20 January 1915.
44 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 551 Files ‘MD 3 Governor General’s Foot Guards Nov 1914-Jan 1916’ and MD 3 
Governor General’s Foot Guards June 1915 -  July 1915’ with GGFG Regimental Order Number 15 of 11
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June 1915 with a nominal roll of forty-three men under the heading ‘The following men enlisted for 
Overseas Service were transferred to 59th Battn CEF, Barriefield [Kingston], on 8* June 1915’. Pay lists are 
stamped ‘GGFG (Recruits CEF)\
45 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 224 File ‘MD 2 -3 1 st Regiment Overseas Contingent Sept 1914’ with pay list ‘31st 
Regt quota of 37th Provisional Bn Feb 1915’, and File ‘MD 2 -  31st Regiment Apr 1915-June 1915’ with 
pay lists of men recruited for the 37th and 58th Battalions.
6 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 563, Data taken from pay lists in files ‘56th Regiment (A & E Company) MD 3 
Daily Orders March-December 1915’, ‘57th Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Aug 1914- 
Aug 1915’ and ‘57th Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Sept 1915-April 1917’. The latter 
file contains a note that HQ MD 3 had instructed that all recruits for the 80th Battalion would be transferred 
as soon as enlisted. The file also contains 57th Regiment Daily Orders for September 1915 showing men 
sent to the 80th.
47 Toronto Star 5 August 1915 p.2
48 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, OC 2nd Division to Militia HQ 27 September 1915 ^
49 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, OC Depot Company 55th Battalion to AAG 6th Division 31 July
1915 ■ : ' ' ■ . .
50 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, GOC 6th Division to Militia HQ 20 July 1915 pointed out that . 
between 19 June and 3 July 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. McRae, for example, received $132 for pay and 
expenses, but failed to secure any recruits. It is perhaps significant that permission was required from 
Militia HQ to relieve recruiting officers. AG to GOC 6th Division 28 July 1915 approved firing all but four 
officers employed on recruiting duties.
51 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Provincial Recruiting Officer to AAG 6th Division 12 August 1915
52 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6th' Division 12 August 
1915, Armstrong to AAG 6th Division 17 August 1915
53 LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6th Division 14 August
1915.
54 LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 30, Pay sheets ‘Recruiting for CEF July.2, 1915 -July 27, 1915’ and ‘Recruiting for 
CEF August 6, 1915 -August 30. 1915’: Stratford Daily Beacon 4 September 1915 p.l; LAC RG 9 IIF9 
Vol 30, Pay sheets ‘Recruiting Men for 71st Battalion’ 23 September-9 November 1915 and 2-21 
September 1915
55RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Vols 7487 (H Orr), 7393 (HK Oakes) and 9318 (JW Stewart). ■
56 Quarterly Militia List Corrected to 1st July 1916 pp. 262.288. 317 and 409 
57DHHKE6848 A329 C3Q9 Minutes of the Militia Council 1916 p;196 lOAiigust 1916.
58 LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 28 June 1915 ; 
recommended that Logie’s earlier request (not on file) should be granted. A marginal note says ‘Yes. SH’; 
Toronto Star 21 August 1915 p.5
59 Militia Order 161 of 29 March 1915
^Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.216
61 Canada, War Purchasing Commission. Report of the War Purchasing Commission: Vol 2. Minutes from 
Minute No. LM av4 1915 to Minute No 6616. April 28. 1916. (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1916) pp.603-605, 
QMG to War Purchasing Commission 19 April 1916 referred to Borden’s announcement of an additional 
| 250,000 men for the CEF ~
[ 62 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20 File ‘Statistics’. Wastage is not confined to battle 
i casualties but includes losses from all causes.
63 Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, p.546 ,
64 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol VI, AG to GOC MD 5 31 August 1916 enclosing a copy of PC 
10944 of 16 August 1916 allowing the Governor in Council to appoint a director of recruiting in each 
district; TNA CO 42/994 contains a copy of PC 2688 of 23 September 1916 concerning the same issue.
65 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 26 September 1916 referring to an 
earlier proposal of 9 August 1916 which was not retained in the file.
66 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, AAG(l) to AG 8 September 1916 outlining the scheme. District 
returns commented on an AG circular letter of 21 September 1916 but no copy of this letter has been found.
67 LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-13-33, AG to Parliamentary Secretary 30 October 1916 comments that 
only MD 1,2,10 and 11 were in favor; GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 25 September 1916 and 13 October 1916 
recommended compulsory callout under the Militia Act, GOC MD 4 to Militia HQ 10 October 1916 noted
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that existing units were short 3,570 men and went on to recommend conscription or some form of 
compulsory service. The file ends 30 October 1916 and it appears no further action was taken. •
68 RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, AG Circular Letter 1 October 1915 saying, in part, “Officers 
Commanding Divisions or Districts will, however, be responsible for seeing that no Unit in their Command 
takes steps for recruiting in another Division or District before the Officer Commanding such other 
Division or District has been furnished with information to this effect.”
69 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol l, Director of Mobilization to AG 27 December 1916 
commenting on Hughes’s favored infantry battalions and AG circular telegram 8 March 1916.
70 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, DOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 6 December 1916
71 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916
72 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Nova Scotia Recruiting Association to OC 6th Division 30 
October 1916, GOC MD 6 to Militia HQ 1 November 1916 saying in part “...I am in sympathy with the 
stand taken by this Association.”
73 L AC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Union of Alberta Municipalities to Sir Robert L. Borden 9 
November 1916
74 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, AG Circular Telegram 2 January 1917 directing that the 
174th, 197th, 223rd, 236th, 244th and 253rd Battalions confine recruiting to their own district after 15 February 
1917; LAC RG 9 IIA2 Vol 33 ‘Minutes of the Militia Council 1916’, p.439 with decisions of 27 December
1916. Six battalions (174th, 197th, 223rd, 236th, 244th and 243rd) lost the right to recruit outside of their 
district.
75 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, Captain G.S. Balfour, i/c Recruiting Detachment to OC 199th 
Battalion Irish-Canadian Rangers 30 October 1916 :
76 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 7, AG to Director of Mobilization 20 October 1915 saying that 
Hughes had authorized a battalion in Victoria to be known as the 88th and that the 88th (New Brunswick) 
Battalion would have to be renumbered, AG to OC 6th Division 20 October 1915 saying that the 88th 
Battalion would now be known as the 104th Battalion.
77 LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG to 2nd Division 6 November 1915 directing that a battalion 
be raised in Sault Ste Marie and asking the District Commander to recommend a suitable CO; LAC RG 24 
Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, Hughes to AG 27 November 1915 directing the 119th and 134th Battalions be 
amalgamated with the title of 119th, the appointment of W.R. Smyth and adding that the number ‘134’ 
should be used elsewhere; LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 ‘ 119th Battalion’, ‘Provisional 
Major’ Smyth was the recruiting officer and the first recruiting meeting was held in Sault Ste Marie 27 
December 1915. Smyth was a fifty-eight year old lumberman and former member of a Volunteer unit in 
Scotland; He formally joined the CEF in June 1916, when he became the CO of the 238th (Forestry) 
Battalion.
78 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 12, ‘134th Battalion Historical Records’ completed 8 January
1917 noting that the battalion had been authorized 4 December 1915 :
79 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 6, ‘122nd Battalion’ with historical summary produced 3 July 
1917 by the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant: Quarterly Militia List corrected to 1st July 1916. p.197: 
LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3726 personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, Box 7015 
personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. MacLaren
80 University of Western Ontario Area Research and Collections Centre Box 5100, Divisional Ordersissued 
by Colonel L.W. Shannon, Administering the 1st Divisional Area 27 November 1915 quoting instructions 
from Militia HQ.
81 LAC RG 24 Vol 1583 File 683-239-5, ‘Report of the Annual Inspection 1916 of the 151st Overseas 
Battalion CEF, Sarcee Camp 23 September 1916
82 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 ‘119th Battalion’, Historical summary prepared by 
Lieutenant-Colonel T.P.T. Rowland 16 May 1917.
83 LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14 ‘135th Battalion’, Canadian War Records Office 
questionnaire complete by Captain J.H.C. Woodward 21 March 1917.
84 Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, p.547.
85 LAC RG 24 Vol 1401 File 593-6-2 Vol 19, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 22 August 1916 outlining his 
proposal which based on the premise that areas with an approximate population of 80,000 should constitute 
a battalion area, AG to GOC MD 3 30 September 1916 rejecting the proposal and suggesting that a base 
battalion could be formed to help fill existing infantry battalions which were all under strength.
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86 LAC RG 9 III DI Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 8 (123rd Battalion) and Folder 71 File 11 (124th Battalion; 
Toronto Globe 1 March 1916 p.8 noted that five battalions were recruiting in the city; Morton. When Your 
Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the Great War, p.59
87 LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916 '
88 LAC RG 24 Vol 4670 File 99-4-7 Vol 3, AAG i/c Administration to Militia HQ 30 August 1916.
89 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folders 143, 158, 172,211,218 and 231
90 LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol III, OC 5th Division to Militia HQ 16 November 1915 lists six 
officers recruiting in Eastern Québec. Judging by the surnames, five were French-Canadian. Three of the 
officers, Lieutenants PJC de Gruchy, Levi Bourassa and E. Jalbert did not serve in the CEF. Major P.A. 
Piuze of the 20th (Québec) Battery joined the CEF in September 1916 while his brother, Captain Azarie 
Piuze of the 89th Temiscouta and Rimouski Regiment was attested in the CEF in April 1918. The last, 
Captain Abel Whitehead of the 7th Hussars in Bury, joined the 117th Eastern Townships Battalion in 
September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917 
outlines the history of recruiting in the District from 1915 onwards.
91 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917
92 LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol VIII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 22 September 1916 and GOC 
MD 5 to Militia HQ 11 November 1916 outline Fages’s intent and the final results.
?3 LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, DOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 26 January 1916, AG to Minister
28 January 1916 asking if the 191st and 192nd should be allowed to recruit and undated minute by Hughes 
saying ‘Go ahead”, AG to DOC MD 13 3 February 1916 directing the 191st and 192nd to continue 
recruiting.
94 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 12 Folder 113, Box 13 Folders 191 and 192; Canada, Department 
of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 191st Battalion 1st and 2nd Reinforcing Drafts. 
Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
95 LAC RG 9 III D 1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14, Canadian War Records Office questionnaire completed 21 
March 1917 by the former adjutant of the 135th Battalion; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Canada. Fifth 
Census of Canada 1911: Areas and Population bv Provinces. Districts and Subdistricts. (Ottawa: King’s 
Printer, 1912) pp.80-81
96 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 135th Battalion. Nominal 
Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
97 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 142; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. 
Canadian Expeditionary Force: 142nd Battalion. Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and 
Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
98 Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.546 -
99 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, HOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 26 August 1916
100 London Free Press 22 May 1916 p2: St Marvs Argus 20 July 1916 p .l:
101 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 110th Battalion: Nominal 
Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). Despite the 
publication date, the embarkation roll is dated 31 October 1916 ; LAC RG 9 IIB10 Vol 22, ‘110th Battalion 
Canadian Roll’ with weekly returns of recruits 26 November 1915 to 29 October 1916.
102 LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 ‘Historical Record of the 232nd Overseas Battalion CEF’
103 LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 ‘Historical Record of the 232nd Overseas Battalion CEF’ -
The 232nd was based in North Battleford but had outlying detachments in Saskatoon, Rosetown, Wilkie, 
Kerrobert and Kindersley; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 232; Canada, Department of 
Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 232nd Battalion. Nominal Roll of Officers. Non- 
Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)
104 LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft ‘Statement by Department of Militia and Defence 
From 1st February to 31st December 1916’ signed by CGS 1 December 1916
105 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to DOC MD 10 29 November 1916 after reviewing a 
proposal to raise a battalion in Selkirk, Manitoba.
106 LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 22, DG Mobilization to CGS 30 December 1916
107 Turner was promoted to Lieutenant-General in June 1917 and later became CGS for OMFC.
108 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73 File 68, Summary of memorandums from 
Gwatkin and Turner compiled by the Parliamentary Secretary 15 January 1917. The original  ̂
correspondence from Gwatkin and Turner has not been found.
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109 LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft ‘Statement by Department of Militia and Defence 
From 1st February to 31st December 1916’ signed by CGS 1 December 1916
110 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel H. Osborne to A. Claude Macdonnell 
M.P. 18 January 1917
111 RG24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, Edwin Pye to DHS 3 December 1940
112 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 66th Regiment Reinforcing 
Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia Orders 1918 
and Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 63rd Regiment 1st. 2nd and 
3rd Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia 
Orders 1918. The 66th Regiment draft sailed 22 January 1916 and the 63rd drafts sailed 22 January 1916,26 
February 1916 and 15 July 1916; Hunt Nova Scotia’s Part in the Great War, p.261 discusses the 66th . 
Regiment draft with dates and strength.
113 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, CGS to AG 15 January 1917
114 DHH 74/672 (Edwi Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917.
115 LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to GOC MD 3 5 February 1917. The 43rd was given 
permission to “..form a regimental depot for the purpose of raising and training drafts.”
116 LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 6-14-10, AAG MD 1 to OC 32nd Regiment 28 February 1917 referring to a 
resolution passed by the officers of the 32nd Regiment, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 30 March 1917 asking for 
approval and AG to OC MD 1 4 April 1917 granting authority. ;
lf7 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 11th Regiment 1st , 
Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia 
Orders 1917. The draft sailed from Halifax 2 June 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, OC MD 1 to 
Militia HQ 15 May 1917, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 10 July 1917 reporting that drafts from the 7th, 21st, 22nd, 
25th, 32nd and 108th Regiments were training in London. -
118 LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, AG to DOC MD 1 23 August 1917
119 TNA CO 42/1004, War Office to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 9 May 1917
120 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel S.C. Mewbum to Kemp 6 March
1917. :■ ; .
121 LAC R 24 Vol 5872 File 7-55-23, OC 53rd Regiment to GOC MD 4 30 March 1917 .
122 LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 file 593-6-2 Vol 25, OC 174th Battalion to DG Mobilization nd but late March
1917, ; . . V
123 Archives of Ontario Sydney Chilton Mewbum Fonds, Ms 798 Reel 1, Series 1, Kemp to Mewbum 8 
March 1917
124 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File ‘CDF’, summary prepared by Edwin Pye 25 ,
March 1943 >
125 48th Highlanders of Canada Regimental Museum Box ‘CDF’, R.E. Haldenby.to Mr. White 17 June 
1917,48th Highlanders ‘Semi-Monthly Statement of Strength of Canadian Expeditionary Force’ 30 June 
1917, the box also contains forms for unsuccessful applicants such as Harry Brennan. 
l26LACRG24 Vol 4547 file 78-1-1, AG circular letter 22 May 1917; 48th Highlanders Regimental ; 
Museum Box ‘CDF’, Daily Orders Part II Number 83 of 12 August 1917 noted that 287 men with the CEF 
Company had been posted to 1st Depot Battalion of the 1st Central Ontario Regiment as instructed by HQ 
MD 2 on 2 August 1917; Depot battalions were authorized by General Order Number 89 of 1 September 
1917, but had been formed some weeks before.
i 127 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 116 File 6, GOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 5 July 
1917 reporting that 95% of the recruits for June 1917 had been found by the British Canadian Recruiting 
Mission
128 Toronto Star 20 July 1915 p.2
129 48th Highlanders Regimental Museum Box ‘CDF’ contains the regimental forms for 203 men who were 
rejected between May 1915 and June 1917. The forms were originated by unit recruiters and subsequently 
annotated by officers from the Toronto Recruiting Depot. The dates suggest the form was first used by unit 
recruiting parties prior to the opening of the Toronto Recruiting Depot. Several of the forms have the 
written consent of wives or parents attached.
130 Hamilton Spectator 6 August 1915 pp. 1 and 14
131 LAC RG 24 Vol 4425 File 26-5-64-2 Vol 1, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 1 June 1917 noted that Miss 
Thobum had been working at the Ottawa Base Recruiting Office since August 1915. The general comment
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regarding staff is taken from scattered correspondence in RG 24 Vol 4425 Files 26-5-64-2 Vols 1-3. In 
May 1917, Miss Thobum complained that her pay had been reduced to $1.70 a day, but with a reduction in 
staff, she was now doing jobs formerly done by sergeants. Since she was now doing the work of a sergeant, 
Miss Thobum felt she deserved the same rate of pay..
132 LAC RG 9,11 F9 Vol 39 File ‘Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916’. Pay lists exist for the London 
Recruiting Depot 1 October 1915 to 30 November 1916, the Windsor Recruiting Officer for September
1916 and the Windsor Mobilization Centre 1 October 1916 to 31 October 1917; LAC RG 9 IIF9 Vol 39 
File ‘Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916’ contains pay lists for the ‘I®* Hussars Recruiting Depot’ in 
Amherstburg 1 July-30 November 1916; London Advertiser 29 December 1916 p .ll describing the work 
of the 1st Hussars Depot
133 LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1383 File ‘MD 11 Recruiting Staff Nov 1915-March 1917’ contains monthly pay 
lists for Mr Charles Henshaw, Recruiting Officer, from 1 November 1915 to 31 March 1917. Henshaw 
received the same pay as a lieutenant-colonel. There may be additional pay lists for Henshaw which have 
not survived. Parker, C.W. Who’s Who in Western Canada: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living 
Men and Women of Western Canada. (Vancouver: Canadian Press Association Limited, 1911) p.205 
described Charles Henshaw as a commission merchant.
134 DHH ‘Minutes of the Militia Council 1917’ p.l 172, Henshaw had been a lieutenant and captain in the 
militia and CEF since 20 September 1915 with the approval of Sam Hughes. On 18 October 1917, the 
Deputy Minister pointed out that she had been paid $3 per diem since then, as well as field pay and 
subsistence allowance when absent from home. Her services were terminated 1 November 1917 and she 
was directed to cease wearing uniform
135 LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG to GOC MD 10 4 November 1915 granting approval and 
referring to the original proposal dated 25 October 1915 which, unfortunately, is not in the file.
136 LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1296, Files ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area B February 1916’, ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area C 
December 1915-January 1916’ and ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area D November 1915-February 1916’; LAC RG 
9 II F9 Vol 1297 ‘MD 10 Recruiting Area D February 1916’; LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, 
AAG i/c Administration HQ MD 10 to OC 188th Battalion 10 February 1916 instructing him to absorb all 
recruits in Area C and OC D Recruiting Area Moose Jaw to AAG i/c Administration HQMD 10 21 
.February 1916 asking that his area be authorized as a CEF battalion; The commanding officers of Areas A, 
B and D went on to command CEF battalions. ;
137 Macphail. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: The Medical Services.
p.154 ■ ’ . , . ;v- . -■ . :
38 LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, Prime Minister to F.B. McCurdy 18 August 1916 referring to an 
earlier proposal from the AG concerning mobilization centres (not in the file) and asking if Militia Council 
had considered the idea, AG to Militia Council 23 August 1916 noting the Prime Minister’s approval and 
AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 instructing districts to establish mobilization centres;
139 LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-M; AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 ‘Mobilization Centre, 
Administration o f
140 LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, DOC MD 12 to AG 25 October 1916 noting that funds had not been 
allocated to rent accommodation for centres in Regina, Saskatoon, Prince Albert, Battleford, Moosimin, 
Moose Jaw, Swift Current and Weybum, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 28 September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 
4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 29 March 1917 explaining that MD 5 was largely 
rural and a central depot was more efficient and less expensive.
141 Toronto Star 1 February 1917 p.14 announced the Depots would be replaced by ‘Mobilization Centres’; 
LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-L contains an undated list probably from the spring of 1918 showing 
the three original mobilization centres as well as one in St Catharine’s.
142 LAC RG 4311 File 24-1-59-M Vol 1, OC 248th Battalion to Chief Recruiting Officer MD 2 23 April
1917
: 143 LAC RG 24 Voi4311, File 34-1-59-M Vol 1, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to DAA & QMG MD 2 
28 November 1917 and File 34-1-59-L, MD 2 to Militia HQ 18 July 1918 reporting the manning of the 
< ’ Sudbury Mobilization Centre






Chapter 3 discussed the CEF recruiting structure from mobilization in 1914 to the 
influx of draftees under the M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t  (MSA) in 1918. The period was one of 
constant change and turmoil with recruits being enlisted by militia units, CEF units and 
district offices at various times and places, sometimes simultaneously. Some of these 
changes were the result o f snap decisions by the erratic Minister of Militia and Defence, 
Sam Hughes, while other changes were introduced by the staff in Ottawa and at the 
district headquarters to impose order on the whole system.
Throughout the change and turmoil, recruiters were expected to enlist men who
met standard criteria, which also changed and evolved as the war went on. While some of✓
these changes increased the number of men eligible for combatant service, other changes 
simply increased the number available for administrative duties. Some of the criteria 
were also based on national prejudices although as the war progressed, these were 
discarded and aliens, visible minorities and natives came to be viewed as valuable 
additions to the manpower pool. The recruiting criteria were also ignored by thousands of. 
men who were anxious to serve and deliberately lied in order to enlist.
At first glance, the criteria were the model of simplicity. Men had to be between 
the ages of eighteen and forty-five, a standard consistent with K i n g ’s  R e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  
O r d e r s  f o r  t h e  C a n a d i a n  M i l i t i a  (KR&O) .1 Boys were excluded although KR&O allowed 
fourteen-year-olds (and thirteen-year-olds in exceptional cases) to join the militia with 
their parents’ or guardian’s consent. These boys were excluded from the CEF, but 
peacetime habits died hard and in August 1915, Militia HQ modified the age standard to
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allow fourteen-year-olds to enlist as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters. The 
reduced aged standards did not last long and were cancelled in January 1917 because
•y
juveniles were o f no use as reinforcements for units m France.
The upper age limit was amended in June 1916 to allow forestry workers to enlist 
up to age forty-eight because they were “labourers only, and are not to be considered as 
enlisted for General Service overseas.”3 In January 1917, the same age range was 
extended to skilled railway workers, although medical officers were reminded that “the 
apparent age rather than the age given is to be taken into account and the condition of the 
arteries of all men 41 years of age and over is to determine acceptance or rejection.”4 
Those men serving with combatant units who were overage but managed to reach 
England were not returned to Canada, but were drafted to labour units providing they . 
were medically unfit for the trenches.5
Canadian age standards created problems in England where the CEF was 
governed by British regulations. British policies were quite clear; active service in France 
or Belgium was restricted to those between the ages of nineteen and forty-two.6 The 
effect o f this was that on arrival in England, those between thirteen and eighteen were too 
young for active service and those between forty-two and forty-five were too old.
Canadian authorities in England were initially unconcerned with the conflict in 
age limits. In December 1916, Sir George Perley advised Prime Minister Borden that 
there was “No maximum age limit for Canadian soldiers proceeding from England to 
[the] seat of war.”7 However, the staff at HQ OMFC was not as sanguine and in January 
1917, the Surgeon-General noted the discrepancy between British and Canadian age 
limits.8 Militia HQ also picked up the matter and both the DGMS and AG expressed
[L of C] were held at the appropriate base depot while those who had arrived in the front 
line could remain with their units but not in the trenches. The latter policy was clearly 
impractical. Infantry battalions had enough on their hands without worrying about young 
soldiers in the transport lines and, in any event, the possibility of long-range shelling 
meant the boys were exposed to danger. In November 1916, therefore, GHQ directed that 
soldiers who were eighteen or younger would be returned by their units to the appropriate 
base depot where they would remain until of age.13 The policy was further modified in 
May 1917 when boys between the ages of eighteen and nineteen were allowed to serve 
with one of the many army schools, forward of the base depots but still within the L of C. 
The policy was firm and a proposal from the Canadian Corps in August 1918 to employ 
minors with a demonstration platoon at the Corps railhead (forward of the L of C) was 
firmly scotched by HQ OMFC.14
Underage soldiers in France who concealed their age remained with their units, 
unless angry parents or guardians produced birth certificates. But these cases were 
relatively few and there is no record of a concerted effort to weed these minors out. InV
January 1918, HQ OMFC authorized Canadian Corps HQ to transfer 500 men under the 
age of eighteen years and six months to Britain but judging by unit war diaries, there was 
no mass exodus of juveniles.15 Regimental histories support this. In 1917-1918, for 
example, the 85th Battalion lost seventeen minors, the 102nd Battalion lost twenty-one and 
the 18th and 72nd Battalions lost twenty-four teens each.16
At the other end of the spectrum were the older men who could not be drafted to 
France. Many were identified by medical boards before embarkation to Britain and 
retained in Canada or discharged. However, some were not identified until they arrived in
c ,
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England and these men were employed on general duties with reserve battalions. But it 
was illogical for seniors to serve with units whose sole purpose was to feed 
reinforcements to Canadian units in France or Belgium and in November 1916, these men 
were posted to the 37th Reserve Battalion.17
The 37th was not a conventional infantry battalion, but became the basis for the 1st 
Canadian Labour Battalion, which was posted to France in 1917 where it was joined by 
three other labour battalions. These units were not composed exclusively of overage men, 
but rather o f those whose medical categories (including age) precluded front-line
IQ
service. Still, it is striking that of the 106 Canadians from various labour units who are 
buried in France or Belgium, thirty-two were over forty-two years of age.19
Not all seniors who served in France or Belgium did so with labour units. Railway 
troops, for example, were exempt from the upward age limit of forty-two, although the 
Canadian General Base Depot in France insisted on rejecting Canadian Railway Troops 
(CRT) reinforcements over forty-three “unless they looked young and were going to a 
specialized job.” There were also, men with front-line units who were retained by their 
units. Peter Comego, a forty-seven year-old native soldier, and Johnston Paudash, a fifty- 
two-year-old native soldier, for example, were retained by the 21st Battalion because both 
were accomplished scouts and snipers. Others, such as Sergeants Geddes and Ritchie of 
the 78 Battalion, were removed from their units but retained in the forward area with the 
4th Divisional baths and the 4th Division entrenching battalion respectively.21
These then were the policies and procedures concerning those who were over or 
under age. But these policies were frequently ignored, either because individual recruits 
were anxious to serve or because commanding officers were trying to fill the ranks. In all,





it is estimated that more than 33,000 men who were too young or too old enlisted in the
CEF. While some of these men made a valuable contribution to the war effort, others 
instead became a significant administrative burden.
A total of 6,548 underage soldiers were discharged from the CEF during the
war. But these were only the ones who were detected. The total of those who served is
unknown although a reasonable estimate can be made using Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission [CWGC] cemetery and memorial registers. These registers were compiled 
in the 1920s and about 61% of the entries in these registers include the age on death 
provided by the soldier’s next of kin. The information provided by the next of kin is 
likely correct -  why would they lie?23 There are 1,412 men listed who were under the age
of nineteen when they died.24
Table 14
Estimated Total Underage Enlistments 1914-192025
Age on Death ' CWGÇ Registers Estimated Deaths Estimated
Enlistments
15 14 .
16 75 : !
’ 17 296 '
18 1,027
Totals 1,412 2,315 24, 369
Notes: (1) The overall death rate for all ages was 9.5% and it is assumed this 
applied to underage soldiers as well.26
(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly overstated. Non-battle
A deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% of all deaths. The average 
age of the CEF was 26.3 years, a cohort with an annual death rate of 3.9 
per thousand in 1921. However, the annual death rate for male teens was 
slightly less at 3.1 per thousand.27
There were at least two ten-year-olds, both of whom enlisted in March 1916: 
Wesley Mickey, a schoolboy from Wadena, Saskatchewan, and Reuben Rosenfield, a 
bugler from Winnipeg who enlisted to be with his father, Sergeant Arthur Rosenfield of
c
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the 10.1st Battalion.28Neither Mickey nor Rosenfield served overseas, either in Britain or
on the continent.
The youngest to serve in Flanders was probably William Hutchison of Vancouver 
who enlisted in the 211 Battalion at the age of twelve and was discharged in Vancouver 
as underage on 2 December 1916. However, Hutchison’s mates were reluctant to lose 
their battalion ‘mascot’ and were able to smuggle him to England where he somehow 
managed to join the 8th Battalion, CRT and at the age of thirteen, was sent with his new
O Q •
unit to Belgium. The youngest who died in France was fifteen; there were eight with 
that melancholy distinction while six others died in Britain or Canada.
Table 15
Underage Fatalities 
Estimated Age on Enlistment80
Estimated
Enlistment
Age > i ' '  V
1915 .
;  '
, k L <
'  '  1
1916 1917 1918 Totals Proportion
/  , ‘ \  ’ (
13 1 1 2 0.2%
14 3 9 10 2 24 2.0%
15 8 71 61 2 1 143 12.1%
16 32 175 194 26 10 437 37.0%
17 57 261 193 52 12 575 48.7%
Total 100 517 459 82 23 1,181
Proportion 8.5% 43.8% 38.9% 6.9% 1.9%
Notes: (1) A few of the attestation forms are marked with the soldier’s true date 
of birth but in the majority of cases, the age on enlistment had to be 
estimated based on length of service. A boy who died at seventeen, for 
example, with more than two years of service was probably fifteen years 
old or younger when he enlisted.
(2) It is acknowledged that the longer a boy served, the more likely he was 
to die.
Attestation papers show that 1,025 (86.8%) of the teens included in Table 14 
claimed to be eighteen or older when they enlisted, which suggests the boys were anxious
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to go while recruiters were willing to look the other way. Surprisingly, more of these 
boys enlisted in 1914-15 when volunteers were plentiful than in 1916-17 when there was 
a shortage of recruits. A total of 156 boys (13.2%) admitted they were seventeen or 
younger when they enlisted. But the majority of these self-confessed minors (134) 
enlisted between August 1915 and January 1917 when boys were allowed to join with 
: their parent’s consent as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters.
At the other end of the spectrum were the older men, those over forty-five, some 
of whom were able to enlist because seniors were welcomed, at least for home defence. 
duties. A total of 226 militiamen on full-time service, for example, died during the war 
and are buried in Canada. A third of these men were too young or too old to enlist in the 
CEF and the average senior was 53.6 years old.33 In Toronto, twenty-one men served 
with the District Sanitary Corps. Seventeen of these men were between the age of forty- 
eight and seventy-five with an average age of 54.5 years.34 These soldiers were not 
members of the CEF until July 1918 when all militiamen on full-time service, including 
seniors, were transferred to the CEF.35
No record was kept of the number of men over the age of forty-five who enlisted. 
Post-war tabulations showed that 1,471 men were released as overage, but there must 
have been many others who were not discharged. However, as with the minors, CWGC 




Estimated Overage Enlistments 1914-1920
A geonD eath CWGC Registers Estimated Deaths Estimated
Enlistments
47-50 331 543 5,712
51-55 135 221 : 2,330
: 56-60 46 75 794
61-65 15 25 259
66-68 6 10 104 .
Totals 533 874 9,198
Notes: (1) Table 16 is based on those who died and not those who enlisted. 
Estimates are therefore approximate and not absolute.
(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly understated. Non-battle 
deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% of all deaths. The average 
age of the CEF was 26.3 years, a group with a natural death rate of 3.9 per 
thousand. The 48-55 cohort, however, had a natural death rate
that was somewhat more at 8.4 per thousand.37
(3) The majority of those who died at age forty-six or forty-seven (144) 
likely enlisted at age forty-five. They have therefore been excluded from 
Table 15.
(4) Rounding off has produced a discrepancy of ten estimated enlistments. 
In terms of individuals, the oldest man to offer his services was probably ninety-
two-year-old Sir Mackenzie Bowell, a former prime minister who offered to join the 
224 (Forestry) Battalion in 1916 as a lance-corporal although this was probably a 
publicity stunt to shame younger men into joining.38 The oldest to actually enlist was 
probably eighty-year-old Alexander Muir, an ex-soldier of the British 11th Hussars who 
joined the GASC Detachment at Militia HQ in June 1916. He was demobilized in 1920 at 
the age of eighty-four. The oldest soldier buried in France is probably Sapper John" 





/ ‘ AgC V;, 
Cohort •
1914 1915*  ̂r * t 1916r , » ,
1917 1918 Totals Proportion
47-50 44 133 100 23 12 312 64.9%
51-55 13 44 44 10 6 117 24.3%
56-60 3 ■ ■' 10 20 : 2 3 : 38 . 7.9%
61-65 1 8 1 10 2.1%
66-67 1 2 1 4 0.8%
Totals 60 189 174 37 21 481
Proportion 12.5% 39.3% 36.2% 7.7% 4.4%
Notes: (1) Based on CWGC cemetery and memorial registers.
(2) Thirty-eight men who died at the age of forty-six have been excluded 
since they were probably under the age of forty-five on enlistment.
A total of 458 or 86% of the men listed in Table 17 claimed .to be forty-five years 
or younger when they enlisted in the CEF. In theory these lies should have been picked 
up during the enrolment medical, but birth certificates were not required; doctors noted 
the ‘apparent age’ only and most felt they had “no option but to accept the statement [of 
age].”41 In any event, recruiting staff were often willing look the other way. In May 1917, 
for example, Charles Harrigan joined the Canadian Forestry Corps at Revelstoke, British 
Columbia. His date of birth was given as November 1869 and his ‘apparent age’ as forty- 
seven. Harrigan also claimed to have served with the militia during the 1870 Fenian raids 
when he was only one year old according to his declared date of birth. Neither his age nor 
his former service was challenged by the recruiters.42
The enrolment of older men suggests efforts to address a shortage of recruits, but 
more seniors enlisted in 1915 at a time when there were plenty of recruits, which suggests 
that the motivation was a product of enthusiasm and not the need to fill the ranks one way 
or another. The reasons why the older men chose to join up can only be guessed at -
patriotism, the need for a job and, for the old soldiers, a chance to return to a settled life 
with known expectations. The latter was not an inconsequential factor; 263 of those who 
died, or more than half, were ex-servicemen while 67 others were current members of the 
militia. In round numbers, about two-thirds of the seniors were already familiar with 
military service when they enlisted in the CEF. There was also, like today, an unwritten 
obligation to help deserving ex-soldiers and there were cases of commanding officers 
who went out of their way to accommodate the old sweats who wanted to soldier again.43
Together, more than 33,000 men who were outside of the normal age range 
enlisted in the CEF; about 5% of all recruits - a significant addition to the manpower 
pool, although not all served in France or Flanders. About 84% of the underage soldiers 
who died were buried in France and Flanders, 5% in Britain and 11% in Canada. On the 
other hand, 34% of the overage men who died were buried in France or Belgium, 14% in 
Britain and 51.9% in Canada.44 It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a much 
larger proportion of the underage soldiers saw active service
, • ■, From an administrative point o f view, the need to cater to the under-age and over-
\
age soldiers detracted from their usefulness. Both juveniles and seniors in England or 
France had to be combed out and returned to Britain or repatriated to Canada where they 
were discharged. It is true that many of the young soldiers eventually reached nineteen 
and were deployed to France, but had they been enlisted at the proper age, a great deal of 
administrative effort could have been saved. In the case of the older men, particularly in 
England, it can be argued that their presence freed up younger men for service in France. 
However, these jobs could have been done by substitutes such as those who were unfit
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for service at the front and women. On the other hand, those who concealed their age, 
perhaps as many as 20,000 were a genuine addition to the manpower pool.
Age was not the only criteria for enlistment. Men also had to be medically fit and 
Militia HQ continually altered the standards throughout the war in an effort to expand the 
manpower pool. Medical fitness is a multi-faceted subject, but height requirements, 
dental health and eyesight serve as useful proxies. ; ,
The initial standard, announced on 17 August 1914, was 5’ 3” for all corps with 
the exception of artillery (5’ 7”), engineers (5’ 4”) and CASC horse transport drivers (5’ 
5”).45 The standard for infantry lasted less than a year, however, and in July 1915, was
’ / * r
reduced to 5’ 2”, a reduction that has been attributed to a shortage of recruits.
However, this was not the case. In brief, Major Francis Milton, a militia officer serving 
with the 44th. Battalion in Winnipeg, wrote to" Sam Hughes and suggested that a new 
battalion should be raised of men under the regulation height. Hughes was enthusiastic 
about the proposal but the AG noted in June 1915 that there was no need “for. herding. ' V  .
them [undersize soldiers] in separate battalions” and suggested that it would be better to 
reduce the minimum height to accommodate shorter men. The district commander 
responsible for the 44th Battalion (Colonel H.N. Ruttan) was then consulted and he 
recommended a one-inch reduction in the minimum height. Hughes accepted the advice, 
recruiting regulations were amended and as of 21 July 1915, the minimum height for 
infantrymen was 5’ 2”.47 •
Later reductions after the summer of 1916 were directly related to declining 
enlistment figures.48 In December 1916, the minimum height for infantrymen was
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reduced to five feet and a year later, the standard for non-combatants was dropped to 4’
11”, four inches shorter than the minimum height established in August 1914.49 The 
artillery was also affected by the slump in recruiting and in June 1917, the requirement 
for artillery drivers was lowered to 5’ 3”, to be followed in September 1917 by a another 
reduction to 5’ 2”.50 Also in September 1917, the height standard for field gunners was 
lowered to 5’ 6” (a reduction of one inch) but garrison and siege gunners had to be at 
least 5’ 7”.51All of these changes were part of a deliberate effort to enlarge the pool of 
potential recruits. '
Was the reduction of the infantry height standard to five feet a profitable change
to the medical standard? The experience of the bantam units suggests that the benefits, if
/
any, were limited.
The idea of bantam battalions was not original, but an imitation of the British 
bantams, originally formed in the fall of 1914 when the 15th and 16th Battalions of the 
Cheshire Regiment were raised in Birkenhead from men standing 5’ to 5’ 3” (later 5’
2”). The concept was a popular one in Britain and by mid-1916, there were two bantamV
divisions serving in France. Neither division, however, was composed wholly of 
bantams; those serving with artillery, engineer, pioneer and signals units had to meet 
normal height standards. Bantams were not intended to supplement the British 
manpower pool but reflected popular enthusiasm for the war effort by providing shorter 
men with an opportunity to serve their country.
Not surprisingly the CEF followed suit in 1916 by raising the 143rd and 216th 
Bantam Battalions as well as a bantam company for the 167th Battalion.54 As with the 
British bantams, neither o f the two battalions were created because of a recruiting
174
shortfall but instead resulted from lobbying by two enthusiasts who were captivated by 
the notion of something new .55 Both Captain A.B. Powley of Victoria (OC 143rd 
Battalion) and Major F.L. Burton of Toronto (OC 216th Battalion) had served in France 
and likely both had first-hand knowledge of the British bantam divisions.56 Both the 143rd 
and 216th were formed at a time when there was no shortage of recruits. On the other 
hand, the bantam company of the 167 Battalion was authorized in November 1916 at a 
time when recruiting, especially for Québec-based units, had fallen off sharply.57
The concept of bantam battalions was contrary to Militia HQ’s preference for 
homogeneous units that could be shipped overseas and absorbed by any battalion that 
required reinforcements. Perhaps for this reason, no one in Ottawa laid down a uniform 
height requirement for Bantams, unlike in Britain, where standards were laid down by the 
War Office. Instead, the height standard reflected the commanding officer’s preference. 
The,2 16th recruited men who stood 5’ to 5’ 1 V z \  the 143rd accepted those who were 5’ 4” 
or shorter and the 167 was willing to take volunteers under 5 ’ 2”.
The bantam concept was not as popular in Canada as it was in Britain and some of 
the men in the 143rd considered ‘bantam’ to be a pejorative term .59 Both battalions,
i L
therefore, had to recruit outside of their parent districts to find enough men. The 216 
recruited mainly in MD 2, but 29% of its strength came from four other districts in 
Eastern Canada. Similarly, the 143rd recruited primarily in MD 11, but also enlisted 125 
men or 10.6% in MD 13.60 The idea did not find favor with Militia HQ, however, 
probably because of the cost of transporting recruits from Alberta to British Columbia 




.On the surface, the two battalions were successful and recruited almost a thousand 
men who were not part of the potential manpower pool by virtue of their height.
However, not all of these men were a useful addition to the reservoir. There were 163 
recruits who could not be posted to infantry battalions overseas because they stood less 
than five feet tall. Three of these men were only 4 ’ 7”. There were also 141 boys between 
the ages of twelve and seventeen, many of whom were under the minimum height for 
bantams.62
Some of the Bantams seem to have been stunted and not merely short and in July 
1916, almost two hundred unfit men from the 143rd were weeded out by medical officers 
at the Sidney Mobilization Camp in British Columbia.63 Later, in England, the battalion 
was examined again and at least 155 men were consigned to the Canadian Railway 
Troops Depot as unfit for the infantry.64 The 216th had problems as well and in May 
1917;' doctors with the 1st Canadian Reserve Brigade at Shomcliffe declared 217 men
unfit for the infantry.65 This was just the beginning and ultimately, 300 bantams from the
/
216th were transferred to the Forestry Corps.66 Obviously these men were not an efficient 
addition to the manpower pool.
Table 18
Personnel Disposition -  Bantam Battalions
^^D isposition ;
IrCW * 1 f-! ■.
' 143rd tj  216tn Total Proportion 
O f Enlistments
Recruited 1,174 1,123 2,297
Sailed to UK 883 783 1,666 51%
Served in France 604 318 922 40%
Note: The 216th provided two hundred drivers to the Reserve Brigade CFA in 
June 1917.68 These men have been included in ‘Served in France’.
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Would bantams have been useful in the front lines? In the British army the 35 
(Bantam) Division found that trench parapets had to be lowered to allow men to shoot, 
meaning that conventional units relieving the bantams had to rebuild the parapets. 
Eventually, the 35th had to issue a divisional order requiring every man to carry two 
sandbags to build up the fire step. Bantams also had difficulties handling the service rifle 
(Lee-Enfield) because of its length and a special butt one inch shorter than normal was 
eventually produced in 1918.69 Presumably Bantams also had the same problem handling 
the Lewis gun, but there is no evidence that the gun was ever modified.
It was also difficult to find physically fit reinforcements. In August 1916, the ; 
GOC 105th (Bantam) Brigade wrote that most of the new arrivals were underdeveloped 
men “who were unfitted, both morally and physically to take their places in the fighting 
ranks of the British Army.”70 Subsequently in December 1916, medical boards inspected 
the 35th Division and found 2,784 men with “Deficient Physique -  physical incapacity to 
perform the normal duties of a soldier in the fighting line.”71 The evidence is indirect, but 
the experience of the 35th Division suggests that throwing open the CEF to shorter men 
was of minimal benefit.
Dental standards were relaxed as well to allow men with faulty teeth or dentures 
to enlist. The changes started in March 1915 when the ADMS at HQ MD 2 directed that 
men with defective or deficient teeth would be retained in Canada for treatment, 
“including the provision of such artificial dentures as are necessary to admit of efficient 
mastication.”72 The policy made sense and in May 1915, Militia HQ directed that men 
with partial plates or who required dental treatment could be enlisted, a regulation 
modified in August ! 915 to allow men with full dentures to join the CEF.73 Oddly
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enough, dental care was not mandatory and those who refused treatment were passed as 
‘fit’, “provided they are not suffering from malnutrition or digestive trouble, and are 
otherwise physically fit.”74
To meet the increased demand for dental services, the Canadian Army Dental 
Corps (CADC) was established in April 1915, but for overseas duty only. Districts were 
authorized to appoint dentists to the CAMC on a temporary basis, but this was evidently 
unsatisfactory and in July 1916, CADC detachments were formed in every district.75 The 
detachments, however, were used to treat serving soldiers and not to screen recruits. The 
determination of dental fitness remained the purview of the medical officer conducting 
the examination.
Did the relaxation of dental standards and the creation of the" CADC add. 
significantly to the number of men who joined the CEF? In December 1916,20,365 
Canadian soldiers at Shomcliffe, Seaford and Crowborough were classified,by medical
77boards and 8,385 or 41.2% were found to be dentally unfit. There is no evidence that 
the findings of the medical boards reflected Canadian oral health in general, but it seems
V
reasonable to conclude that the relaxation of standards and the provision of dental care 
allowed several hundred thousand men to join the CEF who might have been rejected in 
1914;
Vision standards were modified as well. Initially recruits had to have D 15/20 in 
the right eye and D30/20 in the left eye.78 In November 1915, the regulations were 
modified. Recruits with D60/20 in either eye (uncorrected) were fit for general service 
while those with D120/20 in the right eye could be enrolled in the CASC, CAMC and 
COC.79 The following year, recruiting slumped and the standards were relaxed even
c
further. In August 1916, the general standard was lowered to D80/20 for all and D200/80 
for drivers. Those with only one eye were routinely turned away until January 1917 when 
they were allowed to enlist in pioneer, labour, construction, forestry and railway units
• • O r t
provided that the missing eye had not been lost because of an organic disease.
Enrolling recruits with poor eyesight implied that eyeglasses had to be provided 
and from March 1915 onwards, men posted to Flanders were issued with two pair as 
required.81 But, this applied only to those serving overseas and recruits in Canada were 
expected to provide their own glasses, an illogical policy that was corrected in May 1916, 
when the Militia Council decided to provide glasses to all those who needed them.
The initial dental and vision standards were simple and straightforward but 
significantly reduced the pool of potential recruits. Changes to these standards allowed 
more men to join the CEF but the need to provide dentures and eyeglasses increased the 
administrative overhead. Regardless of this, the changes more than benefited the CEF.
: Not all of those who joined were employed with infantry units, but it took almost
two years before Militia HQ recognized that skilled workers who did not meet infantry
standards were useful in specialist corps. From June 1916 onwards, Forestry Corps
recruits missing no more than one finger on each hand (other than thumb and forefinger)
and one or two toes on each foot (other than the great toe) were acceptable. At the same
time, the maximum age limit for skilled forestry workers such as millwrights and saw
filers was extended from 45 to 48.83 Men with flat feet were unacceptable to the infantry
but Militia HQ made an exception for the Skilled Railway Employees because “Any men
0/1
who are good enough for the railway companies are good enough for us.”
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. Not all of these changes were beneficial and overlooked the fact that forestry 
recruits, for example, were expected to work “harder than infantry in the trenches, as far 
as the physical end is concerned.”85 Railway troops were able to cope with flat feet but 
according to the Senior Medical Officer of the CRT Depot in England, most of those over 
forty-two or forty-three who were posted to France could not physically cope with the job
■ • - Q / *  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
while those with only one eye had difficulties with night operations.
Many of those who joined the CEF were unfit on enrolment and were 
subsequently discharged. But, the designation as ‘unfit’ was relative and it has to be kept 
in mind that standards were relaxed throughout the war. Arguably a man judged to be 
unfit in 1914 could very well have been declared fit in 1918. Fitness was also a function 
of the man’s corps and those discharged from infantry battalions might very well have 
been fit for the CASC or another specialist branch of the service.
The number of men released as medically unfit is not certain. In September 1916, 
Colonel Bruce produced a scathing report on the problem of unfit men in England, but 
although he gave numerous examples in his report he did not indicate the extent of the 
problem.87 In a postwar speech in Montréal, General Sir Arthur Currie claimed “100,000
no
men were enlisted and sent to England who were of no use to us in the field” but the 
source of his data is unknown. In any event, although General Currie and Colonel Bruce 
may have exaggerated their claims, the problem was still a serious one. Between 6 
October and 5 November 1916 alone, almost one in six of all infantrymen who arrived in 
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Unfit 42,897 33,155 76,052
Found unfit by unit 
MO
859 ■ 21 880
Found unfit within 3 
months of enrolment
4,301 • . 15 v. • v 4,316
Found unfit on 
reaching 18
54 16 70
Unfit for his special 
duties
v go 41 131
Totals 48,201 33,248 81,449
Notes: (1) The term ‘unfit for his special duties’ presumably refers to those who were 
unfit for their corps.
(2) Column 3 applies to those who served in England but not in France or 
Flanders. It is appreciated that some of these men may have been injured in 
training accidents. ,
The medical conditions that resulted in the release the men in Table 19 are 
unknown although Annex A lists some of the leading causes. Regretfully it has not been 
possible to determine if these causes were due to nutritional, occupational, environmental 
or hereditary factors.
There were other factors that resulted in unfit men being enlisted, according to a 
well-reasoned report produced in October 1916 by Colonel Marlow, ADMS MD 2: 
“Careless examination by medical officers or civilian practitioners, undue pressure-on the 
part of commanding or recruiting officers anxious to increase the number in their units, 
attestation without further medical examination, and retention of men at small billets.” 
There were other reasons as well which Colonel Marlow did not comment upon. 
The prewar C AMC was small and there were too few medical officers to cope with the 
flood of recruits, a problem recognized on the eve of war by the ADMS of MD 6 .
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Hiring civilian physicians made up for the lack of medical officers, but this in turn helped 
to increase the number of unfit recruits.
Physicians were paid fifty cents for each recruit examined and not all doctors 
considered the tariff to be acceptable.94 Some refused to examine recruits while others, at 
least in MD 5, openly said that a fifty-cent fee warranted a fifty-cent examination.95 
There was also a shortage of civilian physicians in remote areas who were willing to 
examine recruits. In the Gaspe, for example, there was only one doctor available. For 
some reason, he was willing to examine recruits but not sign the attestation forms.96
Even if  physicians were willing to examine recruits, they sometimes applied their 
own standards. In the Algoma District of Northern Ontario, the 119 Battalion 
complained of local doctors who either misunderstood or ignored CAMC instructions.97 
Further south in Victoria County, the ADMS of MD 3 reported that civilian physicians 
also ignored instructions, preferring to judge a man’s fitness by his ability to do a day’s 
work.98 CAMC medical officers would have resolved these problems, but there were only
a few hundred available on the outbreak of war and most of them were absorbed by the
\
greatly expanded medical establishment overseas. In any event, the dispersal of the CEF 
in small detachments scattered across the country in the winter of 1915-1916 meant that 
there was no choice but to rely on civilian practitioners.
Medical officers and civilian physicians were hampered by an absence of 
diagnostic tests and medical examinations depended to a large extent on the candor of the 
recruit. In 1917 the GOC MD 11 noted that “many men are reported to be untruthful. 
Such men may very easily escape the notice of the Medical Officer of the Unit for a 
considerable time.”99 Alcoholics, drug addicts, epileptics and men with chronic
conditions, anxious to serve their country, were therefore able to enlist, although in many 
cases, the stress of military life brought their condition to the notice of the authorities.
For the most part, doctors conducted external examinations only. To some degree, 
this was not important since most physicians could recognize obvious signs of disability 
such as irregular heartbeat, chronic rheumatism or weeping chancres. But detecting other 
diseases called for specialized tests. Tuberculosis tests were available, but cost three 
dollars (almost three times the daily pay of a private soldier) .100 Wasserman tests for 
syphilis were also available and by 1916 were common enough that the Toronto General 
Hospital routinely screened all admissions.101 Whether or not every recruit could have 
been screened by these tests is uncertain, at least during the wintér of 1915-1916 when 
detachments were scattered across the country. It would have been impossible for the 
119th Battalion in the remote Algoma District of Ontario, for example, to send blood 
samples to a laboratory (probably in Toronto) for analysis. However, by the end of 1916, 
centralization of units in Canada and the creation of mobilization centres meant that 
standing medical boards were able to make use of specialized equipment such as x-ray 
machines.
; There were also the mentally disabled who were able to hoodwink the doctors and 
enlist in the CEF. In all, a total of 1,486 men were released because of mental disorders. 
Presumably these were cases of insanity and do not include the mentally deficient and . 
learning disabled. A handful of examples of the latter categories are known such as the 
soldier with the 4th Divisional Train in British Columbia who had been “given a great 
deal of individual attention and instruction but does not seem to be able to absorb v 
anything and has shown no improvement whatever.”102 Another soldier from the 181st
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Battalion was examined by a medical board in England and found to be “a high grade 
imbecile, his intelligence is weak, memory of defective(sic) and he is untidy and dirty in 
his habits.” 103 Obviously neither man was of any benefit to the CEF.
These unfortunates were an added burden on units in England and France and in 
1916-1917 there were complaints that newly arrived reinforcements were suffering from 
‘senility, ‘dementia’, ‘mental deficiency’ and ‘delusional insanity. ’ 104 The number is not 
certain, but a total of 6,828 men were hospitalized or released with mental disorders not 
related to battle. There were also 6,432 men discharged as ‘inefficient & undesirable’ 
without leaving Canada and some of these may have been mentally deficient.105 
Together, the mentally disabled and the mentally handicapped probably accounted for 
about 2% of all enlistments, a lower rate than Canadian males in general.106 The ratio was 
roughly consistent with the American Expeditionary Force [AEF] which found that about 
1.5% of all draftees were either mentally deficient or suffering from some form of mental 
disease.107 '
The lack of testing was not because Canadian psychiatrists were unaware of the
V
problem. Clearly they were and in 1917, the AEF adopted psychological testing based, in 
part, on recommendations from Canadian doctors who “indicated the urgent desirability 
of the application of psychological methods in the selection of recruits and in the 
studying of incapacitated soldiers.” 108 But there was no psychiatrist with the DGMS staff 
at Militia HQ and thus no advocate for testing. In any event, intelligence tests would have 
been problematic with the CEF dispersed across the country in small detachments, a 
problem not faced by the AEF, which concentrated large numbers of recruits in relatively 
few central camps. !
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Despite the absence of formal testing, authorities were concerned with mental • •; 
health and medical officers were reminded in 1917 that “Great care is to be taken in 
ascertaining the mental capacity of a recruit.” 109 Training officers were required to assess 
the mental capacity of recruits and classify their intelligence as above average, average or 
under-average, while remembering that “a man may be naturally intelligent although 
owing to lack of educational opportunities he may appear stupid.” 110 Those classified as 
below average in intelligence were to be referred by the training officer to the medical 
officer for observation and subsequently, if necessary, to a standing medical board for 
disposal. 111
Mental health was not assessed and medical officers were cautioned in October 
1917 that it was unwise to ask men if they had ever been admitted to a psychiatric 
institution. Despite this, medical officers were expected to scrutinize recruits carefully for 
mental disorders, although the DGMS admitted this would be fruitless if the individual 
was in remission.112 The Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice, however, 
had no concerns about mental health and in June 1918 MSA registrars were instructed toi
ascertain the names of potential draftees confined to “asylums, institutions for the feeble 
minded [and] hospitals.”113 At least one psychiatric hospital in Ontario is known to have 
forwarded a list of suitable inmates but there is no evidence that men were removed from 
hospitals and placed in uniform .114
The number o f unfit men sent overseas to England was considerable, and by mid- 
1916 had become something of a scandal, so much so that Militia HQ directed that 
special medical boards be formed in every district to review unit medical examinations 
that were to be regarded as preliminary. These boards had the authority to alter the
original-findings of the unit medical officer or local physician and direct that men be sent 
overseas, discharged or transferred to duties in Canada more suited to their physical 
capabilities.115 This did not solve the problem entirely but kept the number of unfit men 
embarking for England to a minimum.
Initial criteria published in 1914 did not stipulate that recruits be British subjects, 
perhaps because they were drawn from the militia which accepted British subj ects 
only.116 Nor was citizenship a formal requirement for the 2nd Division authorized in 
October 1914, perhaps because the units were declared to be temporary corps of the 
Active Militia.117 However, not all units raised in the fall of 1914 were part of the 2nd 
Division and the matter was finally codified for the CEF in August 1915 by a general
1 1 o
order requiring aU recruits to be British subjects.
More than 500 men in the First Contingent were from non-English-speaking 
countries and since the majority of the foreign-born in the general population had been 
naturalized (see Chapter 5), most were probably British subjects.119 A total of thirty-eight 
men were from enemy states or were thought to be German sympathizers. Described as 
‘undesirables’, these men were returned to Canada in November 1914.120 None of the 
others were repatriated, however, perhaps because the CEF in Britain was subject to the
i o t
British A r m y  A c t  which allowed one man in every fifty to be an alien.
Canadian requirements, however, were more stringent than British. In October 
1914 Militia HQ directed that “it is considered inadvisable to enlist persons of foreign 
birth or nationality.” 122 Specific nationalities were singled out. In November 1914, Militia 
HQ announced that Russian subjects could not be enlisted and those who had been
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attested were to be discharged forthwith. A few months later, in February 1915, HQ MD 
10 advised the 105th Regiment in Saskatoon that CEF recruits bom in the United States 
had to be naturalized British subjects and of British descent, an interesting exercise in 
genealogy.123
Given the decentralized nature of the Canadian Forces and the relative autonomy 
of military districts, regulations regarding aliens were not uniformly applied. At one end 
of the spectrum was HQ MD 2 which in early 1915 ordered the discharge of all Italians, 
Danes, Greeks and Russians serving with Second Contingent units in Toronto. At the 
same time, militia units recruiting on behalf of the CEF in St Catharines and Brantford 
were forbidden to enlist foreigners while the 51st Regiment in Sault Ste Marie was 
instructed to release all CEF recruits from Belgium, the United States, France and 
Russia.124 The policy was firmly applied and of twenty-six Russians with the 37th 
Battalion, only two, presumably British subjects, sailed to England in August and 
November 1915.125
Not all districts were as hard-nosed as MD 2. In eastern Ontario (MD 3), the 59th 
Battalion enlisted more than sixty Russians, virtually all of whom sailed to England with 
the battalion or in one of two reinforcing drafts. 126 In MD 5, the 57th Battalion at Québec 
City enlisted about a hundred Russians; sixty-four sailed to England. In total, 27.2% of 
the men in the 57th Battalion were not British subjects by birth.127 The 41st Battalion, also 
from Québec City, was able to reach full strength only because of a company of Russian- 
born recruits from Western Canada.128 A total of 221 men who were not British subjects 
by birth sailed in 1915 with the main body of the 41st or the reinforcing draft -  about 20% 
of the unit.129 But even in Québec, the policy was not consistent. Kostos Bastas, bom in
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Greece, enlisted in the 24th Battalion in 1914 but was discharged because he was an alien. 
A determined man, Bastas immediately applied for naturalization and in March 1915, 
was able to join the 41st Battalion as a newly-minted British subject.130
As the war, with its interminable demand for men, ground on, every district found 
it increasingly difficult to recruit. In Alberta, for example, Brigadier-General Cruikshank 
noted the shortage of recruits in January 1917. A large proportion of the British subjects 
living in MD 13 had already enlisted while up to 50% of those applying to district 
mobilization centres were medically unfit. Farmers were actively discouraging recruiting 
while high wages, bumper crops and an increased demand for labour all combined to
keep men at home.131 Not surprisingly, recruiters became more ready to accept foreigners
/
without inquiring too closely into their status as British subjects.
The formation of the 97th (American Legion) Battalion brought the first changes 
to citizenship criteria. Intended to attract Americans domiciled in Canada, it quickly 
became apparent that potential recruits were discouraged by the need to be British 
subjects. In November 1915, therefore, citizenship requirements were waived for the 97 , 
and eventually other American Legion battalions were accommodated as well. With 
the American Legion battalions as a precedent, it was only a matter o f time before other 
aliens were also accepted.
Recruiting regulations were not formally amended, but the idea that aliens were 
acceptable in the CEF was finally recognized in April 1917 when an Order-in-Council 
was issued authorizing a revised form of enlistment oath for men who were not British 
subjects because of “the large number of men [enlisted who are] not Citizens of Canada, 
or British subjects.” 133 Neither KR&O nor the G e n e r a l  O r d e r  of August 1915 was
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formally suspended or amended, but the Order-in-Council was a de facto admission that 
foreign-bom soldiers were welcome in the CEF.
There was a further change in 1918 with the introduction of conscription under 
the M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t  1 9 1 7. In brief, draftees were required to be British subjects. 
Immigrants who had not been naturalized could still be drafted, but only for non- 
combatant service. Since the demand was for infantrymen, it can be safely assumed that 
relatively few non-British subjects were drafted.134
A number of those drafted in 1918 were enemy aliens from Germany or the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. An apparent contradiction of previous regulations, the
provision was consistent with the spirit of the N a t u r a l i z a t i o n  A c t  1 9 1 4  which reminded
/
those naturalized that they were “subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities to which 
a natural bom British subject is subject.” 135 The sentiment was repeated in the W a r t i m e  : 
E l e c t i o n s  A c t  of 1917 which disenfranchised all those bom in enemy countries 
naturalized after. 31 March 1902 but allowed those who had joined the CEF or who had 
been rejected as medically unfit, together with their families, to retain the vote.136 In 
effect, citizenship with its attendant rights carried with it an obligation to serve the state.
Eligibility for the CEF was clouded by the fact that foreign nations felt free to 
control immigrants resident in Canada. Italy allowed Italian citizens living in Canada to 
join the CEF but only after obtaining a Consular certificate that they were exempt from 
service in the Italian army. Serbs and Montenegrins were also allowed to enlist, but were 
subject to recall by their home countries for military service.137 In Ottawa, the 5th Field 
Company had to release seven Belgians in January 1915 after representations from the 
Belgian Consul. On the other hand, Frenchmen were not claimed by their parent
country unless they were reservists, in which case they were expected to report to their 
unit regardless of whether or not they were naturalized British subjects. Those serving 
with the 1st Division, such as Major Raymond Brutinel, were faced with the prospect of 
arrest if they deployed with their units to France. The issue was quickly resolved, 
however, when the French government agreed that those serving with the CEF would not 
b e ‘bothered’ .139
: Enlistment of Russians was a bureaucratic nightmare mainly because of 
conditions imposed by their home country. In October 1914, the Russian ambassador in 
Washington notified the Montréal consulate that Russians living in Canada who had 
fulfilled their military obligation were free to join the CEF. But this may have been an
s
error and a few days later, the consul notified External Affairs that the policy applied 
only to Russians living in Britain or France. Those living in Canada, therefore, could not 
enlist in the CEF and those who had should be discharged forthwith.
Militia HQ promptly notified all districts and only twenty-two Russians are 
known to have been enlisted in November and December 1914, mainly in the Maritimes 
and Western Canada. However, judging by a request from the Russian attaché in London 
in December 1914 to allow twenty-nine Russians with the 1st Division to attend Greek 
Orthodox services, the restriction did not apply to those serving overseas. 140
The Russian government insisted on maintaining a grip on all Russians, regardless 
of individual circumstances and Canada’s status as a nation. In March 1915, the CEF 
recruiting officer in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, asked if Russians who came to Canada as 
young children could enlist in the CEF. The response from the consul was swift: these 




communications between1 Russia and Canada have never been interrupted,” wrote the 
consul, and “they are able to reach Russia, by their own means.” 141 Similarly, in June 
1915 Sergeant-Major Haynes of Roblin, Manitoba, was advised that former members of 
the Russian army living in Canada were not allowed to join the CEF but were expected 
“to join their own regiment in Russia, and have to go there by their own means.” 142 
: The Russian policy was clearly impractical because of the closure of the Baltic 
and Black Sea ports and the difficulties of an ocean voyage from Canada to Archangel or 
Vladivostok. In July 1915, the Imperial Russian Consulate in Montréal notified External 
Affairs that the Czar had issued a decree on 18 June 1915 authorizing Russian subjects in 
Canada, including reservists and territorials, to .enlist in the CEF. But, the edict 
announced, these men had to apply to the Consulate for an identification certificate in 
order to enlist.143 To obtain this certificate, men had to produce Russian identification 
papers (passport, military booklet or birth certificate), provide a photograph and pay 
consular fees of $1.63 -  more than a day’s pay for a private soldier.144 Not surprisingly, 
Canadian authorities were not consulted in the process of modifying CEF enlistment 
procedures. Nor is there any record of any arm of the Canadian government protesting 
what amounted to an infringement of Canadian sovereignty.
Inevitably there were problems with the process put in place by the Russian 
consul apart from the volume of requests (more than 6,600 Russians enlisted in the CEF). 
In March 1916, the CGS noted that a number of Russian subj ects in Saskatchewan had 
lost or destroyed their papers and feared that “good men and true may be lost to the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force because they have the misfortune to be without papers.” 145 
He suggested that Hawryl Slipchenko in Saskatoon could verify they were genuine
c .  ■
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Russians, but the consul dismissed the idea and insisted that local authorities at the 
recruit’s place of birth in Russia would have to investigate the man’s claims.146 For their 
part, some of the Russian-born soldiers who enlisted detested the requirement for a 
certificate from the consul, were reluctant to provide their photograph to Russian 
authorities and were opposed to letting the consul know they were members of the 
CEF.147 The system was cumbersome, and in practice amounted to an inefficient farce 
despite the avowed purpose of weeding out enemy aliens trying to pass themselves off as
148bona fide Russians.
Enemy aliens, those bom in enemy countries, were automatically suspect and all 
concerned understood that these men could not be enlisted. But the policy was not 
applied uniformly and a handful of those with former service in the Canadian Forces 
were allowed to join the CEF. Examples include George Merkel from Bamburg, a skilled 
harness maker who had served with the PF in the Canadian Ordnance Corps since 1906, 
and Rudolph Back from Magdeburg who had served for eighteen years with the militia 
and had fought in South Africa with the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion of the RCR.149
Aliens were barred from enlistment on the basis of nationality and not ethnicity. 
Andi Brod from Berlin, for example, was discharged from the 5 Battalion because he 
was German-bom. However, both Adolph Messerschmidt, a Baltic German, and 
Reinhold Krinke, a Volhynia German, were technically Russians and therefore 
acceptable.150 There was a tacit recognition that some ethnic groups from enemy 
countries could be safely enlisted: those from Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkan provinces of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bohemia, Moravia and Christians from the Ottoman 
Empire.
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Initially immigrants from non-English speaking countries found it difficult to join. 
But starting in the second half of 1915 the proportion of immigrants enlisting exceeded 
comparable rates for the CEF as a whole as shown in Table 20. In other words, these men 
found it easier to enlist which suggests that recruiters were not as zealous in enforcing 
citizenship requirements as they were in 1914 and the first half of 1915.
. Table 20
Sample of Foreign Bom Enlistments 1914-1916151
Born 1914 -.1915 Increase 1915 Increase 1916 Increase 1916 Increase Sample
’ % - - . ~ Aug-Dee;, Jan-Jun ' „over JuL-Dec ; over Jan-Jun - over - Jui-Dec _ over Size
* , Recruits ■ previous Recruits previous Recruits previous Recruits previous
6 months * 6 months 6 months -- 6 months
Belgium 108 73 . 68% 109 149% 298 273% 94 32% 682
France 78 85 109% 113 133% 227 201% 100 44% 603
Denmark 53 37 70% 123 332% 242 197% 115 46% 570
Greece 13 5 39% 35 700% 55 157% 65 118% 173
Holland 26 24 92% 53 221% 102 193% 22 22% 227
Iceland 5 7 140% 42 600% 182 433% 7 4% 243
Italy 29 58 200% 227 391% 338 . 149% 120 36% 772
Japan 1 2 200% 3 150% 59 1967% 118 200% 183
Montenegro 14 1 7% 24 2400% 14 58% 33 236% 86
Norway 42 32 76% 116 363% 616 ■ 531% 138 22% 944
Romania 9 4 44% 12 300% 74 : 617% 58 78% 157
Russia 110 123 112% 906 737% 2,029 224% , 870 43% 4,038
Serbia -■ 13 4 31% 32 800% 75 234% 43 57% 167
Sweden 50 36 72% 181 503% 457 253% 131 29% 855
Switzerland 14 12 86% 31 258% 55 177% ... 23 42% 135
..****, ' r\ \ r-* * k. _ . *- - 5 - I  ■ „ . _ ' *: ‘ -- V „ -
Totals 565 503 89% 2,007 399% s4,823 . 240% . 1,937 40% 9,835
l „ _ » - 9- ... -
CEF - All 56,584 51,674 91% 100,678 195% 133,614 133% 36,007 27% 378,557
Notes: (1) Percentages have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.
(2) Nations and regions not specified in Table 20 are: Albania, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Central America, Cuba, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
North Africa, Ottoman Empire, Portugal, South America and Spain. .. ■
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In theory, Chinese recruits had to be British subjects, of age and medically fit. 
However, they were not wanted and there may have been specific rules to prevent them 
from joining. In April 1917, the AAG at HQ MD 2 wrote that “regulations do not permit 
of the enlistment of Chinamen into the Canadian Expeditionary Force.” The 
regulations invoked by HQ MD 2 have not been found, but a Military Service Branch 
Circular in August 1918 notified local registrars that the Department of Militia and 
Defence policy was not “to enroll men with the CEF, who are obviously Chinese.” 153 The 
Circular also noted that depot battalions had been instructed to return Chinese-Canadian 
draftees to the Registrar’s records (i.e. discharged). Whether the exclusion of Chinese 
Canadians was a regulation or an informal policy is not certain. Either way, it is quite 
clear that these men were not welcome in the CEF.
Not surprisingly, very few Chinese Canadians joined the CEF. Marjorie Wong 
has estimated that about three hundred enlisted, but this is clearly an exaggeration and to 
date, only five men have been identified.154 Three were bom in Canada: Frederick Lee 
from Kamloops, who was killed at Hill 70 in August 1917; Wee Tan (William Thomas) 
Louie, who was drafted into the Alberta Regiment; and Wee Hong (Walter Henry) Louie, 
who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in April 1917.155 Two were bom in China: Tung 
On Hong from Haileybury, who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in May 1917;_and 
Victor Fong, a Quebec City student who enlisted in the 248th Battalion in October 1917 
and then promptly deserted.156 There may have been a few others. In 1920, Hugh Guthrie, 
the Minister of Militia and Defence estimated that about a dozen Chinese Canadians had 
enlisted in the CEF.157
-  ' ; ■. ■; ' Japanese immigrants also had difficulties with recruiting criteria. Many were 
transient and intent on earning sufficient money to purchase a farm or house in Japan. No 
doubt, many of these men were not British subjects. Language was also an issue. Militia 
HQ was adamant that recruits had to speak English or French but,; as late as 1924-1926, 
almost 74% of Japanese immigrants in British Columbia were unable to read, write or 
understand English.158 Most of them lived in British Columbia where the provincial 
government discouraged enlistment which could lead to enfranchisement, a sentiment 
echoed by the CGS who thought that “when the war is over & demobilization sets in, 
those of them who served in the CEF will make themselves a nuisance. Après nous, le 
Déluge” .159 Elsewhere there were no objections to recruiting Japanese Canadians; in 
March 1916, the men of the 216th Battalion in Toronto were asked if they would welcome 
a Japanese company and “Every hand in the battalion went up in the affirmative.” 160
In Vancouver, the Canadian Japanese Association in Vancouver offered to raise a 
battalion while others offered to raise an independent company. The battalion was . v 
rejected by Militia HQ because there were doubts that the manpower supply was 
adequate to form and sustain the unit. The proposal was passed to Britain and Japan, but 
neither government replied and the Militia Council decided not to proceed with forming 
the battalion.161 The independent company was also quashed because the idea of a
1 ¿ 0
company that could not be broken up for reinforcements was anathema to Militia HQ.
Japanese applicants living in the United States were banned from enlisting with 
the British Canadian Recruiting Mission, although at least nine were able to join. 
Ethnicity was not a bar to conscription and at least twenty-four Japanese Canadians or 
Nisei were drafted under the MSA -  almost 11 % of all known Japanese enrollments.
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Surprisingly, eighteen were residents of British Columbia or the Yukon which formed 
part of MD l l .164 ;
Sikhs also received short shrift. Almost 99% of them lived in British Columbia 
where they were regarded with suspicion and contempt although they had been bom in a 
British colony and in many cases anxious to enlist.165 There were no objections to Sikhs 
enlisting provided they did so in the Indian Army and not in the CEF. In September 1914, 
W.P. Archibald, the Dominion Parole Officer, for example, reported that he had 
interviewed a number of ex-members of the Indian Army in the British Columbia 
Penitentiary and recommended that they be allowed to join the Indian Corps in France: 
“These men have every appearance of strength and manhood and I am sure they are 
anxious to serve their country.” 166 Archibald missed the point: the men in question were 
living in Canada and not India.
I; ; A  few months later, in December 1914, a deputation of East Indians approached
the premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, with an offer to raise a contingent 
of ex-Sepoys.167 McBride passed the proposal to Prime Minister Borden, but it was 
rejected, in part because the CGS believed that finding reinforcements would be difficult 
and because of concerns “these men are not of the tribe or race of Sikhs who are 
considered the best fighters in India.” 168 The proposal was then passed by Borden to the 
Governor General in February 1915 with a suggestion that the War Office pick up the 
offer o f Sikh recruits from British Columbia.169
The number o f East Indians who managed to enlist in the CEF is unknown and 
one historian has gone so far as to say that none were accepted. However, a search of 
on-line attestation forms has turned up sixteen men who were clearly not Anglo-Indians
or the sons of British expatriates.171 The first East Indian joined the 24th Battalion at 
Montréal in January 1915 while the last volunteered at Ottawa in October 1918.172 The 
sample reflects the general dislike of East Indians in British Columbia where the 
overwhelming majority lived. Only two men were residents of British Columbia while 
one, who joined the British Columbia Regiment, was a California Jew born in India who 
had been enlisted by the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission.173 At least one Sikh 
enlisted at Vancouver under an assumed name.174 In total, seven volunteers enlisted in 
Ontario, two in Québec, three in Manitoba and three in British Columbia. As with 
Chinese Canadians, East Indians were not supposed to be conscripted under the MSA,
but there was at least one Sikh, Ram Singh of Grand Forks, who was drafted into the
. /
British Columbia Regiment in December 1917.175
There were no regulations preventing blacks from enlisting, but many had 
difficulties. As the AG noted in October 1915 “The final approval of any man, regardless 
of colour or other distinctions, must, of course, rest with the Officer Commanding the 
unit.”176 Enlistment, then, depended on the bias (if any) of the recruiter or his 
commanding officer.
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning the experiences of 
individual blacks who were rejected by recruiters and these examples have been used by 
historians to present a bleak picture of universal racism. Less well known are the 
experiences of blacks who enlisted as volunteers and served overseas, men such as Miles 
Dymond from Fredericton who joined the 1st Field Company at Valcartier in 1914, John 
Granito, a sergeant with the 54th Battalion, Curley Christian, Canada’s only quadruple
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amputee, and James Post, an underage black with the 4 Canadian Mounted Rifles who 
was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. .
Also unreported are efforts by authorities to ensure that blacks were able to enlist. 
In November 1915, for example, there were complaints that blacks had been turned away 
by recruiters in MD 2, and Sam Hughes demanded an explanation. The reply from the 
district commander was unequivocal: “Last summer [the] question arose here and I ruled 
they [blacks] must be accepted.” 179 The district commander’s reply was not a pro forma 
denial. A few days later, the AAG of HQ MD 2 wrote to the Toronto Recruiting Depot, 
“If the practice of refusing to accept colored men has been followed, it must be 
discontinued at once.” The reply from the depot was succinct: “We make no 
discrimination here as to color or creed.” 180
Elsewhere authorities were adamant that there should be no institutional
discrimination. In July 1916, the commanding officer of No. 1 Construction Battalion
wrote that the designation of a black unit as No. 2 Construction Battalion had resulted in
complaints from his men who were upset at being associated with blacks. The reply from
the AG was blunt and direct. Those joining No. 2 Construction Battalion were both
British subjects and Canadians. Coloured troops were “recognized as comrades in arms
both in France and England. It is for you, therefore, to .inspire your men with correct
181ideas on the subject.”
Still, attitudes in the CEF (and Canada for that matter) were ambivalent. In 
November 1915, J.R.B. Whitney, publisher of the blackjoumal C a n a d i a n  O b s e r v e r ,  
wrote to Sam Hughes asking if  the CEF would accept a company of blacks recruited in
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Ontario; Hughes was taken by the suggestion but substituted a black platoon grafted on to
• 1 S')an existing battalion. The proposal was then passed to HQ MD 2 for review.
HQ MD 2 queried thirty-seven battalions, all of which refused to accept the 
platoon.183 Nineteen battalions considered that black soldiers would deter recruiting or 
would be unpopular with the officers and men, with the 147th Battalion in Grey County 
reporting that “prejudice against negroes in this County is extremely bitter” and the 114 
Battalion commenting that a black platoon would cause serious friction and discontent 
within the unit. Twelve battalions reported they were up to strength and did not need 
recruits while the CO of the 169 noted that his unit was up to full strength but he was 
willing to offer eight blacks in his battalion to help build up the platoon. Three battalions 
replied that they were recruiting only to fill up existing platoons while the 133rd and 177th 
were willing to accept blacks, but only if they were residents of Norfolk or Simcoe 
County respectively.
The replies reflected CEF ambivalence towards blacks. Prejudice existed but there 
! were military factors as well. Battalions were formed by selecting commanding officers 
who then appointed a complete slate of officers, including platoon commanders, before 
starting their recruiting campaign.184 The addition of a black platoon to an existing 
battalion, therefore, required the unit to be reorganized. Commanding officers were (and 
still are) very busy people. Reorganizing the battalion to accommodate a black platoon 
and then finding reinforcements to keep the platoon up to strength were added burdens . 
that the commanding officer could do without. The platoon may have advanced the status 
of blacks within Canada but would have been an added complication for over-worked
commanding officers who were under considerable pressure to complete their
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battalions.185
The number of blacks who managed to satisfy both social and military criteria for 
enrolment is unknown, although the Governor General’s military secretary noted in 
October 1915 that His Royal Highness had inspected a number of units and “come across 
quite a good number of coloured men.” 186 However, a sample of 1,090 men who were 
probably black has been compiled based on those who served in No. 2 Construction 
Battalion, a handful who joined other units and men bom in the West Indies'187 The 
sample suggests that more than 1,200 blacks served in the CEF.
Table 21 :
Black Soldiers - Sample
»’Group Sample ’’ , M ean1 
Enlistment 
Date















605 October 1916 167 27.6% N/A N/A
Total 1,090 December
1916
243 22.3% 209 19.2%
CEF March 1916 10% 2 1%
Not all of those who enlisted lived in Canada. American blacks accounted for at 
least 243 men, or 22.3% of all blacks who enlisted - more than one in five as compared to 
the CEF average of 10%. If only those living in Canada are considered, the enlistment 
rate was 9.4%, slightly below the Canadian-bom rate of 11.2%. The mean enlistment date
\
for all blacks was December 1916, nine months after the CEF average while 19.2% were 
conscripts, slightly lower than the national average.
However, these statistics are skewed by the all-volunteer construction battalion 
recruited between July 1916 and March 1917. If only the West Indian sample is 
considered, then the mean enlistment date was February 1918 w ith! 83 draftees 
accounting for 40.7% of all enlistments. Admittedly these numbers are soft. Attestation 
forms did not specify ethnicity and perhaps there were a few men in the sample groups 
who were not black. The sample groups themselves are also incomplete. Still, the 
evidence strongly suggests the mean enlistment date for blacks was significantly later 
than the GEF as a whole and the MSA rate was somewhat higher. Clearly the CEF was
s
ambivalent about accepting black recruits, an attitude summarized by the AG in April 
1918: “We are not hunting for coloured recruits but merely making a place for them as 
they come in.” 188 :
Specific criteria were also applied to natives by Sam Hughes, at least in MD 1, 
from August 1914 to December 1915. In brief, natives were forbidden to enlist for 
overseas service. The restriction was not a reasoned and deliberate policy but rather a 
hasty response to a query from MD 1 on whether Indians were eligible for the CEF. Both 
the query and the response were dated 8 August 1914. That the policy was a spur of the 
moment decision is supported by the fact that Hughes’s military secretary wrote to the 
Ontario M.P.P. for Huron County on the same day assuring him that natives in his riding 
who wished to enlist could apply to the 32nd Huron Regiment which was recruiting for 




Strictly speaking, Hughes’s policy applied only to MD 1 which contained 4,240
natives -  about 4 %  of all natives in Canada.190 There is some indication that the
restriction was applied in MD 2 in February 1915, but this is far from certain.191 In any
event, the policy was not publicized and no evidence has been found of a Militia Order,
General Order or circular instruction concerning the matter. Admittedly the Department
of Indian Affairs was notified, but not until October 1915 and only in response to a
specific question. In any event, the restriction was formally rescinded in December
1915 after MD 1 and MD 2 requested authority for the newly-authorized 114th and 135*
10'!Battalions to recruit natives.
The effect of the supposed ban on native enlistments was limited. In November
y
1914, the 20th Battalion in MD 2 had an Indian company from the 37th Regiment as well 
as two lieutenants, both of whom were status Indians.194 In 1915, before the restriction 
was lifted, natives openly enlisted in other MD 2 units including the 58th, 76th, 81st and 
84th Battalions as well as the Canadian Mounted Rifles Depot in Hamilton.195 The honour 
roll of native fatalities published by Fred Gaffen shows seventy-two men who enlisted
V
between September 1914 and the beginning of December 1915 when the restriction was 
lifted.* Only three were from MD 1, all of whom joined the First Contingent in 
September 1914. The remaining sixty-nine came from every other district in the country 
and enlisted at various times between September 1914 and November 1915.196 It seems 
apparent, therefore, that Hughes’s direction had little effect outside of MD 1.
, The number of natives who joined is unknown although the generally accepted 
estimate is 3,500 to 4,000 men.197 Virtually all were status Indians or Métis. Only one
* A cursory search of embarkation rolls turned up an additional 128 Natives who enlisted priuor to 
Deember 1915.
Inuk is known to have joined the CEF although there were two men with the 228
1QRBattalion who may have also have been Inuit.
Canadian historian Fred Gaffen has compiled an honour roll of 336 fatalities, 
mainly status Indians although a few Métis are also included.199 The roll contains errors 
and omissions and after these are taken into account, the total is 314 natives who died 
during the war.200 Given the overall death rate of 9.6% in the CEF, this number suggests 
that only 3,271 natives were enlisted. But the honour roll is probably not complete and 
the commonly accepted estimate of 3,500 native enlistments seems reasonable. Assuming 
that 3,500 natives joined, the enlistment rate was 6.5% of all males or 7.6% if those living
in the Northwest Territories are excluded (no recruiting parties are known to have visited/
this region.)201 In comparison, the enlistment rate for Canadian-born males was 11.2%. 
Part o f this difference may be due to the fact that status Indians could be
fyy
conscripted into non-combatant corps only, at least from 17 January 1918 onwards.
Since there was little demand for men in non-combatant corps, it is likely that few natives 
were drafted. Only four men of the men on Gaffen’s honour roll, or 1.2% of all deaths, 
were draftees. In contrast, to pick four regions at random, 67 or 4% of the 1,676 CEF 
men commemorated on cenotaphs in Perth, Oxford, Huron and Middlesex counties in 
Ontario were draftees.
Informal rules were set by some reserves that saw the war as a chance to advance 
their cause. On the Cape Mudge Reserve of British Columbia, an impromptu gathering of 
young men on 6 January 1916 resulted in a declaration that “as the Indians were not 
voters, and as they had not been consulted either with regard to the taking away of their 
original heritage, or in the formation of any of our [Canadian] laws they did not feel
c
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called upon to take up arms for the flag.”204 Other bands supported the notion that their 
young men were free to decide if  they should leave the CEF after enlisting, or, in other 
words, desert. At Caughnawaga, Québec, residents were sufficiently militant that Indian 
Affairs advised Militia HQ that military police should not enter the reserve to apprehend 
deserters, thus creating a safe haven on Canadian soil. In British Columbia, some, 
natives could not enlist unless they had permission from their chief, leading one volunteer 
to retort in 1917 “that the only chief he recognized was King George V .”206
Many reserves were isolated. Recruiting parties could not visit on a routine basis 
and would-be recruits had difficulty reaching recruiting stations. The 228th Battalion, for 
example, enlisted at least seventeen men at Moose Factory, Ontario, accessible at the 
time only by water. In Manitoba, a recruiting party from the 203rd Battalion probably 
used a lake steamer to secure sixteen native recruits at Norway House in June 1916. In 
August 1917, Forestry Corps recruiters enlisted John Semple, a native from Berens River 
“On the S.S. Wolverine on Lake Winnipeg.”207 Communities on James Bay and 
Hudson’s Bay were also difficult to reach and in 1917 Lieutenant C.M. McCarthy hired a 
‘gasoline boat’ at an estimated cost of $1,500 to go down the Albany River and recruit 
forty-five men at Attawapiskat, Albany River and Fort Albany.
Militia HQ constantly made efforts throughout the war to expand the pool of 
potential recruits but their efforts were inconsistent and unfocussed. Asians were 
routinely turned away while no attempt was made to tap the black community. Some 
remote reserves were visited by recruiting officers but there was no concerted effort made 
to enlist natives who did not live in southern Canada. In all, the reluctance to enlist 




Sample - Visible Minorities209








Chinese 26,813 3,995 5 (minimum) >0 .1%
East Indians 2,315 345 16 (minimum) 0 .6%
Japanese 7,522 1,121 227 (minimum) 3 %
Blacks 8,807 1,312 1,200
(estimated)
13.6%
Natives 44,939 6,695 3,500-4,000
(estimated)
7.8% -8.9%
Total 90,396 13,468 4,948 5.5%
CEF 3,626,621 539,210 14.9%
Notes: (1) CEF enlistments exclude those w 10 were American residents or who
were enlisted outside of Canada.
(2) Natives in the Yukon and Northwest Territories have been excluded 
since there was no active recruiting with the exception of the Yukon 
Infantry Company.
(3) The number of black and native enlistments is based on estimates.
(4) Chinese and East Indian enlistments include men who were Chinese or 
East Indian as well as those who were bom elsewhere but were obviously 
Chinese or East Indian in origin.
(5) Japanese recmits include two men bom in Korea which was then 
a Japanese possession.
(6) Men whose parents were British or Canadian expatriates have not been 
included regardless of their birthplace.
Recruiting criteria were continually modified throughout the war. A number of 
changes were initiated by Militia HQ in an effort to broaden eligibility for enlistment, but 
not all changes were productive. The reduction in height standards for the infantry, for 
example, produced few soldiers who were fit for the trenches. Other changes, such as the 
age range, failed to take into account British standards that governed the CEF overseas. 
Other criteria that inhibited recruiting and regulations concerning non-English speaking 
immigrants and visible minorities probably turned many would-be recmits away.
c
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-Militia HQ was not a passive participant in the effort to find recruits but actively 
sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. The evolving changes had , 






The general state of health of Canadian males during the First World War is not 
certain, but without a detailed description of underlying causes, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusion other than there were a large number of men enlisted who were unfit for 
military service.
Table 23
Releases -  Other Ranks210
Description ; Overseas' Canada Only . Total
Medically unfit 85,673 42,897 128,570
Rejected by unit MO 7 746 753-
Rejected by unit MO although 
accepted elsewhere
14 113 127
Unfit within three months of 
enlistment
15 4,301 4,316
Unfit on reaching 18 years of 
age
16 54 70
Totals 85,725 48,111 133,836
Note: Those who were wounded or injured in France and Belgium are included with the 
medically unfit who served overseas.
In considering specific causes of medical unfitness, a clearer picture emerges that 
illustrates aspects of public health in general. It is probable that most of the diseases 
shown in Table 23 were acquired in civilian life and were not the result of military 
service, although only an examination of individual personnel files would prove this.
Diagnostic tools available in 1914-1918 could have detected some of these 
conditions such as defective teeth, nutritional and metabolic disorders, anemia, foot 
deformities, mental disorders, parasites, tuberculosis, gonorrhea and syphilis. However, 
the general lack of laboratories and the dispersal of many units in small detachments
l
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throughout rural areas made any sort of systematic testing difficult, if  not impossible. 
Many of the diseases listed are readily treatable today and it is difficult to imagine 
soldiers being released in modem times because conditions such as venereal diseases or 
parasites.
210
 ̂ r  Table 24
Chronic Diseases - Selection 
Other Ranks of CEF211
Condition Discharges
, f
Deaths Total>s . > Percentage 
of all 
diseases
Heart and pericardium 3,502 323 3,825 18.1%
Defective teeth I0 l 101 0.5%
Stomach inflammation and 
ulcers
959 45 1,004 : 4.8%
Other stomach diseases 22 6 •28 0.1%
Liver disease 21 15 36 0.2%
Hernia 1,153 ; 13 1,166 , 5.5%
Gall and bladder disease 56 6 62 0.3%
Pancreas 2 •2...
Ductless glands 233 8 241 i:i%
Nutritional and metabolic 
disorders
88 62 150 0.7%
Tumors (general) and cysts 84 19 103 0.5%
Diseases of reproductive system 824 17 84 Y 4%
Anemia and other blood 
disorders
73 29 102 0.5%
Muscles and fascia 200 1 201 1%
Spinal diseases (excluding 
cerebral spinal disease)
79 1 80 0.4%
Bones and periosteum 1,729 6 1,735 8.2%
Flat foot 414 414 2%
Other foot deformities 402 2 404 1.9%
Diseases o f lymphatic system 147 7 154 0.7%
Spleen 5 1 6 ■x
Mental disorders (including 
suicides)
1,486 123 1,609 7.6%
Epilepsy 629 16 645 3.1%
Other diseases of the nervous 
system
829 93 922 4.4%
Parasites (including scabies) 357 357 1.7%
Alcoholism 70 63 133 0.6% '
Other intoxicants and drugs 81 54 135 0.6%
Tuberculosis (lung) 2,602 376 2,978 14.1%
Other tubercular diseases 292 101 393 1.9%
Gonorrhea 1,804 22 1,826 8.6%
Tertiary syphilis 11 2 13 0.1%
Rheumatism (acute or chronic) 1,446 9 1,455 6.9%
Totals 13,885 627 21,121
N otes: ( ! )  M ental disorc ers exclude m en suffering from  shell shock or
neurasthenia.
(2) Men with below average intelligence were released as ‘unlikely to
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become an efficient soldier’, a catch-all description that included a wide 
variety o f causes.212 A total of 6,700 other ranks were discharged as 
‘inefficient & undesirable.’
(3) Not included are cases of cancers, new growths and tumors. A total of 
360 men were discharged under these categories and 197 died for a total 
of 557 soldiers.
However, Table 24 shows those who were accepted for enlistment and were then 
subsequently discharged. In other words, the table may not accurately reflect the general 
medical state of Canadian males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Regretfully 
no comprehensive statistics appear to exist, since medical care was not centralized. 
However, an intriguing picture emerges from a report prepared by an enterprising 
medical officer in Ontario (probably Windsor) of 889 men who applied for enlistment. A  
total of 289 men or 32.5% of those who applied were rejected for reasons set out in Table
212
Table 25
Medical Rejections -  Ontario - 1917213
Reason for Rejection Number Percent of all Rejections
Hernia 42 14.5%
Underweight or undersized 38 13.1% :
Deformed -  old accident or disease 28 9.7%
Hemorrhoids 21 7.3%
Mental Deficiency 20 6.9%
Varicose veins 20 6.9%
Tuberculosis 18 6 .2%
Asthma 4 1.4%
Osteomyelitis [bone infectionl 4 1.4%
Old Pott’s Fracture [ankle] 3 1%
Grave’s Disease [hyperthyroidism] 3 1%
Defective knee joints 3 1%
Rheumatic Fever 11 3.8%
Chronic otorrohea [chronic ear discharge] 10 3.5%
Valvular disease of the heart 10 3.5%
Defective sight or hearing 9 3.1%''
Various amputations 9 3.1%
Infantile spinal paralysis [Poliol 5 1.7%
Epilepsy 5 1.7%
Stammering 2 0.7%
Active syphilis 2 0.7%
Underage 2 0.7%
Overage 1 0.3%
Anal fistula [abscess] 3 1%
Chronic eczema 2 0.7%
Diseases of the spine 2 0.7%
Congenital torticollis [wryneck present at birth] 1 0.3%
Discharging neck sinus [Pilonidal cyst] 1 0.3%
Chronic laryngitis 1 0.3%
Chronic gonorrhea 1 0.3%
Scoliosis [curved spine] 1 0.3%
Insanity 1 0.3%
Diabetes 1 0.3%
Night blindness 1 0.3%
Tachycardia [rapid heart beatl 1 0.3%
Deaf mutism 1 0.3%
Extensive foot calluses 1 0.3%




Note: The table does not include multiple causes of cisability.
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- The majority of conditions described were chronic or long-standing, a disturbing 
view of Canadian manhood in 1917. The reasons for these conditions are uncertain, 
although some were probably related to economic status and the availability of medical 
care. Assuming that literacy is a rough proxy for social class, many of those rejected must 
have been lower class or working-class men who could not afford adequate medical care, 
a telling comment on public health at the beginning of the twentieth century. Only 29 or 
4.8% of the 600 recruits accepted were illiterate whereas 71 or 24.6% of those rejected
were illiterate.
A somewhat different picture emerges from a small sample of men recruited by




Medical Rejections -  48th Highlanders 
1915-1917214
Cause of Re jection Number Proportion of Sample
Eyesight and squint 35 29.7%
Varicose veins 10 8.5%
Hernia 8 , 6 .8%
Poor development 8 6 .8%
Underweight 8 : . 6 .8%
Flat feet 6 ' , 5.1%
Heart defects 6 5.1%
Requires operation 5 . 4.2%
Deformed 4 3.4%
Hammertoes 4 3.4%
Underage ' 4 3.4%
Rheumatism 3 2.5%
Epilepsy 2 : • 1.7%
Old injury 2 1.7%
Overage 2 1.7%
Tuberculosis ........  2 1.7%
Undersized 2 1.7%
Asthma ' 1" 0 .8%
Bunions 1 • . 0 .8%
Cancer-lung ' 'I' 1 0 .8%
Goiter 1 0 .8%
Measles 1 0 .8%
Spinal defect 1 0 .8%
Tubercular right elbow 1 0 .8%
Total 118
Note: some men had multiple defects. Harry Brennan, for example, was rejected 
not only because he had cancer but because he was 17 years-old. Medical conditions only 
are listed to give an indication of public health at that time.
Some of the defects listed in Table 26 were probably the result of inadequate 
medical care. Certainly bunions, goiters, measles and tuberculosis could have been 
treated while those with hernias could be given trusses. The number of men who were 
rejected as poorly developed or underweight (13.6% of the sample) also suggests poor 
nutrition while the old injuries and perhaps the deformities suggest work-place injuries
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During the First World War, 598,020 other ranks joined the CEF, a tremendous 
achievement for a small nation of only 3,859,183 men.1 But not all of these men could 
reasonably be expected to join the CEF: some were too old or too young, others were 
needed for essential industries and some were medically unfit. In all, an estimated 820, 
637 men were available for military service with only 652,820 fit for overseas service. 
The manpower pool therefore was severely limited and was able to sustain the CEF only 
with difficulty. Not surprisingly both official and unofficial efforts were made to modify 
enlistment criteria and tap alternative sources. Some of these efforts were successful 
while others were not. But, in the process, long-standing prejudices were challenged, 
peacetime shibboleths discarded and the employment of manpower rationalized with the 
result that by 1918 many thousands of men were eligible for military service who would 
have been turned away at the beginning of the war.
There was no fixed order of battle for the CEF throughout the war, although by 
1917, there was a general understanding that Canada would maintain four divisions and a 
cavalry brigade in France together with ancillary troops and the 5th Division in England. 
In terms of an establishment, Sir Robert Borden announced in his New Year’s message 
on 1 January 1916 that the strength of the CEF would be maintained at 500,000 men. The 
order of battle (i.e. number of divisions or units) was not specified and there is no 
evidence that Borden considered the number o f men required to maintain this 
establishment before he made his announcement.
)
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-Prime Minister Borden may not have considered the limitations of the national 
manpower pool, but others had grave concerns. In June 1915, when only two divisions 
were contemplated, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, 
suggested to Borden that additional divisions should be raised only if the requisite 
number of soldiers, together with reinforcements, were available. The CGS, Gwatkin, 
also had doubts and in the fall of 1915, predicted the CEF would have difficulties 
maintaining more than three divisions in the field. Implicit in both comments was the 
notion that the CEF should be tailored to the available manpower pool. Others shared 
their concerns. In Montréal, Lord Shaughnessy, President of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, spoke to the Board of Trade in March 1916, saying that “the raising of 500,000 
men seemed an almost unbearable burden for the country when it was taken into 
consideration that more than 300,000 were already engaged in war industries.”3 In 
Parliament, Senator James Mason addressed his colleagues in April 1916, and warned 
them that the nation could not sustain a force of 500,000 men.4
All of these concerns revolved around the size of the national manpower pool.
In round numbers, about 15.5% or 598,020 of the 3,821,995 males reported in the 1911 
census served in the CEF.5 The proportion is understated, however, since enlistment was 
open (officially) only to British subjects between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. If 
























PEI 16,592 157 119 16,868 43 : 16,792
Nova Scotia 85,909 8,437 4,147 98,493 1,504 95,850
New
Brunswick
64,188 2,371 2,151 68,710 780 67,339
Québec 341,783 23,066 26,048 390,897 9,448 374,297
Ontario 410,896 106,997 64,353 582,246 23,341 541,234
Manitoba 49,868 39,806 33,088 122,762 12,001 101,675
Saskatchewan 61,193 38,871 58,843 158,907 21,342 121,406
Alberta 37,446 31,954 53,515 122,915 19,410 88,810
British
Columbia
41,508 54,718 62,046 158,272 22,504 118,730
Totals 1,109,383 306,377 304,310 1,720,070 110,373 1,526,133
Notes: (1) Data excludes the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
(2) Germans, Austro-Hungarians and those bom in the Ottoman Empire have 
been deducted from the totals shown in Column 4 to produce a revised total of 
188,672 of whom an estimated 110,373 (column 6) had been naturalized and were 
therefore eligible to join the CEF.
(3) The total number of eligible males in column 7 is the sum of columns 2, 3 and
6 .
Not all of the eligible men shown in Table 27 were available to the CEF: essentialV
services and industries, especially munitions plants, needed labour despite the need for 
recruits. However, the Canadian government did not designate essential industries and 
the number of essential workers is therefore unknown. How many were there?
A postwar compilation of Empire recruiting statistics by the War Office noted that 
it was difficult to compare British and dominion recruiting rates because of staple 
industries in the dominions that “did not lend themselves readily to the substitution of 
female labour.”7 The comment is apt. Loggers, foundry workers and miners not only
231
needed specific skills, but also brute strength. Industries that employed relatively few 
women therefore can serve as a useful proxy for essential occupations.
Table 28 
Major Industries














Building trades 245,990 211 246,201 0 .1%
Fishing and 
hunting
34,547 ' 265 34,812 0 .8%
Forestry 42,901 13 42,914 >0 .1%
Mining 62,706 61 62,767 0 .1%
Iron and steel 
manufacture
58,976 426 59,402 0.7%
Vehicle
manufacture
21,312 63 21,375 / 0.3%
Shipbuilding 3,225 7 3,232 0 .2 %
Wood working 35,829 1,593 37,422 4.3%
Steam railways 86,116 190 86,306 0 .2%
Water transport 24,367 78 24,445 0.3%




Notes: (1) The 917,848 agricultural workers have not been included because many of 
these jobs could have been done by women, teenagers, old men and those who 
were unfit for military service.
(2) Wood workers included basket makers, many of whom were probably 
women.
If anything, the total of essential male workers shown in Table 28 is probably 
understated because the number of wage earners in the manufacturing sector almost 
doubled during the war, from 395,681 workers in 1915 to 693,116 in 1918. In part, the 
increase was due to women joining the work force but most were employed in the 
clothing and textile industries and were therefore not essential workers. 10 Heavy industry 
and the production of staples remained the purview of men. Assuming that the total of 
industrial workers in Table 28 represents the minimum number of men who could not be
spared for military service, the national manpower pool shown in Table 30 should be 
reduced to about 1,082,635 potential recruits.11
How many of these 1,028,635 potential recruits were medically fit? There are no 
comprehensive statistics available of the proportion of Canadian men who were fit for 
military service, although there is some evidence that a significant proportion did not 
meet the minimum medical standard. In 1917, a CAMC doctor in Windsor examined 
more than eight hundred recruits and found that 47.9% were fit for general service,
19.8% were fit for limited duties either in Canada or overseas and 32.3% were unfit for 
military service of any description.12 In May 1917, the GOC MD 3 reported that from 
1914 onward, 31.3% of all applicants in Eastern Ontario had been rejected, mainly 
because they were medically unfit. In the same district, between 1 January and 1 April 
1917, 3,197 men volunteered for the CEF and 1,266 or 39.6% were found to be unfit for 
military service.13 However, these results were specific to MD 3 only and may not have 
been typical for the country as a whole.
In the fall of 1917, medical boards under the direction of the Military Service 
Branch o f the Department of Justice examined all single males between the ages of 
twenty and thirty-five who were eligible for conscription. The results were not entirely 
consistent. Saskatchewan boards, for example, found almost 60% of all men fit for 
combat duty overseas whereas Québec boards found only 36% fit for combat duty. 
Barring any evidence that Québec men were not as healthy as the rest of the country, the 





MSA Medical Board Results 1917 
Men Aged 20-3515
Medical Category Number Examined Percentage
Fit for combat duty 
overseas
128,974 46.8%
Fit for limited duty 
overseas
37,192 13.5%
Sub-total: fit for 
overseas duties
166,166 ' ■ 60.3%
Fit for limited duty 
in Canada only
42,581 15.5%
Unfit for any 
military service
66,733 24.2%
Total Examined 275,480 h
How accurate were the results of the MSA medical boards? In Britain, National 
Service medical boards examined 2,425,184 Britons in 1917 andl918 and found that of 
every nine men, three were fit for general service, and two were fit for non-combatant 
service. Of the remaining four, three were ‘physical wrecks’ capable of little exertion and 
the last was “a chronic invalid with a precarious hold upon life.”16 In summary, only 
55.5% of all men examined in 1917-1918 were fit for some form of military service, a 
figure roughly comparable to the results of the Canadian boards. v
Assuming that the level of fitness was uniform across the country, the revised 




Revised Manpower Pool 
Canadian Males 18-45
Province Eligible Males Fit for Fit for Fit for Unfit for
Í I í l | ¡ ! ! ¡ | ! I I P Í S l S l l I i |
Overseas' CanadaOnly MilitaryService MilitaryService
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) ' (4) (5) _ (6)_
PEI 16,792 7,859 2,267 10,126 6,666
Nova Scotia 95,850 44,858 12,940 57,798 38,052
New Brunswick 67,339 31,515 9,091 40,605 26,734
Québec 374,297 175,171 50,530 225,701 148,596
Ontario 541,234 253,298 73,067 326,364 214,870
Manitoba 101,675 47,584 13,726 61,310 40,365
Saskatchewan 121,406 56,818 16,390 73,208 48,198
Alberta 88,810 41,563 11,989 53,552 35,258
British
Columbia





Total 1,082,635 652,829 167,808 820,637 261,998
Notes: (1) The sub-total of eligible males in column 1 is taken from column 7 of
Table 29.
(2) MSA medical board rates have been used to calculate the number of 
men shown in columns 3, 4 and 6 .
(3) Column 5 is the sum of columns 3 and 4.
(4) Of those fit for service overseas, 506,673 were fit for service at the 
front while 146,156 were fit for non-combatant duties only.
Whether or not district and unit commanders were aware of the intricacies of the
manpower pool seems doubtful. On the other hand, manpower in general was a matter of 
concern at all levels, particularly after .1 January, 1916 when Borden announced arf 
establishment of 500,000 men for the CEF. The upshot was that consistent efforts were 
made both nationally and locally to modify, augment or, on occasion, ignore recruiting 
standards in order to expand the pool of potential recruits.
The manpower pool was also expanded by recruiting outside of Canada. Strictly 
speaking, this was not illegal. Enlistment in the CEF was restricted to British subjects but
c
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Canadian residency was not a requirement and about 10% of all those who joined the 
CEF were residents o f the United States, Bermuda, England, Greece, France and : • 
Belgium.
The PF and CEF garrisoned Bermuda for two years, from September 1914 to 
September 1916. During this time, at least forty-six islanders were enrolled, thirteen by 
the 38th Battalion and thirty-three by the 163rd Battalion.17 There was no real need to 
enlist these men; Bermuda was not a theatre of operations, both battalions were near full 
strength and reinforcements were readily available from Canada.18 Furthermore, by 
recruiting Bermudians, the CEF was directly competing with efforts in the colony to raise 
two small company-size contingents, one of which was attached to the 38th for training.19
s
Remarkably, there were no objections by Bermuda’s House of Assembly or the public at 
large.20
All thirteen Bermudians who enlisted in the 38th Battalion were expatriates and it 
is possible that these men, with no ties to Bermuda, preferred to take their chances with a 
formed unit rather than an independent Bermudian company, or perhaps they preferred
. . V
CEF pay scales.21 The 163rd Battalion also enlisted a few expatriates but most of their 
recruits were blacks from Bermuda or the British West Indies who were enrolled as 
officers’ mess waiters to free Canadians for training with their parent companies. 
However, the idea of local blacks serving in a white battalion upset local sensitivities and 
the governor registered a stiff protest with Militia HQ in Ottawa.23 The 163rd therefore 
stopped enlisting islanders and in September 1916, left Bermuda without, apparently, 
discharging the offending mess waiters.24
- The CEF also enrolled recruits in operational theatres such as Salonika, where, in 
1917, the 5th Canadian General Hospital enlisted a twenty-four-year-old blacksmith who 
claimed to be from Montréal.25 There were also at least thirty men enlisted in France or 
Belgium. The majority were British subjects by birth, fourteen Canadians and thirteen 
Britons, one of whom claimed to be a Canadian resident. Of the remaining three, one was 
a Belgian with former service in a militia unit, the 65th Carabiniers, and gave his next of 
kin as his wife who was living in Montréal. In contrast, neither of the two Frenchmen
thwho were enlisted had any discernable connection with Canada when they joined the 8 
Canadian General Hospital.27 Most of these men were probably enrolled with permission 
from HQ, although only one example is known when Canadian HQ in London authorized 
the 4th Canadian Stationary Hospital at Saint-Cloud near Paris in January 1916 to enlist a 
Parisian with Canadian parents.28
Enrolling recruits in France and Belgium may have been unusual, but was not 
unheard of. Certainly the Canadian Section, GHQ 3rd Echelon was willing to accept 
recruits and in some cases, to frank the attestation papers of those who were enlisted in 
France.29 HQ OMFC was also aware that men were enlisted on the continent and in June 
1918 readily agreed to a proposal that Canadians serving with the Royal Engineers in 
France be allowed to join the CEF, provided, of course, the British Expeditionary Force 
[BEF] had no objections.30
The CEF also recruited in England and in 1919 HQ OMFC reported that 1,733 
men had been enlisted in the United Kingdom.31 None of these recruits, of course, were 
part of the Canadian manpower pool.
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Recruiting in the United Kingdom started in October 3914 when the RCD were 
given permission by Divisional HQ to recruit twenty-three men to bring the regiment up 
to strength.32 A month later in November 1914, the 17th Battalion and the Divisional 
Cyclist Company, both of which were under-strength, placed ads in British newspapers 
without the approval of Divisional HQ.33 Neither recruiting campaign was overly 
successful (the Cyclists enlisted three men and the 17th eighty-seven), but the ads drew 
the attention of the War Office which ruled on 19 November 1914 that the CEF was 
permitted to recruit only in Canada.34
The War Office ruling was understandable given the need to build up the BEF,
but could not be sustained in practice. Admittedly the CEF in England was over-strength
/
by 4,500 men, but the haphazard mobilization at Valcartier meant there was a shortage of 
artificers, farriers, shoeing-smiths and saddlers, skilled tradesmen who were not available 
from Canada because there was no coherent reinforcement system. The War Office 
position was also illogical since the BEF tapped the 1st Division for more than a hundred 
men and commissioned them in the British army.36 Faced with the illogic of the originalV
policy and the pressing need to find skilled specialists, especially for the 1st Divisional 
artillery, the War Office reluctantly gave permission on 19 January 1915, for the CEF to 
recruit thirty skilled tradesmen in England.
More than 250 Britons joined the CEF in England before the 1st Division sailed to 
France in February 1915. About a hundred of these men were enlisted after the War 
Office gave permission to recruit thirty specialists.38 Thirty-five joined the artillery, ten of
whom were skilled tradesmen. Forty-two cavalrymen enlisted, but only nine had
/
civilian experience that was relevant.40 The CAVC took in twenty-seven recruits, but
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only two had previous experience working with animals.41 At least twenty-five men also 
joined HQ 1st Canadian Division including six grooms, two cooks and two footmen.
These men may have been specialists, but were hardly the skilled tradesmen envisaged by 
the War Office.
In February 1915, the 1st Division sailed to France and recruiting in Britain 
virtually stopped, leaving expatriate Canadians with no alternative but to join the BEF. 
However, in June 1915, the minister’s representative, Major-General J.W. Carson, 
obtained permission from the War Office to enlist bona fide Canadians living in the 
United Kingdom.42 The question of what constituted a bona fide Canadian was a thorny 
one, and after some deliberation, Canadian HQ decided that a genuine Canadian was a
s
British subject who had been previously domiciled in Canada for an unspecified period of 
time.43 ■
i This definition was apparently too elastic^ however, and in May 1916, Canadian 
HQ ruled that potential recruits had to provide documentary evidence of three years’ 
residence in Canada.44 The following year, in April 1917, the rules were relaxed when the 
United States entered the war and ‘friendly or neutral’ aliens became eligible to join the 
CEF. But this policy was short-lived and from September 1917 onwards, recruits had to 
be bona-fide Canadians temporarily domiciled in Britain (i.e. visitors).45 The definition of 
‘Canadian’ was also tightened up and in June 1918, OMFC directed that prospective 
recruits in Britain or France had to produce a certificate of Canadian citizenship issued by 
the High Commissioner in London.46
Recruiting in England was tolerated but not encouraged and prospective recruits 
were expected to make their own way to a CEF unit willing to accept them.47 Despite
t
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this, there was a steady flow of recruits. Pay must have motivated some of the applicants; 
a private in the BEF received the princely salary of a shilling a day (about 250) while his 
CEF counterpart received four times as much. But there were other factors as well. 
Members of the Canadian Munition Workers Unit who were employed at Dalton-in- 
Fumess in England, for example, were anxious to join the CEF when their contracts 
expired, but preferred to enlist in England to avoid the return trip to Canada.48
There were also Canadians with the BEF who wished to transfer to the CEF. In 
May 1915, thirty-one Canadians with the 2/6th (Cyclist) Battalion, Royal Sussex 
Regiment requested a transfer to the Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company at Hounslow. 
The request was approved by the War Office and the men transferred, together with 
fourteen unruly Rhodesians, men that the 2/6th Royal Sussex were glad to be rid of.49 But 
this was an exception and the general policy was that “Transfers from the Imperial to the 
Canadian Forces are not permissible.”50 But as always, the rules were modified and in 
June l918, HQ OMFC notified the Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon that applications 
to join the CEF would be accepted from those serving with the BEF, “but only where the 
men are Canadians enlisted in North America in technical units [mainly men with the 
Inland Water Transport] and are now being transferred compulsorily by the Imperial 
Authorities to the Infantry.”51 It seems unlikely that many were transferred to the CEF. In 
April 1918, eighteen men serving with the Royal Engineer Inland Water Transport were 
drafted to the BEF’s Durham Light Infantry and asked HQ OMFC to intervene. Their 
petition was unsuccessful despite a moving appeal: “We therefore ask you to claim us as 





Sample -  Enlistments In Britain
Quarter Year Enlistments Proportion Remarks
October-December 1914 207 13.7% Recruiting forbidden
January-March 1915 104 6.9% War Office allowed 30 
skilled tradesmen to be 
enlisted
April-June 1915 13 0.9%
July-September 1915 45 3.0% Recruiting allowed for bona 
fide Canadians.
October-December 1915 137 9.1%
January-March 1916 341 2 2 .6%
April-June 1916 219 14.5% Documentary evidence of 
three years of Canadian 
residency required
July-September 1916 113 7.5%
October-December 1916 42 2 .8%
January-March 1917 46 3.0%
April-June 1917 62 4.1%
July-September 1917 37 2.4% Bona fide Canadians 
temporarily domiciled in 
UK
October-December 1917 20 1.3%
January-March 1918 25 1.7% ‘
April-June 1918 64 4.2% Citizenship certificate 
required
July-September 1918 23 1.5%
October-December 1918 13 0.9%
Total 1,511
Notes: (1) The period January to March 1916 was the peak recruiting period for 
the CEF as a whole and the CEF in England.
(2) The mean enlistment date for the CEF in England was the beginning of 
April 1916, about two weeks later than the CEF as a whole.
In terms of numbers, the men enlisted in England, France and Belgium were not a 
significant extension to the manpower pool although the men who joined the 1st Division 
in 1914-1915 must have been a welcome addition. Only one in five was a native 
Canadian although all were required to have some connection with Canada. Whether this 
connection was genuine or imagined is immaterial. The care taken to enlist only
c
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Canadians (however the term was defined) meant that those who wished to serve with 
other Canadians were given the opportunity to do so.
In contrast to Bermuda and Europe, the United States made a. very significant 
contribution to the manpower pool. The number is uncertain but it is estimated that more 
than 57,000 Americans served in the CEF from start to finish. These recruits were 
American residents, although most had been bom elsewhere.53 They enlisted in two 
distinct groups: those who crossed the border on their own initiative to join up in Canada; 
and those who were recruited by the British Canadian Recruiting Mission (BCRM) in the 
United States.
Recruiting Americans was fraught with legal difficulties. American citizens who' y
joined the CEF were deemed to have expatriated themselves or, in other words, forfeited 
their citizenship.54 Foreign armies, including the CEF, were also forbidden by the U S  
P e n a l  C o d e  to recruit within the United States or to enter the United States with the 
intention of enticing men to leave in order to enlist elsewhere.55 Both provisions were 
reinforced in August 1914 by President Wilson’s proclamation emphasizing AmericanV
neutrality.56 In Canada, CEF regulations and the M i l i t i a  A c t  specified that recruits had to 
be British subjects, thereby excluding American citizens.
Despite these obstacles, there was a steady trickle of enthusiasts from 1914 
onward who travelled to Canada to enlist in the CEF. At Beebe Junction in the Eastern 
Townships of Québec, 123 men crossed the border in September 1914, all bound for 
Valcartier.57 At Windsor, Ontario, four men entered Canada on 21 September 1914 
declaring their intention to enlist. Included in this group was James Groesbeck, who 
claimed to be a native Californian planning to enlist in Montréal. Presumably this was the
same man who enlisted in the 23rd Battalion at Québec City in November 1914, claiming 
to have been bom in Winnipeg. 58 This was only the beginning and by the end of 
December 1914, forty-four men had entered Canada through the Windsor border point 
after declaring their intention to join the CEF.59 Results were similar elsewhere and up to 
May 1916, 248 men entered Canada at Niagara Falls with the stated purpose of joining 
the CEF.60 The majority of these men had been bom outside of the United States.
The steady trickle of men travelling north to join the CEF was of interest to 
recruiters who sought likely prospects at major border stations. In 1915-1916 the 99th 
Battalion based in Windsor, Ontario, concentrated its efforts on the border crossings and ;
was able to recruit a substantial number of American residents, a resource to which/
inland battalions did not have access.61 Another Windsor-based battalion, the 241st, 
recruited 821 men in 1916-1917, of whom 517 or 63% were American residents.62 
Similarly, more than a quarter of those who joined the 176th Battalion at Niagara Falls in 
1916-1917 were American residents. In London, the 63rd Depot Battery maintained a 
recruiting office in Windsor with the result that almost a third of those who joined in
¿ • l
1916-1918 were American residents.
Recruiting offices near the border gave units a distinct advantage and there was 
considerable jostling at major border crossings. Windsor, Ontario, was particularly 
popular and at one point in October 1916, there were fifteen unit detachments vying for 
recruits from Detroit.64 Surprisingly, there were no complaints from the American 
government. The 213th Battalion, however, went too far when it opened a battalion 
recruiting stand in Niagara Falls with British and American flags at the Canadian end of
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the international bridge. In this case, the State Department lodged a formal complaint 
with the British Embassy in Washington.65
Some units advertised for recruits in American newspapers. In March 1916, the 
99th Battalion committed a spectacular gaffe by placing ads in papers owned by Josephus 
Daniels, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy. In this case, Militia HQ had no choice but to act 
and in March 1916, banned all advertising in American papers.66 But some units chose to 
ignore the unequivocal ban imposed by Militia HQ. In April 1916, the Grand Rapids 
News of Michigan noted CEF advertisements and reported that “Information has been 
received from American consuls that the Canadian Government is conducting a campaign 
to lure prospective recruits across the border on promises of work.” There were other 
complaints as well, and in November 1916, Militia HQ repeated the prohibition on 
advertising in the United States and added that district commanders would be “held 
personally responsible for observance of these instructions and any officer disregarding
• • • ¿ osame will be subject to immediate dismissal.”
There were a few cases where units actively recruited on American soil. In
V
February 1916, three men from Rochester, New York, claimed that an NCO in plain 
clothes from the 139th Battalion enticed them to Cobourg, Ontario, where they were 
delivered to the battalion recruiting office instead of being provided with the lucrative 
jobs promised. A few months later, in June 1916, Lieutenant Austin of the 211th 
Battalion, accused of recruiting in Seattle under an assumed name, was incarcerated in a 
local prison. In October 1916, three NCOs from the 141st Battalion were arrested in 




note, however, that these units were in a distinct minority and most units were careful to 
pay lip service to American neutrality.
There were also cases where measures were taken to assist potential recruits to 
cross the border. The 7th Field Company in London maintained a recruiting office in 
Windsor, Ontario, but also hired a Detroit crimp to find likely recruits in pool halls and 
taverns and then escort them to Canada past immigration agents who obligingly looked * 
the other way. The cooperation extended by these agents at Windsor was not an isolated 
example. In November 1915, the Department of the Interior instructed immigration ; 
officials at Niagara Falls and St John’s, Québec, to admit potential recruits and escort 
them to the nearest recruiting office.71 Similar instructions were also given to 
immigration officers in Victoria, Vancouver and Sarnia. There were unofficial 
arrangements as well. In Winnipeg, the secretary of the Bohemian National Alliance of 
America (Canadian Branch) advised the Russian Consul in Montréal in 1916 that “The 
arrangements we [Bohemians] have made with the Emigration authorities are very 
satisfactory, and so far we have had no trouble getting [Bohemian] men across the 
border.”73 The arrangements made by the secretary of the Canadian Branch, Sergeant 
August Fibiger of the 223rd Battalion, could not have been a secret and were probably 
done with the tacit approval of the CO.
American neutrality ceased to be a problem on 6 April 1917 when the United 
States declared war on the German Empire. The mood of the country was distinctly pro- 
Allied and after the Ambassador in Washington cleared the way, Brigadier-General W. A. 
White, an officer with the British Mission to the United States, lost no time in soliciting 
congressmen for permission to enlist recruits from the 700,000 British subjects in
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America who were neither citizens nor declarants.74 The results were almost immediate 
and on 7 May 1917, Congress amended the U . S .  P e n a l  C o d e  to allow Allied nations to 
enlist residents who were not American citizens or declarants and had been bom in the 
Allied nation concerned;75 The amendment, which allowed foreign armies to enter the 
United States and actively seek recruits, was a remarkable act of generosity and 
cooperation even though the potential recruits were not eligible to serve in the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) .76
By 6 June 1917, the British Recruiting Mission, later renamed British Canadian 
Recruiting Mission (BCRM), had started operations in New York.77 Developing the
infrastructure and importing staff took some time, however, and in the interim, US Army
/
recruiting offices assisted the BCRM by receiving applicants, conducting medical exams, 
providing subsistence and forwarding men to the nearest CEF depot in Canada or, in the 
case of Britons, Jews and Australians, to the Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova 
Scotia.78
From a modest start in New York City, the BCRM expanded steadily. The 
headquarters was located in New York City and for organizational purposes the country 
was divided vertically into three divisions: the Eastern Division based in New York City, 
the Western Division in Chicago and the Pacific Division in San Francisco. By 
November 1917, twenty-seven recruiting depots had been established as well as mobile 
detachments that visited urban centres in the Western and Pacific Division. Canadians 
were part of every division, but the Western Division was staffed entirely by Canadians
with a militia officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Dennis, in command.
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70
. The BCRM also received civilian assistance. British consuls were instructed to 
assist the mission and seventy-two recruiting committees were formed by prominent 
Britons and Canadians living in the United States.80 Border crossing problems were non­
existent. In June 1917, the Superintendent of Immigration noted that “for months past our 
inspectors have, all along the Boundary, admitted such men as applied for entry to enlist 
and were believed to be suitable.”81
Special efforts were made to recruit French Canadians and in June 1917, Major 
J.J.O.L. Daly-Gingras of the 258th Battalion was posted to the BCRM in the hopes of 
enlisting a sizable number of French-Canadian immigrants in the New England states.
The results were disappointing and in August 1917, a Catholic priest, Captain F.C.D.
s  •
Doyon, reported that many had already joined the AEF as translators and the remainder 
anticipated being drafted in the near future. In summary, said Father Doyon, a concerted 
effort to recruit these men would be a waste of time.
BCRM recruiting in the United States encountered some obstacles. Most U.S.■ i
Army recruiting stations cooperated with the BCRM, but a few were reluctant to provide 
assistance or tried to entice BCRM recruits into the American Army.83 Local draft boards 
were also loath to lose potential recruits for the AEF and in Boston, an Irish declarant 
who tried to join the CEF was instructed to remain in the United States or be charged 
with desertion from the AEF.84 In Buffalo, a BCRM recruit from the Engineer Depot at 
Brockville was jailed for draft evasion when he returned home on leave in uniform.85 But 
others were more cooperative and in Chicago,1 Judge Stelk ordered non-U. S. citizens held 




- BCRM recruits were documented and examined in the United States and then 
forwarded to a Canádian depot for attestation. But the men were not subject to military 
law until they were attested and there were no legal means of preventing them from 
deserting. In March 1918, about 5% of all BCRM recruits vanished before they arrived at 
a depot in Canada while in August 1918 HQ MD 2 reported that more than 9% had 
disappeared while in transit. To stop this, Militia HQ directed in April 1918 that men 
would be attested by BCRM recruiting detachments.88 But since only one of the three 
BCRM divisions was controlled by Canadians, it is unlikely that the revised procedure 
had much effect.
Judging by attestation papers, BCRM medical examinations were carried out byy
CAMC or RAMC medical officers or, on occasion, by civilian physicians. The number of 
applicants who were medically unfit is unknown although returns from New York City 
for July 1917 show that 32.8% were rejected89. Those who had been passed as fit were 
reassessed by medical boards on arrival in Canada. Results probably varied by district, 
but in MD 2, for example, 4% of all arrivals were turned down by medical boards.90 In 
all, it is estimated that about 63% of all BCRM applicants were fit for some form of 
military service, a rate comparable to the MSA medical boards.
Not all districts benefited equally from the BCRM. MD 2 received the lion’s share 
with 12,390 recruits by 7 September 1918, more than a third of all those recruited by the 
BCRM .91 The reasons seem fairly obvious. The Western Division HQ was located in 
Chicago which had direct rail connections to Toronto and the division covered a huge 
area, from Pennsylvania to the Rocky Mountains. A detailed breakdown of the allocation 






Allocation by District 21 July 1917-4 August 191792
District Recruits Proportion
MD 1 35 3.9%
MD 2 464 52.3%
MD 3 5 0 .6%
MD 4 69 7.8%
MD 5 0 N/A
MD 6 46 5.2%
MD 10 120 13.5%
MD 11 108 12 .2 %
MD 13 0 N/A
New Brunswick 41 4.6%
Total 830
Note: New Brunswick was later redesignated MD 7.
The issue of which corps the recruits were assigned to caused some difficulties. 
Initially, BCRM recruiters promised applicants they could choose any branch of the CEF 
they wished and, not surprisingly, most opted to avoid the infantry. It must have come as 
a shock, therefore, that on arrival in Canada, most were assigned to the infantry. Not all 
accepted their assignment and in MD 2 about 2 %  of all BCRM recruits refused to be 
attested and were returned to the United States.93
Only 63.4% of all BCRM recruits who arrived in Toronto up to 18 August 1918 




Corps Allocation MD 2 as of 18 August 191896
Corps Total Proportion
Infantry 5,306 42.1%
Artillery 332 2 .6%
Cavalry 290 2.3%
Engineers 2,071 16.4%
Service Corps 215 1.7%
Medical Corps 233 1.8%
Railway Troops 2,616 20.7%
Dental Corps 6
Officer Training 26 0 .2 %
Garrison duty in Canada 1,475 11.7% ' :
Base Hospital 48
Total 12,618
By October 1918, the BCRM had provided more than 33,000 men for the CEF, a 
very substantial contribution to the national manpower pool. But how many actually 
served in France, especially with the infantry where the need for reinforcements was the 
greatest? Almost half of all BCRM recruits were enlisted after March 1918. Judging by 
those who served in the 20 Battalion, it took twenty-eight weeks, or seven months, for 
the average BCRM recruit to reach the front lines after being attested in Toronto.98 
Assuming that all BCRM recruits took seven months to reach France, it is probable that 
about 17,000 men were taken on strength before the Armistice of whom about 42.1% or 
7,100 were infantrymen, a total that would be consistent with Table 33. But, had the war 
continued into 1919, there is no doubt that the BCRM contingent would have made a 
much more substantial contribution.
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Table 34 .










2nd CMR 21 28 99 148 MD 2
4tn CMR 1 18 75 94 MD 2
4m Battalion 14 24 - ' 118 156 ' MD 2
16th Battalion 1 (Note 1) 5 26 32 MD 10, 
11, 12
18th Battalion 9 30 8 47 MD 1
20m Battalion 89 50 121 260 MD 2
72nd
Battalion
26 51 79 156 MD 11
85th Battalion 0 4 3 7 MD 6
PPCLI 28 10 0 38 MD 3
Totals . 189 220 529 938
Note: Other than Private Fraser who was posted to the 16m Battalion on 16 
February 1918, all BCRM reinforcements arrived between March and 
November 1918.
The BCRM was useful but relied on voluntarism and was therefore limited since 
non-declarant British subjects living in the United States who refused to volunteer for the 
CEF, AEF or BEF could not be compelled to serve. Conversely, American citizens living 
in Britain or Canada could not be drafted by the BEF or CEF. To resolve this problem, 
Britain and the United States concluded a reciprocal convention that gave men a choice 
between returning home where they could be conscripted or remaining in their country of 
residence subject to local draft laws. The preliminary agreement was signed on 19 
February 1918, but the American Senate insisted on amendments and it was not until 30 
July 1918 that the reciprocal convention came into effect.100 With the introduction of 
conscription for those living abroad, there was no need to recruit volunteers in the United 
States and on 12 October 1918, the BCRM closed its doors.101
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. The.terms of the convention concerning Canada were simple and straight­
forward. All American citizens domiciled in Canada and all Canadians living in the 
United States between the ages of twenty and forty-four were liable to be conscripted in 
their country of residence unless they returned home. Both Americans and Canadians 
had a sixty-day grace period in which to make a decision. For those who wished to return 
home, both the Canadian and American Governments agreed to facilitate repatriation but 
the men were required to pay their own way.
Whether or not the reciprocal convention had any effect on the manpower pool is 
impossible to determine although it appears that the CEF had the short end of the stick. In 
the United States, the Provost Marshal General estimated that about 20,000 potential CEF 
recruits living in the United States chose to serve with the AEF rather than return home. 
In Canada, 18,372 Americans registered with consular officials after 30 July 1918 and 
were thus exempted from the MSA. No record appears to exist of the number of 
Americans in Canada who were drafted into the CEF nor is there any record of the 
number of Canadians who trekked north under the terms of the convention.
The CEF also accepted convicts, although initially the reason was patriotism and 
not the need to fill the ranks. The first were eight prisoners at St Vincent de Paul 
Penitentiary who volunteered for the CEF on 14 August 1914. Their applications were 
reviewed by the Minister of Justice, but only one prisoner was released; in the event, he 
failed to enlist and was returned to prison. Others soon followed and by December 1914, 
sixty-five felons had been released from penitentiaries and jails in order to join the CEF. 
Some were given unconditional pardons, but most were released on a ‘Ticket of Leave’,
the precursor to the modem parole. About half of these ex-lags failed to enlist. Twenty- 
five simply vanished, one was deported, two were convicted of burglary after their 
release and were returned to St Vincent de Paul, three were arrested for failing to enlist 
while the last, George Juen, from Kingston Penitentiary, enlisted but refused to go 
overseas and was returned to prison.104 '
For the first two years of the war, prisoners were released on the initiative of the 
Justice Department and not the CEF. The Justice Department motives were moral: in 
1915, for example, the Inspector of Penitentiaries recommended that Frank Jones, a 
Kingston prisoner, be enlisted because “military discipline is exactly what he requires to
make a man of him .” 105 The Dominion Parole Officer also had faith in the uplifting
/
nature of military service and in September 1915 recommended the release of a chronic 
alcoholic from Dorchester Penitentiary: “I think if he were given a chance to go the Front 
he would make an excellent soldier and would redeem himself by good conduct.”106
The CEF was not concerned with morality but manpower, and in 1916 started to 
take an interest in retrieving men who had been incarcerated for desertion, of which there 
were a substantial number. A single raid by military police on St Thomas, Ontario, in 
November 1915 netted thirty absentees. The 176th Battalion on the Niagara Peninsula had 
257 deserters in less than a year and in August 1916 there were 1,500 absentees from 
Camp Borden, Ontario, alone.107 Initially deserters were tried by court martial, a 
procedure that required testimony by witnesses. However, in many cases, deserters were 
not apprehended before their unit, together with witnesses, had sailed to England. To 
solve the problem, an Order-in-Council was issued in January 1916 declaring that 
deserters would be tried under the C r i m i n a l  C o d e ,  documentary evidence could be
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substituted for sworn testimony and on summary conviction men could be imprisoned for 
up to two years, with or without hard labour. 108
Not every deserter was caught, but there were enough to swell the prison 
population. Under ordinary circumstances these men would not have been welcomed 
back, but recruiting dropped off sharply in the latter half of 1916. An Order-in-Council 
was therefore issued in November 1916 to allow magistrates to suspend convictions at 
the request of the military providing the offenders agreed not to desert in the future. This 
did nothing for those already incarcerated, however, and the Order-in-Council was 
followed almost immediately by an amnesty allowing convicted deserters to be released 
into the custody of the military.109
y
In 1917, the CEF took an active interest in prisoners other than deserters and 
began to recruit within the prisons. At Kingston, for example, the MD 3 Recruiting 
Officer arrived at the penitentiary on the morning of Friday, 26 May 1917 with a small 
team to process recruits. By noon, nine men, selected by the warden beforehand, had 
been interviewed, medically examined, attested and issued with uniforms. At 1:40 p.m.
V
that afternoon, the draft, accompanied by an escort,; left for Halifax and early Monday
morning, was delivered to a troopship, less than seventy-two hours after leaving 
110prison.
The passage of the M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  A c t  in 1917 brought further changes. Nothing 
in the Act prevented convicts from being conscripted, although men disqualified under 
the Dominion Elections Act, a category that included prisoners, were exempt from 
combatant service. 111 There is no evidence that this legal nicety was followed, however, 
and virtually all of the convicts who are known to have been drafted served in the
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infantry. Despite the MSA, however, prisoners could only be released with a pardon or 
ticket of leave granted by the Justice Department. Convict conscription was therefore 
selective and only those deemed suitable by the Justice Department were called up.
The actual process of drafting convicts was carefully controlled. Traveling 
medical boards visited penitentiaries and examined those considered suitable by prison 
staff. In Kingston, Warden Creighton went so far as to measure potential recruits, so that 
uniforms could be issued before the men left prison.113 Convicts who were drafted were 
not given their freedom, but simply acquired khaki-clad turnkeys. In December 1917, 
prison staff from St Vincent de Paul escorted draftees from the prison directly to Peel ,
Street Barracks in Montréal.114 In Halifax, a recently drafted prisoner was taken under
/
guard in May 1918 from the County Jail to the Nova Scotia Regiment Depot, where “He 
will be kept under close confinement and placed on board transport as such, with orders 
to the OC Troops to release him after the transport sails.” 113 The methodology may have 
varied, depending on local circumstances, but invariably, convicts were kept under close 
scrutiny until they were safely aboard the troopship.
There was some concern that hardened criminals might be enlisted in the CEF and 
in May 1917, Militia HQ notified districts that “men who are found guilty of serious 
crimes are not on any account to be accepted as recruits.” 116 The Department of Justice 
also had concerns and in October 1917 issued instructions to exclude “serious cases in 
which on account of the nature o f the crime committed or for repetition of offences it 
appears impossible in the public interest to exercise any clemency.” 117 Despite these 
concerns, the majority of prisoners who enlisted seem to have been good soldiers despite 
their civilian crimes. In New Brunswick, a convict from Dorchester Penitentiary who had
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been convicted of statutory rape was drafted under the MSA and served satisfactorily 
with the 18th Battalion in France until he was demobilized in 1919.118
However, there were a small number of unsavory recruits such as the twenty-three 
convicts from Kingston Penitentiary who were serving with the 6 th Reserve Battalion in 
England in July 1918. The group included one man serving a life term, two imprisoned 
for ‘white slavery’, another convicted of manslaughter, one rapist and a bank robber 
convicted of two counts of armed robbery and shooting with intent to wound. Two of the 
men confessed that they were drug addicts and Sir Edward Kemp, the minister 
responsible for the OMFC, thought that the sudden increase of robberies and assaults in
the vicinity of the 6 th Reserve Battalion could be traced directly to these ex-prisoners." 9
/
The number of men released to join CEF is uncertain since most of the relevant 
Justice Department files remain closed. Warden Creighton of Kingston Penitentiary 
wrote in October 1918, that he had released more than eighty prisoners for military 
service including thirty-one men drafted under the Military Service Act over a three-day 
period m March 1918. Since Kingston held about a quarter of all federal convicts, this 
suggests that more than three hundred men were released from federal prisons alone. On 
the other hand, annual reports submitted to Parliament show that from 1914 to 1918, 523 
prisoners were given a conditional release in order to join the CEF. These were 
conditional releases, however, and if non-conditional releases (pardons) and MSA 
draftees are considered, then it is probable that more than 700 felons served in the CEF, a 
substantial number given that there were only 4,438 men in all penal institutions at the 
end of 1916. The estimate is not unreasonable and is comparable to convict enlistments
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in the. Second World War when 598 convicts were transferred from prison to the armed
1 0forces between September 1939 and February 1943.
Although Militia HQ was able to enlarge the manpower pool by tinkering with 
entry requirements and making more efficient use of manpower, the reluctance of the 
i CEF to enlist non-English speaking immigrants was a significant loss of potential 
recruits. Numbers in Table 35 are soft, but if immigrants had joined at the same rate as 
Canadians born outside of Québec, the CEF would have gained an additional 26,900 
men, or more, considering that many immigrants were males of military age. The loss of
potential recruits may be overstated since 14.6% of a sample of 16,319 immigrants lived
/•
in the United States and were not part of the national manpower pool. Still, the potential 




Place of Birth 
Male Population 1911125
Place of Birth . 
(1)
Males -  All Ages British
Subjects
CEF Recruits Proportion
Canada 2,849,442 2,849,442 318,728 11.2%
British Isles 470,061 470,061 228,170 48.5%
British
possessions
16,967 16,967 9,416 55.5%
United States 168,728 98,706 35,599 2 1 .1%




. - •- •  ̂ •
Foreign b o m - 
enemy
104,488 61,125 ; .










Notes: (1) There appears to be a mathematica error in the 1911 Census and the
number shown in column 2 exceeds the published summary by 445 men.
(2) Column 5 reflects the proportion of Column 2 that enlisted.
(3) Column 3 is based on the 1916 census of the Prairie Provinces which 
showed that 58.5% of all immigrants had been naturalized.
(3) Column 4 includes American residents.
(4) The total number of enlistments includes officers, nursing sisters and 
other ranks who joined between 1914 and 1920.
Not surprisingly, the enlistment rate for immigrants from non-English speaking 
countries differed considerably. In general, the mean enlistment date for non-English 
speaking immigrants was later than the CEF norm of March 1916, a difference that can 
be attributed, in part, to the initial difficulties these men had in enlisting. Whether or not 
the recruit’s parent country was engaged in the war also played a part; those from Italy, 
Romania, Norway and Sweden (both neutral) were slow to join. On the other hand, the 
enlistment date for those from Holland (also neutral) was not too far off the CEF mean.
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Enlistment, however, not only depended on the willingness of the CEF to accept the 
foreign-bom recruit but also on the individual’s desire to serve. There were groups who 
were reluctant to join, for whatever reason, and therefore had to be conscripted, provided, 










Bulgaria 33 July 1915 2 1 % 4.3%
Belgium 982 April 1916 12.7% 40.9%
Iceland 385 April 1916 34%  ̂ 82.5%
Holland 364 May 1916 14.8% 29.6%
Montenegro 107 May 1916 3.7% (Note 2)
France 970 June 1916 16.8% 50.6%
Serbia 250 June 1916 6 .8% (Note 2 )
Switzerland 229 June 1916 10.5% (Note 2)
Russia 6,696 July 1916 15.8% 45.5%
Denmark 968 August 1916 9%' , \ : /
44.5% 
(Note 4)
Japan 226 September 1916 10 .2% 22.5%
Greece 334 October 1916 15.9% 18%
Sweden 1,679 November 1916, 26.6% 44.5% 
(Note 4)
Italy 1,531 December 1916 25.7% 19.9%
Norway 1,481 December 1916 28.9% 44.5% 
(Note 4)
Romania 350 March 1917 32.3% 46.1%
Ottoman Empire 290 April 1917 17.2% 39.6%
Albania 13 September 1917 30.8% (Note 2)
Germany 203 April 1918 62% 58.8%
Austria-Hungary 1,612 June 1918 74.1% 50.2%
l i l t l l S
Total -  All 18,703 August 1916 24%
Total-A llied 11,497 June 1916 17.6%
Total - Neutral 5,068 September 1916 2 1 .6%
Total -  Enemy 2,138 April 1918 64.3%
* . ,, - ‘ > ,
CEF total March 1916 2 1%
. Notes: (1) The mean enlistment date is the month by which half of all men in the 
sample had enlisted.
(2) Data on immigrants from these countries is not available.
(3) More than 27,700 men bom in non-English speaking enlisted. The
' sample at Table 35 is not complete but probably represents the majority of
recruits from each country listed.
(4) Available data groups Scandinavian immigrants together.
Attitudes to non-English speaking immigrants were mixed. Clifford Sifton,
Minister of the Interior from 1896 to 1905, thought that the Ukrainian immigrant, “a 
stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat,” 127 was a decided asset to the nation, but others 
were not as sure. J.S. Woodsworth, who was generally sympathetic to immigrants and 
their problems, preferred a homogeneous people who were “in accord with our 
democratic institutions and conducive to the general welfare.” Similarly, Agnes Laut, a 
popular Canadian author who was not opposed to immigration per se, wrote, “These 
poverty-stricken Jews and Polacks and Galicians will be the wealth and power of Canada 
tomorrow” but added “will Canada remain Canada when these new races come up to 
power?” There were also concerns that non-English-speaking immigrants were a 
potential threat to peace and good order. In April 1914, for example, Major Vernon Eaton 
of MD 13 wrote of “a large number of emigrants(sic) coming into the West who have to 
be taught to respect, and to obey the laws of Canada”. Immigrants, especially those 
whose native language was not English or French, were viewed with suspicion and were 
not regarded as true Canadians, regardless of their status as British subjects. In short, they 
were not ‘one of us.’
The same attitudes prevailed in the CEF. In reply to a request from HQ MD 2 to 
enlist naturalized Bulgarians, the AG wrote in October 1915 that “blood being thicker 
than water, you should take no chances.” 131 A few months later in March 1916, a request
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from HQ MD 10 to enlist Persians, who were bitter about Turkish persecution, was 
turned down because Persians “would not mix well with Anglo-Saxons.” 132 Greeks could 
be enlisted but, the AG wrote in November 1917, “No special effort, however, should be 
made to recruit them.” However, Canadians were ambivalent. In November 1914, the 
mayor of Fort William, Ontario, thought that “little encouragement is offered to the 
foreigners [to enlist], but if they could be persuaded to take up arms, there would be a 
profound effect on the future generation.” 134 All of this must have been discouraging to 
the immigrants themselves, many of whom “desire to be regarded as Canadians and to be 
permitted as such to discharge their duty to their adopted country in this war.” 135
There were also concerns that men from enemy states concealed their origins
s
when they enlisted and represented a security threat. Some of the Ukrainians from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, who claimed to be Russians, were suspected of maintaining 
ties with the old country, while others were “reported to be sending money from Canada 
to the United States to be forwarded from there to Austria.” 136 Other groups were suspect 
as well. Germans were said to be passing themselves off as Scandinavians while 
Austrians were suspected of claiming Serbian or Romanian citizenship.137
Security concerns with recruits bom in enemy countries or of enemy parentage 
may have been exaggerated, but the concerns had some basis in reality. In England, 
Private Ziegler of the 14 Reserve Battalion, who may have been from Germany, advised 
his Polish-bom comrades in 1917 to claim they had been bom in Germany rather than 
Russia to avoid being posted to an infantry battalion in France. 138 In 1916, the CGS 
pointed to the case of Private Minot of German ancestry who was serving with the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force in France. Minot apparently deserted to the Germans and
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shortly afterwards, positions previously unknown to the enemy were heavily shelled.139 
In February 1917, Private George McDonald of the RCR deserted and warned the 6th 
(German) Reserve Corps that the Canadian Corps was making preparations for an attack 
at Vimy Ridge. McDonald, whose true name was Otto Ludwig Doerr, had been bom in 
Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, although when he enlisted with the 212th Battalion at 
Saskatoon in 1916, he claimed to have been bom in Kentucky. McDonald/Doerr 
evidently had an accent but was able to account for this by claiming that he had been 
raised in Mexico and lived in Texas.140 :
Language presented a problem for immigrant recruits, many of whom spoke little
or no English or French. The number of these men who managed to join is unknown
/
although there were enough that Militia HQ found it necessary to issue repeated 
instructions that “no men should be enlisted who have not a satisfactory knowledge of 
either the French or English languages.’’141 The instructions were not xenophobic and 
there were some very good reasons why non-English speaking men could not be 
accepted. In 1916 Russian-born soldiers with the 39th Reserve Battalion in England made 
little progress in training because they could not understand the English-speaking 
instructors. The problem was serious and the OC 12 Reserve Brigade warned that these 
men would only be partially trained on completion of the standard recruit course and 
would be of limited value to battalions in France who would “be unable to handle them 
owing to their want of English.”142 In April 1916, the 11th Reserve Battalion reported 
receiving a draft of forty-five Russians, only six of whom could speak or understand 
English. “These men would be unable to report their observations if they were sent out on 
patrol [in France],” reported their company commander, and would “also [be] absolutely
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unable to transmit a verbal message.”143 A year later in August 1917, the 5th Reserve 
Battalion commented on a draft of men who could not speak English and warned that 
“none o f them would be of the slightest use for front line work.” 144
Sporadic efforts were made by reserve units in England to accommodate men who 
had difficulties with French or English. In April 1916, the OC 12 Canadian Reserve 
Brigade recommended that all Russians be grouped for training under NCOs who were 
fluent in both Russian and English.145 In November 1916, the 9th Canadian Infantry 
Reserve Brigade noted that bilingual instructors were required for Russian-speaking 
reinforcements while in June 1917 the 5 Reserve Battalion recommended that
instructors who spoke Greek should be used to train newly-arrived unilirigual Greeks/
with the 241st Battalion. A different approach was taken by the Canadian Pioneer ‘ 
Training Depot and in 1916 a number of Russians were promoted to lance-corporal and 
used to instruct non-English speaking Russians. The experiment was not a success, 
however, because the instructors were no further advanced than their students.146
The use of bilingual instructors was not a satisfactory solution. Admittedly the 
immigrant soldiers would complete their training, but there was still the knotty problem 
of speaking English or French sufficiently well to function with units in France. The 
obvious solution was to conduct second-language classes. The 37 Battalion Base 
Company in MD 2 suggested in 1915 that non-English speaking soldiers (mainly 
Russians) be grouped together and given an opportunity to attend language classes, but 
nothing came of this recommendation.147
The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had the same problem but on a much 
larger scale. Almost 20% of the AEF were foreign-born and many spoke English poorly
t
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or not all. At Camp Gordon, Georgia, a major training base for infantry reinforcements, 
for example, about 75% of all draftees in 1918 could not speak English.148 The US War 
Office was slow to recognize the problem, but in January 1918 the Intelligence 
Department in Washington was enlarged with the addition of the Foreign-speaking 
Soldier Subsection (FSS), intended to facilitate the training and integration of immigrant 
soldiers. Under the direction of the FSS, non-English-speaking soldiers were grouped 
into ‘development battalions’ with English-language training and military training under 
instructors who spoke their language.149.
The AEF was able to do this, but only because it was highly centralized and took
in a large number of men in a relatively short period. In contrast, the CEF was/
decentralized and recruited fewer men over a much longer period of time. As well, the 
Canadian Forces were administered by a headquarters staff that was miniscule in 
comparison to the AEF and barely able to keep up with routine administration, let alone 
launch creative innovations. In short, a Canadian equivalent to the FSS was simply not 
possible.
\
The failure to tap the pool of non-English speaking immigrants probably cost the 
CEF about two months’ wastage for units in France and Flanders. Citizenship 
requirements, the ability of foreign states to control immigrants on Canadian soil, a 
general mistrust of immigrants and security concerns all played a part. Language was also 
an issue, not necessarily because men were turned away but because reserve units in 
England, which were set up to train homogeneous blocks of reinforcements, could not 
train the immigrant soldiers efficiently. .
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. There was also considerable inefficiency because there was no uniform 
description of a soldier’s fitness, which meant the pool of serving men could not be 
managed efficiently. For the first two years of the war, a soldier’s fitness depended on his 
corps and there was no way of determining if a healthy CASC driver was fit for the 
infantry without a medical examination. Nor was there any way to determine if an 
infantryman marked as ‘unfit’ by his battalion should be transferred to the CASC or 
repatriated to Canada. However, with the introduction of medical categories, men could 
be employed in jobs consistent with their physical abilities. Category A men, for 
example, could be transferred to the infantry and replaced by Category B infantrymen. 
The effect was to reduce the strain on the manpower pool by making more men available
s
for service in the trenches.
The War Office made several efforts to institute medical categories in 1915, but 
these applied only to conscripts and men reported unfit by their units.150 In general, unfit 
soldiers, regardless of corps, were described as ‘PB’ (permanent base) or ‘TB’
(temporary base) if the individual was expected to improve. In May 1916, more than
12,000 soldiers were examined by CEF medical boards in England and 20.46% were 
judged to be ‘PB’. 151 But the results were unsatisfactory since there was no indication of 
the limitations on employment.
The system was finally rationalized in May 1916 when the War Office 
promulgated Army Council Instruction (ACI) 1023 which set out a universal system of 
medical categories that reflected individual fitness and training regardless of corps.152 
The CEF was slow to follow suit, however, probably because Canadian HQ in London 
under Major-General Carson was not particularly efficient and did not recognize either
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the problem or the remedy. In November 1916, Colonel A.D. McRae of Canadian HQ 
visited units in France and, together with Lieutenant-General Byng, the Canadian Corps 
commander, discussed the results of the visit with the DCIGS at the War Office. In a 
nutshell, the two recommended the use of common standards in both France and England 
and urged that the same standards be adopted in Canada.153 The creation of HQ OMFC 
facilitated matters and by the end of November 1916, ACI 1023 was brought into effect 
for the CEF in England and France. 154 The system was then adopted in Canada in May 
1917, when Militia HQ issued Militia Order 50 to identify unfit men who might
otherwise be posted to England and “to utilize available material [manpower] to the best 
purpose.” 155
The category system established by ACI 1023 with minor modifications 
authorized in Militia Order 50 is summarized in Table 37.
Table 37
Medical Categories
Category General Description Remarks
A Fit for active service Ai -  fully trained 
Aii -  recruits
Aiii -  fully trained but required
hardening
A iv-m inors
B Free from serious organic defects Bi -  able to march five miles
and fit for active service on the Bii -  able to walk at least five miles to
lines of communication and from work
Biii -  sedentary duties only
C Fit for service in Canada only
D Temporarily unfit
E Unfit for categories A, B and C Not expected to become fit within six 
months
Note: Not all subcategories are listed in Table 37.
Once men had been categorized, the benefits of the system became obvious. In 
January 1917, for example, HQ OMFC directed units in England to transfer all men with
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Category B or C to the Canadian Railway Troops Depot at Purfleet or to the Canadian 
Forestry Corps, something that would not have been possible six months earlier without 
mass medical boards.156
Standard medical categories allowed fit men in non-combatant corps to be 
weeded out and diverted to the infantry. As early as January 1917, a draft of 399 CASC 
reinforcements from Canada, “of splendid physique, being above the average of Infantry 
Battalions now arriving,” 157 lost a hundred men to,the infantry on arrival in England. 
Further transfers of Category A soldiers to the infantry followed: by 9 May 1917, a total 
of 525 men had been transferred from the CASC Training Depot to reserve infantry 
battalions. Others followed; 436 CASC men were transferred to the infantry in August 
1917 and a further 313 in September 1917.158 Another 227 followed in October- 
November 1917.159 The results were dramatic. In January 1917, CASC personnel in 
England were virtually all Category A but by July 1918, they were virtually all Category 
B .160 Other corps were expected to yield Category A men as well and in the first six 
months of 1917, for example, 469 pay clerks at HQ OMFC were drafted to the infantry 
and replaced by Category B and C men.161 -
The system was not perfect. CAMC personnel in the forward areas in France were 
required to be medically fit and in May 1917, the ADMS at HQ OMFC noted that the 
CAMC Training Depot could not afford to surrender any more Category A men.162 
Similarly, the QMG reported in November 1917 that the CASC Training Depot had to 
retain a pool of Category A horse transport drivers as reinforcements for divisional trains 
in France, because “it is feared that under the trying winter conditions, the demand for 
reinforcements will be exceptionally heavy if men of low category are employed.” 163
267
Even.the reserve battalions were affected. In January 1918, HQ OMFC urged that 
Category A NCOs should be posted to France although it was difficult to find competent 
instructors with low categories. Still, OMFC added, the effort should be made.164
The process of combing out non-combatants who were fit for the front was not a 
reaction to periodic shortages of infantry reinforcements for France, but an ongoing effort 
to make efficient use of available manpower. The general policy was set in May 1917, 
when HQ OMFC directed that “all men of Category ‘A’ of Units and Corps other than 
infantry, who are surplus to the estimated requirements of reinforcements for the next 8 
months, should be transferred to Infantry Reserve Battalions.” 165 In May 1918, the 
process was further refined when a Board of Officers was established by HQ OMFC to 
visit every unit in England and allocate men according to their medical fitness. The 
Board’s work was difficult and time-consuming, but its efforts “resulted in effecting a 
saving of the greatest possible amount of Man-Power in the Overseas Military Forces of 
Canada.” 166 r
Despite the apparent benefits of the combing out process, the effect appears to 




Select Infantry Battalions 
Non-Infantry Reinforcements167
Corps 1917 1918 Total
CADC 1 2 3
CAMC 9 91 100
CASC 98 150 248
CAVC 6 Vi! ■ 5 ...... 11
CFC 2 128 130
CRT 2 24 ^ -  26
Remount Depot 5 6 11
Signal Corps 93 A ■ . 9 3 . - •
Totals 123 499 622
Note: Table 38 lists non-infantry rein brcements posted to the 2nd CMR, 4th CMR,
4th Battalion, 16th Battalion, 18™ Battalion, 20th Battalion, 72nd Battalion, 85th 
Battalion and PPCLI. The table does not include men of the Canadian Labour ' 
Corps who arrived as reinforcements after their medical category was upgraded.
On average, each battalion listed in Table 38 received about 69 non-infantry
reinforcements which suggests that about 3,317 were posted to the forty-eight battalions
in the Canadian Corps. But the total number of transfers to combatant corps must have
been somewhat more if postings to the artillery, machine gun corps and the cavalry
brigade are also considered. The true significance of the use of medical categories lies in
the realization that the manpower pool not only had to be tapped, but had to be efficiently
managed.
Women could also have been used to replace men who were physically fit for 
active service, a measure that would have helped to alleviate the shortage of manpower in 
1917-1918. In England, HQ OMFC was more than willing to make use of British women 
from Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps (QMAAC) as cooks, drivers and mess 
waitresses, but there was no equivalent in Canada although more than 5,000 women were
1 fiRhired as civil servants and worked as clerks and typists.
It was not as though women had not served with the.CEF since the beginning.
A total of 2,854 nurses were commissioned in the CAMC as well as ten other women in a 
variety of units including the Canadian Field Comforts Commission and the CAMC.16- 
There were also 342 Canadian women who served overseas with Voluntary Aid 
Detachments;170 But there were no female soldiers with the exception of Maud Blake, a 
Kingston dental mechanic who enlisted as a private in .1915 and was demobilized as a 
sergeant in January 1919. Blake, it must be pointed out, joined as a woman and made 
no effort to conceal her gender.
Women were not unwelcome in the CEF. After all, QMAAC women served with 
CEF units in England with no apparent problems. The subject was not seriously discussed 
at Militia HQ, however, until December 1917 when a letter signed by an anonymous 
‘Anxious and ‘Willin’-to-go’ Stenographer’ in Toronto suggested that the CEF form a 
Canadian version of QMAAC. The letter was passed to the CGS who took the suggestion 
seriously and directed the AG to broach the issue with the Minister’s military secretary. 
HQ OMFC was then consulted on the proposal to form a Canadian equivalent to the 
QMAAC, but reported in March 1918 that the War Office had rejected the idea because 
there were enough British women to fill the demand and there was a shortage of shipping
1 77to bring the women to England.
The matter did not end there. In May 1918, Colonel Machines at Militia HQ noted 
that the Royal Air Force was recruiting women to serve with RAF units in Canada and 
observed “Will this not, however, expose the Department to criticism, if something of the 
same kind is not done in connection with the Canadian Forces?”173 Maclnnes’s 
suggestion evidently struck a chord. The Militia Council considered the issue on 30 May
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1918 and formed a sub-committee headed by the QMG to study the matter. The sub­
committee worked slowly, however, and it was not until 18 September 1918 that Militia 
Council reviewed the final report and approved the formation of the ‘Canadian Women’s 
Army Auxiliary Corps’ (CWAAC). However, Major-General Mewbum, the Minister of 
Militia and Defence, deferred any action until the Prime Minister and Civil Service 
Commission had been consulted. Nothing concrete emerged from these consultations (if 
in fact, they ever took place) and the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 
rendered the proposal moot.174
Would a significant number of men have been made available for overseas duty
with the creation of the CWAAC? In May 1918, there were approximately 90,600
/
soldiers serving in Canada.175 Many were MSA men waiting to go overseas, however, 
while others were being cared for by the Military Hospitals Commission. In all likelihood 
there were only a few thousand fit men employed in administrative positions who could 
have been replaced by members of the CWAAC. As well, since the CWAAC had been 
authorized in September 1918, only two months before the armistice, there would have 
been little or no benefit to the CEF. Had the war continued into 1919, however, the 
CWAAC would probably have made a significant contribution by adding several 
thousand men to the reinforcement stream.
From start to finish, the CEF recruited about 616,636 officers and men. But many 
of these men did not meet age and fitness requirements or were recruited outside of 
Canada and thus were not part of the national manpower pool. All of this begs the 









Sub-total -  debits 116,016
Recruits -  convicts 700
Recruits -  Bermuda 46
Recruits -  Greece, France 
and Belgium
'31
Recruits -  England 1,733
Recruits -  US residents 22,338
Recruits -  BCRM 33,335 ;
Sub-total -  credits 58,183
All recruits not part of the 
manpower pool
173,198
All recruits from manpower 
pool
443,438
v  ' • •
In summary, about 54% of all men in Canada who were eligible for military 
service enlisted in the CEF. However, the rate would have been somewhat higher if the 
CEF had welcomed non-English speaking immigrants, natives and visible minorities and 
encouraged them to enlist. On the other hand, modifications to recruiting criteria 
discussed in Chapter 4 probably added several hundred thousand recruits to the CEF, men 
who needed eyeglasses, dental care or dentures. The introduction of uniform medical 
categories also affected manpower. The system did not enlarge the reservoir, but made 
management of the pool more efficient and allowed men to be retained who might 
otherwise have been released. All in all, there may have been some shortcomings, but in 
the end, Militia HQ was able to make good use of the available manpower.
Numbers alone do not suffice to win battles and success depended on well-trained 
reinforcements arriving at their units in a timely fashion. Training, then, was vital and 
this forms the central theme in Chapter 6.
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Canadian bom and 306,377 British bom, a total of 1,526,133 males aged 18-45 were eligible to serve in the 
CEF.
7 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, p.379
8 Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce. Fifth Census of Canada. 1911: Vol VI. Occupations of the
People. (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1915) pp.2-7 Table 1 - *
9 Statistics Canada. Historical Statistics of Canada (1983) Table A1 at
http://www.statcan.£c,ca.proxv 1 ,lib.uwo.ca:2048/pub/l 1 -516-x/section/A 1 -eng.csv. It is assumed that few 
men would have been employed in heavy industry beyond age 60. Ages are given in five year cohorts with 
2,355,000 men between the ages of fifteen and sixty. Of those aged fifteen to nineteen, it is assumed that 
40% or 142,000 were eighteen or nineteen. A total of 1,694,000 or 72% of all men were aged eighteen to 
forty-four and of military age. It has therefore been assumed that 443,498 of the 615,969 essential workers 
were suitable for the CEF by reason of age.
10 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book 1922-23. (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1924) 
p.433 noted that the workforce increased from 395,681 men and women in 1915 to 603,116 in 1918with 
women mainly employed in the clothing and textile industries.
11 The revised figure for the manpower pool is the total shown in Table 1 minus the number of workers 
available for enlistment in Table 2.
12 Bryce. Conservation of Manpower in Canada: A National Need, p.12 citing the results of more than eight 
hundred examinations carried out by Captain C.J. Withrow, probably in late 1917. The figures include 
those placed in Category ‘D’ (temporarily unfit).
13 LAC RG 24 Vol 4428 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 2, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 7 May 1917, the figures given 
were approximate only since in the early months, more attention was paid to organization than statistics; 
Chief Recruiting Officer MD 3 to GOC MD 3 25 April 1917 with the results of the survey and adding that 
eight recruiting offices felt medical standards should be reduced.
14 An Act respecting Military Service 29 August 1917, section 3(1) defined Class 1 as “Those who have 
attained the age of twenty years and were bom not earlier than the year 1883 and are unmarried or are 
widowers but have no child.” PC 919 of 20 April 1918 extended the Act to single men aged nineteen; 
Morton When Your Number’s Up pp.66-67 comments on differing standards of local tribunals. No doubt 
the same applied to medical boards.
15 Machin. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch, p.78. The numbers quoted exclude those 
who were granted an exemption from military service prior to being medically examined. The figures 
should be taken as a guide only since there were distinct regional differences, probably reflecting local 
attitudes towards conscription. Only 35.9% of all Québec draftees, for example, were fit for general service 
overseas while 59.7% of those examined in Saskatchewan were fit for general service.
16 Great Britain, Ministry of National Service Report: Vol I: Upon the physicalexamination of men of 
military age by National Service medical boards from November 1st, 1917 -  October 31st. 1918 pp.3-4;
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Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great Wan 1914-1920. p.379 provided 
lower figures for men aged 18 to 41: 25% were fit for general service and 15% were fit for non-combatant 
overseas service. The source of the data was not given; Winter, J.M. ‘Military Fitness and Civilian Health 
in Britain during the First World War’ in Journal of Contemporary History-'Vol 15 (1980) pp.214-215 has 
critiqued the Ministry of National Service figures by pointing to imprecise definitions, hurried 
examinations and institutional biases on the part of local boards. The same remarks may apply to Canadian 
boards, but their methodology has not been studied by historians.
17 The RCR, a PF battalion, was stationed in Bermuda in 1914-1915. They may have enlisted a few, but the 
PF attestation papers are not available or readily searchable at the RCR Museum. Recruits in the other two 
battalions were found by searching 38th Battalion attestation papers with service numbers from 410001 to 
412000 and 163rd Battalion attestation papers with service numbers from 660001 to 663000 at 
http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef7index-e.html;
18 Gagnon, Jean-Pierre. ‘Canadian Soldiers in Bermuda During World War One’ in Histoire Sociale-Social 
History Vol XXIII Number 45 (May 1990) pp. 17-18 noted that reinforcements were sent from Canada as 
required; An Historical Sketch of the Seventy-Seventh Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force. (Ottawa: 
War Publications Limited, 1926) p.18 notes that a draft of 100 men was sent to the 38th Battalion in 
Bermuda on 3 December 1915.
19 Ingham, Jennifer. Defence Not Defiance. (Bermuda: privately published, nd) p.50, The Second Bermuda 
Contingent was attached to the 38th for training.
20 The Bermuda Royal Gazette was searched from September 1914 to September 1916 and no comment 
was found concerning recruiting by Canadian battalions; Bermuda Archives, House of Assembly Debates 
1914-1915, House of Assembly Debates 1915-1916. CS 6/1/28 ‘Governor’s Despatches 1913-1916 and CS 
6/1/28 ‘Governor’s Despatches 1913-1916 were searched as well with no results.
21 Bermudians who enlisted in the 38th were bom in Britain (six), Canada (four), Jamaica (two) and the 
United States (one). The Bermuda contingents were paid one shilling (twenty-five cents) per diem while 
the CEF received $1.10.
22 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-11-36, Governor of Bermuda to Militia HQ 18 
August 1916 complaining that blacks had been enlisted as officers’ mess waiters and adding that the matter 
should not become public knowledge; Bermudians who enlisted in the 163rd were bom in Bermuda 
(eighteen), Britain (nine), British West Indies (four), Australia (one) and the United States (one).
23 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-11-36, Governor of Bermuda to Militia HQ 18
August 1916; Ingham. Defence Not Defiance p.9 notes that Bermuda forces were segregated with whites 
serving in the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps and blacks in the Bermuda Militia Artillery; Hallett, Clara 
and Harris, Edward ‘Those who served: Bermuda Contingents overseas in the Great War, 1914-1918’ in 
Maritimes: The Magazine of the Bermuda Maritime Museum Vol 19 Number 3 (2006), p.3 1 a
24 One of the men enrolled by the 163rd Battalion, 661146 E.G. Steele, was killed in action on 7 July 1917 
while serving with the 14th Battalion.
25 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3674, 229463 George W. Goukler.
26 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6449 62300 Joseph Guillaume Octave Mouton. According to his 
attestation paper, Mouton had served with the Belgian Army from December 1914 to 28 August 1916. He 
was attested by Major A.E. Dubuc of the 22nd Battalion ‘in the field’ on 22 October 1916.
27 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Boxes 2454 (229469 F. Derancougne) and 9503 (229457 H. Tardivon).
28 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-479-1 Vol 1, OC 4th Canadian Stationary Hospital to AAG & QMG 
Rouen 4 December 1915, AAQ & QMG to Canadian Records London 20 December 1915 and reply from 
Director of Recruiting and Organization 5 January 1916 .
29 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Boxes 10322 (1263461 James Whittingham) and 2870 (1263476 Harvey 
H Elliott). Elliott, a native Canadian, had formerly served with the British ASC.
30 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-1093 8, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon, June 
1918 appendix 6 with a copy of a letter from OMFC to the section dated 10 June 1918.
31 Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada, p.44 noted that 1,733 men had been 
enlisted; Duguid Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol I p.51 claims 
that 3,079 had been enlisted. The discrepancy may be due to Duguid counting those who were re-attested 
while OMFC did not. The OMFC figure is consistent with LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Officer i/c 
Enlistments to Director of Recruiting and Organization 20 April 1916 with preliminary figures and a 
further letter dated 26 June 1916 with corrected figures for 1916 showing that 960 men had been enlisted
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up to June 1916. A survey of on-line attestation forms on the Library and Archives of Canada web site has 
produced 1,516 British recruits, 1,064 of whom had joined by 30 June 1916.
32 Duguid. Official History: Chronology. Appendices and Maps, p. 140 notes the RCD were given 
permission on 20 October 1914 to recruit twenty-three men; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. 
Canadian Expeditionary Force: Royal Canadian Dragoons: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non-Commissioned 
Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915 notes that the RCD sailed to England with 557 men; 
Love, David W. A Call to Arms: The Organization and Administration of Canada’s Military in World War 
One. (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1999). p.25 notes that British War Establishments, presumably 
adopted by the RCD on arrival in England, called for 524 men. It is unlikely that the RCD lost fifty-six men 
on their arrival in England and the extra men may have been required to form a depot squadron to provide 
reinforcements.
33 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 419 File E-90-1, Chief Paymaster CEF to HQ Canadian Contingent cal5 
November 1914 concerning the Cyclists and 17th Battalion. The same letter can be found in DHH 74/672 
(Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-11-39; Duguid. Official History: Chronology. Appendices and Maps, 
p.l 16 notes that the 17th Battalion sailed with 624 men -  355 under establishment and p. 158 notes that the 
divisional cyclist establishment was 8 officers and 195 other ranks; Canada, Department of Militia and 
Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Divisional Cyclist Company: Nominal Roll of Officers. Non- 
Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915, notes that the company sailed with 
eighty-eight men; The company needed almost 110 recruits to reach the war establishment; Ellis, W.D.
(ed). Saga of the Cyclists in the Great War 1914-1918. (Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion Association, 
1965) pp.4-5 notes that the cyclist company was brought up to strength with men from the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th 
and 12th Canadian Infantry Battalions as well as about twelve South African recruits.
34 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-11-39, War Office to OC V) Canadian Contingent 19 
November 1914;, Numbers enlisted have been taken from LAC RG 150 File ‘17th Reserve Battalion’, Daily 
Orders 5 November 1914 to 20 January 1915; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4956 Reel T-10773, War Diary 1st 
Canadian Divisional Cyclist Company for November and December 1914.
35 LAC RG 24 Vol 1811 File GAQ 3-9, ‘Memorandum on the Canadian Expeditionary Force as at Present 
Reconstituted’ by Colonel W.G. Gwatkin, CGS, 3 October 1914. Gwatkin also noted that reinforcements 
had not been raised, but would be required in May or June 1915 assuming the Is-Division was sent to  ̂ ; 
France in January 1915.
36 LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 419 File E-90-1, GOC Canadian Contingent to Southern Command 8 December 
1914 commenting on the losses
37 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-11-39, GOC Canadians to War Office 12 January 
1915,1st Canadian Division to War Office 19 January 1915 and reply 19 January 1915 giving authority to 
recruit specialists in Britain; Duguid. Official History: Chronology. Appendices and Maps, p. 141 noting 
that thirty specialists for the Divisional Artillery were enlisted in January 1915 .
38. Taken from a nominal roll of 1,516 men enlisted in the United Kingdom based on attestation papers on­
line at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html Unless otherwise noted, all discussion 
concerning numbers enlisted are based on this sample.
39 Tradesmen enlisted in the artillery included shoeing smiths (7), blacksmiths (2), wheelwright (1) and 
saddler (1).
40 Tradesmen enlisted in the cavalry included grooms (3), ranchers (5) and Royal Northwest Mounted 
Police (1).
41 Recruits included a rider and a groom.
42 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Major-General Carson to War Office 25 May 1915 asking for 
permission to enlist Canadians resident in the British Isles, Major-General Carson to GOC Canadian 
Training Division Shorncliffe 14 June 1915 noting that bona fide Canadians could be enlisted in the CEF
43 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-479-1 Vol 1, A/DAAG HQ Canadians [Shorncliffe] to all units 30 June 
1915.
44 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, DAAG to HQ Canadians London 9 May 1916.
45 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 92 File 10-12-31, AG OMFC to Deputy Minister OMFC 30 April 1917; LAC RG 
9 III A1 Vol 92 File 10-12-33, High Commissioner to HQ OMFC 12 September 1917.
46 LAC RG 9 III B 1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon to AAG(C) GHQ 3rd 
Echelon 4 June 1918 with information concerning the decision by OMFC. Canadian citizenship per se did 
not come into existence until 1 January 1947. Presumably the High Commissioner certified that the man in
(
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question was a British subject ordinarily resident in Canada; See also Report of the Ministry: Overseas 
Military Forces of Canada, 1918. p.44
47 LAC RG 9 III Al Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Officer i/c Enlistments to Director of Recruiting and Organization 
8 January 1916
48 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, W.G. Hunter, British Army Recruiting Officer to Major-General 
Carson 4 October 1915, Carson to Hunter 7 October 1915.
49 LAC RG 9 A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-12, War Office to HQ CTD 11 May 1915 offering the men; File 8-1-11, 
War Office to Eastern Command 22 May 1915 directing the men be transferred, CTD to 2/6th (Cyclist): 
Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment 22 May 1915; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4957 File 502 Reel T-10773, War 
Diary Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company, July 1915, Appendix B.
50 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon to AAG (C) GHQ 3rd 
Echelon 4 June 1918
51 LAC RG 9 III D 1 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon, June 
1918 Appendix 6, HQ OMFC to Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon 10 June 1918. However, the release of 
these men from the BEF required British approval and it does not appear that this was given.
52 RG 9 III B1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, undated petition probably submitted to OC Canadian General Base 
Depot at Etaples in April 1918. The petition was forwarded by the OC Canadian General Base Depot to HQ 
Reinforcements 23 April 1918. HQ OMFC to Canadian Section GHQ 3rd Echelon 10 June 1918 noted that 
“...it seems desirable that they [petitioners] should be enlisted in the Canadian Infantry.” Canadian Section 
GHQ 3rd Echelon to AAG(C) GHQ 3rd Echelon 4 June 1918 enclosing a partial list of Canadians with the 
Inland Water Transport.
53 In an effort to determine the proportion of American residents who enlisted in the CEF, attestation papers 
were examined for all recruits who joined one of six major depots from 1915 to 31 May 1917. A total of 
9,161 attestation papers included the recruit’s address. The British Canadian Recruiting Mission started 
operations in June 1917 and the attestation papers of men who joined after May 1917 have not been 
included. Depots chosen for this sample accepted recruits from a broad area and operated for at least 
eighteen months thus eliminating local recruiting trends. The depots concerned were the CAMC depots in 
MD 10 (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and North-West Ontario), MD 11 (British Columbia and the Yukon 
Territories), the CASC Depot in MD 2 (Ontario and Québec), C Battery RCHA (Ontario and Québec), the 
CE depot at St John’s, Québec (Ontario, Québec and the Maritimes) and the CMR Depot in Hamilton 
(Ontario and western Québec). A total of 502 men or 5.5% were American residents. With 406,147 
recruits signing up by 31 May 1917, it is estimated at least 22,338 were American residents. A total of 663 
men or 7.2% were American bom of whom 426 or 64.3% were Canadian residents; Lyddon, Colonel W.G. 
British War Missions to the United States 1914-1918. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) p.203 ' 
noted that the BCRM enlisted 47,188 men, 33,335 of whom joined the CEF. This total included 6,643 
Jews, colored men and other nationalities, some of whom may have been American citizens; His figures 
were echoed by the British Ambassador to Washington in a statement on 18 November 1918 (DHH 74/672 
(Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 2. There were 22,473 Canadian residents who volunteered for the CEF 
between 1 June 1917 and 30 November 1918. Some of these men were, no doubt, American residents. It is 
also likely that some of the 6,643 Jews and colored men enlisted by the BCRM joined the CEF. At least 
four hundred blacks from the British West Indies joined the CEF. No fewer than seventy-five had been 
recruited by the BCRM. The grand total of American residents who enlisted was probably in excess of 
57,000.
54 United States, Government of. Statutes at Large of the United States of America: Vol XXXIV. Part 1. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909) p.1228 An Act In reference to the expatriation o f citizens 
and their protection abroad approved 2 March 1907. Section 2 provided that “Any American citizen shall 
be deemed to have to have expatriated himself... when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign 
state.”
55United States, Government of. Statutes at Large of the United States of America: Vol XXXV. Part 1 
p.1088 An Act to codify, revise and amend the penal laws o f the United States approved 4 March 1909, 
Section 10. Most historians such as Eric Smylie in Americans Who Would Not Wait: The American Legion 
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. (University of North Texas; PhD Thesis, 2002) p.51 claim that the 
Foreign Enlistment Act (1818) prevented foreign countries from recruiting in the U.S. However, this act 
seems to have lapsed at some point in the nineteenth century.
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56 Richardson, James D.(ed). Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents: Voi 18, (Washington: 
Bureau of National Literature, nd) pp.7969-7973, ‘Neutrality Proclamations by the President of the United 
States
57 LAC RG 76 Reel T-5462 ‘Beebe Junction Border Entries April 1914-December 1918’, crossing 14-18 
September 1914.
58 LAC RG 75 Reel T-5506 ‘Windsor Border Entries October 1913-June 1917’, return for 21 September 
1914.
59 LAC RG 75 Reel T-5506 ‘Windsor Border Entries October 1913-June 1917’ , returns for September, 
October, November and December 1914.
60 LAC RG 76 Reel T-5488 ‘Border Entries Niagara Falls August 1914 to September 1915’ and Reel T- 
5489‘Border Entries Niagara Falls October 1915 to May 1916’
61 LAC RG 9 III DI Voi 4699 Folder 68 File 1, 99th Battalion historical report produced March 1918
62 Based on an analysis of attestation papers at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/index- 
e.html with service numbers in the block 1045001-1046000. Attestation papers for 823 recruits are 
available. A total of 517 (63%) of the men claimed to be American residents although only 226 (27%) were 
bom in the United States.
63 A search of attestation papers in the block 850001-851124 allocated to the 176th Battalion at 
http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/001042-100.01-e. showed 1,032 enlistments, 268 or 26% 
of whom were US residents; A search of attestation papers in the block 333801-334800 allocated to the 
63rd Depot Battery at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/001042-100.01-e. showed 960 
enlistments, 288 or 30% of whom were US residents
64 LAC RG 24 Voi 1402 File 593-6-2 Voi 21, OC 213th Battalion to AAG MD 2 14 October 1916 
complaining about other units competing for American recruits. .
65 Smylie. Americans Who Would Not wait, pp. 190-206 discusses the diplomatic problems at some length.
66 Charlotte Daily Observer 26 February 1916, p.l commented at length on the ad placed in a rival 
newspaper and quoted the Washington Times. The ad apparently invited applicants to obtain further . 
information from William Gregory of the Leamington Recruiting Committee; LAC RG 24 Voi 4427 File 
26-6-64-3 Voi 1, AG circular letter 17 March 1916
67 LAC RG 24 Voi 782 File 1982-1-56, the file contains a clipping from the Grand Rapids News dated 20
April 1916. ;
68 LAC RG 24 Voi 782 File 1982-1-56, AG circular telegram 16 November 1916. The telegram also 
stressed that no inducements were to be offered to citizens of the United States.
69 LAC RG 24 Voi 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Voi l ,AGtoOCM D3 16 March 1916 with a copy of an affidavit 
from the three men dated 1 March 1916; OC 139th Battalion to AAG MD 3 23 March 1916 explained that 
the soldier in question was not dressed in uniform and did not have permission to visit the United States. 
The soldier was identified only as ‘Wilson’. The three unhappy men from Rochester were imprisoned after 
refusing to enlist and were later deported; LAC RG 24 Voi 4670 File 99-4-7 Voi 3, GOC MD 11 to Militia 
HQ 6 July 1916 summarizing the case and adding that Austin was released for lack of evidence, Lieutenant 
Sanborn of the 211th Battalion to Judge Advocate General for the State of Washington 24 June 1916 
explaining that Austin was on leave, had no authority to recruit in Washington and adding that the CO of 
the 211th Battalion would be grateful if arrangements could be made to release Austin from jail; Fort 
William Daily Times-Herald 16 October 1916 p.l, 17 October 1916 p.l and 25 October 1916 p.l. One man 
was released on bail and fled to Canada leaving the bondsman to forfeit $1000. The remaining two were 
evidently released without providing bail.
70 McLellan, Roy A. Day to Day Experiences During World War I and World War II. (privately printed 
cl958) p.19.1 am grateful to the Reference Room of the Saskatoon Public Library for providing a partial 
photocopy of their copy of McLellan’s memories -  the only known copy in Canada.
71 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 18 File ‘United States Citizens -Enlistment of in 
Canadian Forces’, Private Secretary Department of the Interior to Minister of Militia and Defence 3 
November 1915.
72 LAC RG 24 Voi 289 File 13-123-5, Superintendent of Immigration to Militia HQ 14 June 1917 
explaining that “ ...for months past our inspectors have, all along the Boundary, admitted such men as 
applied for entry to enlist and were believed to be suitable.”
73 LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Voi 11, Reel 7603 File 400, August Fibiger 
to Russian Consul 3 May 1916 and 11 November 1916. The Bohemian Alliance of America (Canadian
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Branch) must have been small beer since the same address was given for the Alliance office and the 
secretary’s home.
74 Lyddon. British War Missions to the United States, pp.197-198. Lyddon claimed that White and seven
other officers had been sent to Canada in February 1917 to prepare for the possibility of recruiting in the 
United States should the opportunity arise; United States, Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1970: Part I. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975) p.l 16 
Series C 181-194 shows a total of 6,780,214 foreign bom males of whom 3,038,303 or 44.8% were 
naturalized, 571,521 or 8.4% were declarants, 2,390,426 or 35.3% who were landed immigrants only and 
779,964 or 11.5% who were of unknown citizenship; p.l 18 Series C 228-295 shows the place of birth of all 
immigrants of both genders. A total of 1,402,927 were British subjects by birth. Assuming that half were 
male and using Series C 181-194 as a guide, it is estimated that 701,464 men of all ages were neither US 
citizens nor declarants. The figure is slightly understated since Series C 228-295 did not list persons bom in 
New Zealand, British African possessions, British Arabia, Straits Settlement (Malaya), Hong Kong of 
British possessions elsewhere. ■ . ’ ! ;
75 United States, Congress. U.S. Congressional Serial Set Number 7252 Vol 1, House Report Number 14 by 
the Committee on the Judiciary (Bill H.R. 2893) 16 April 1917, Senate Report Number 21 by the 
Committee on the Judiciary (Bill S. 1802) 18 April 1917; Statutes at Large of the United States of America: 
Vol XL., pp.39-40, An Act to amend section ten o f chapter two o f  the Criminal Code approved 7 May 1917. 
The Act exempted the Allies from earlier legislation forbidding recruiting in the United States. The 
amendments were approved by the House of Representatives on 16 April and by the Senate on 18 April
76 Statutes at Large of the United States of America Vol XL. pp.76-83 An Act to authorize the President to 
increase temporarily the Military Establishment o f  the United States. The act was approved by the 
President on 18 May 1917. Section 2 provided that “Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon 
liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their 
intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years.”
77 Lyddon. British War Missions to the United States, p .l98 noted that White arrived in New York at the 
end of May 1917: New York Times 4 June 1917 p.6 reported that the Mission would begin recruiting on 
Wednesday, 6 June 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49, AG circular letter 10 September 1917 
announcing the change in nomenclature
78 LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edwin Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, A/AG to Minister of Militia and 
Defence 7 September 1917 suggested the mission be renamed; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49, AG 
Circular Letter 10 September 1917 notifying all districts of the change; LAC RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, 
U.S. Army General Recruiting Service Circular Letters 1917 Number 69 of 31 May 1917 advised all 
recruiting stations of the procedures for handling BCRM recruits; Lyddon. British War Missions to the 
United States p.l 98: New York Times 31 May 1917 p.5 with a brief outline: Boston Daily Globe 4 June 
1917 p.l quoting Brigadier-General White and adding that BEF recruits would be forwarded to New York 
while CEF recruits would be sent to Canada; LAC RG 24 Vol 23187 File ‘Imperial Depot Windsor Nova 
Scotia MD 6’, Part II Orders from 2 February 1918 to 25 April 1918 record recruits for the BEF, Jewish 
Legion (part of the BEF) and the Australian Imperial Force.
79 LAC MG 27 IID9 (Albert Edwin Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, Undated memorandum ca September 
1917 Appendix 1; LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 1 Vol 3, European War: Memorandum No. 4 rspecting 
Work of the Department of Militia and Defence from January 1. 1917 to December 3 L 1917 dated 6 
February 1918
80 RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, HQ British Recruiting Mission to Militia HQ 29 June 1917, Memorandum 
to Minister 20 June 1917; LAC MG 27 II D9 (Edward Albert Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, undated 
summary of BCRM ca September 1917
81 G 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, Superintendent of Immigration to Major-General Mewbum 14 June 1917
82 New York Times 19 June 1917 p.2 reported the arrival of Major Daly-Gingras and the purpose of his 
attachment to HQ BCRM; LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, OC Boston 
Depot to GOC BCRM 29 August 1917 with details of Father Doyon’s efforts in the New England states to 
recruit French-Canadians.
83 LAC RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, A/AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 23 July 1917.
84 TNA FO 115/2440, HQ BCRM to British Ambassador Washington 31 May 1918, Local Draft Board for 
Division 12 (Boston) to BCRM Boston 20 May 1918 claimed that the man in question had been drunk
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when he enlisted, Eastern Division BCRM to HQ BCRM 28 May 1918 noted that the recruit had been 
advised by the draft board to desert the CEF and his wife had brought in is uniform.
85 TNAFO 115/2440, BCRM Buffalo to Eastern Division BCRM 29 May 1918.
86 Willrich, Michael. City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 165
87 DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 2 File British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, ‘Synopsis of 
Recruits from the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission in the United States forwarded to Canada for the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force’ dated 12 March 1918. HQ BCRM in New York reported that 16,959 
recruits had been forwarded by 2 March 1918 but districts reported that only 16,043 men had actually 
arrived; LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-59-R Vol 4, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to District Record 
Officer 5 September 1918 noted that 13,627 BCRM recruits had been forwarded between 16 June 1917 and 
10 August 1918, but only 12,510 had arrived in Toronto.
88 LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Order Number 475 of 23 April 1918. The change meant that those 
who failed to report in Canada were deserters and could be prosecuted. Judging by the desertion rate of 
men sent to MD 2 commented on above, it seems the order had little effect.
89 LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, Statements of Recruits in New York 
City for week ending 14 July 1917,21 July 1917 and 28 July 1917. In all, 963 men were examined of 
whom 316 or 32.8% were rejected.
90 LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-1-59R Vols 1 and 2, weekly statements of BCRM recruits in MD2 1 
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- Annex A 
Chapter 5
General Health
Canadian-born and Immigrant Recruits 
As discussed previously, British National Service medical boards 
examined 2,425,184 men in 1917-1918 and found that only 55.6% were fit for overseas 
employment in one capacity or another. In contrast Canadian MSA boards examined 
275,480 men in 1917 and found that 60.3% were fit for overseas duty.1 On the surface 
therefore, Canadian males were somewhat healthier than their British counterparts. 
However, this is contradicted by the fact that, in general, immigrants, with the exception 
of those from non-English speaking countries, enlisted at a much higher rate than the 
Canadian-born.
Table 40
Enlistments by Place of Birth
Place of Birth Male Population Recruits Proportion of Males
Canada 2,819,442 318,728 11.3%
British Isles 470,061 228,170 48.5%
British possessions 31,077 9,416 30.3%
United States 168,728 35,599 21.1%
Other foreign bom 305,029 27,723 9.1%
Totals 3,794,337 619,636 16.3%
Notes: (1) Table 40 deals in relative proportions. No attempt has been made, 
therefore, to reduce the number of recruits by the estimated number of 
American residents. Nor has the number of those from enemy countries 
been deducted from the total of foreign bom.
(2) Officers, nursing sisters and other ranks are included.
About 80% of the CEF were volunteers, and enlistment depended to a large
degree on motivation. Patriotism, love of adventure, boredom and unemployment all
played a part. In the case of the British-born some may have been homesick or
disenchanted with life in Canada and were seeking free passage home. But these
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explanations are not entirely satisfactory given the difference in medical fitness between 
Britons and Canadians. A postwar study by the War Office claimed that “A very 
considerable proportion of the population in the Dominions is composed of emigrants 
from Great Britain who are for the most part of very good physical fitness.”3 Did medical 
fitness play a role in recruiting? :
Table 41
Recruits Processed in Toronto 
Week Ending 10 February 19174
Place of Birth ■''gmmwmsM Unfit Total Proportion Fit
Canada 103 69 172 59.9%
British Isles 56 28 84 66.7%
Other 22 6 28 78.6%
All Immigrants 78 34 112 69.6%
Totals 181 103 284 63.7%
The sample in Table 41 is too small and specific in terms of time and location to 
provide proof of the relative fitness of native-born Canadians and immigrants. However, 
the results are reinforced by statistics from the 1911 Census showing place of birth of 
males of all ages who were blind, deaf and dumb, insane or idiotic. Admittedly the 
conditions listed are limited, but the data may serve as a proxy for public health in 
general.
Table 42
Males of All Ages 
Infirmities 19115
Condition Canada British Isles Other All Immigrants
Blind 1,455 269 126 395
Deaf and Dumb 2,115 184 192 376
Insane 5,489 823 1,338 2,161
Idiotic 3,213 149 139 288
Total Afflicted 12,272 1,425 1,795 3,220
Male Population 2,849,442 470,061 508,603 978,664
Proportion Afflicted 0.43% 0.30% 0.35% 0.33%
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Not all who wished to immigrate to Canada did so. Arguably those who were sick, infirm 
or otherwise incapacitated would have had little energy with which to raise funds and 
arrange for passage to Canada. There were also rudimentary checks by immigration 
doctors. From April 1903 to March 1914 a total of 4,529 men and women were refused 
entry because they medically unfit. A further 2,334 were deported in the same time 
frame, also for medical reasons. Causes were varied: insanity, mental deficiency, 
tuberculosis, hernia, trachoma, poor eyesight, epilepsy, poor physique, general debility 
and general infirmity. The fact that the lead cause for rejection was trachoma (infectious
eye disease) suggests that the inspections were, at best, hasty and superficial.6 But, the
/
combination of physical ability and means to organize ocean passage to Canada together 
with medical checks at the port of entry probably combined to produce immigrants who 
were somewhat healthier the Canadian-born.
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